Liber de causis, proposition 1

Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa uniuersalis secunda

The proposition the whole book is built on, and the one place where the chain is visible end to end: two propositions of Proclus, an Arabic excerptor, a Latin translator, and two thirteenth-century readers, one of whom worked out what he was reading. Bardenhewer's concordance is followed exactly, including where it corrects Thomas.

What it drew on

ProclusElements of Theologyel.56, el.57paraphrase

Thomas names these two propositions as the source of this section, and Bardenhewer's table follows him: 'Es entsprechen unserm § 1, wie Thomas angibt, die §§ 56 und 57 des Lehrbuches.' Propositions are given in Creuzer's numbering.

prop 56 · creuzer page 88

Πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ τὰ δεύτερα παρήγετο. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ δεύτερον ὅλην ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ τοῦ παράγειν ἐκεῖθεν (καὶ γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις παρακτικαὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς παράγουσι, καὶ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν)· εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παράγειν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης αἰτίας ἔλαχε, παρ᾽ ἐκείνης ἔχει τὸ εἶναι αἴτιον, ὧν ἐστιν αἴτιον, μετρηθὲν ἐκεῖθεν κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν δύναμιν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ προϊόντα αἰτιατά ἐστι διὰ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ θάτερον ἀποτελέσαι αἴτιον, καὶ θάτερον αἰτιατὸν ἀποτελεῖ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἐκεῖθεν ἀποτελεῖται τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὅτι καὶ μειζόνως ἐκεῖθεν, δῆλον. Εἰ γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παράγειν αὐτὸ τῷ δευτέρῳ δέδωκεν, εἶχεν ἄρα πρώτως ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἐγέννα, τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου γεννᾶν δύναμιν ἐκεῖθεν λαβόν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐγένετο παρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μετάδοσιν καὶ πρώτως, μειζόνως αἴτιον ἐκεῖνο, τὸ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῆς γεννητικῆς τῷ ἐφεξῆς δυνάμεως μεταδεδωκός.

Everything that is produced by secondary things is also produced, in greater measure, by the prior and more causal things from which the secondary things too were produced. For if the secondary has its whole essence from what is prior to it, its power of producing also comes from there (for productive powers are in producers in accordance with their essence, and fill out their essence); and if it obtained the power of producing from the cause set above it, then it has from that cause its being a cause of the things it causes, measured from there by its power of giving hypostasis. And if this is so, the things that proceed from it are caused things because of what is prior to it. For to make the one a cause is also to make the other a caused thing; and if this is so, the caused thing too is made what it is from there. That it is so from there in greater measure is plain. For if it gave the secondary the cause of producing, then it had this cause primarily, and for that reason it generated the secondary as well, the secondary having received from there its power of generating. And if the one became productive by participation, while the other is productive by imparting and primarily, then that one is the cause in greater measure — the one that imparted the generative power to another, to what comes next after it.

Creuzer's note (1) records that codex A numbers this proposition νζ΄ (57) — a one-off numbering divergence in the manuscript, not in Creuzer's text. Note (8) confirms Portus had already conjectured ἄλλῳ, which is why Creuzer's facing Latin is a reworking of Portus rather than an independent version. Phase 3 translation notes. οὐσία is rendered 'essence' throughout the Greek units, to keep 'being' for τὸ ὄν and 'substance' for Latin substantia as the glossary requires. ὑποστατικὴ δύναμις is rendered 'power of giving hypostasis', holding the glossary's 'hypostasis' for the ὑπόστασις family rather than the smoother 'constitutive power'. In the last movement of the proof, ἐκεῖθεν λαβόν may attach either to the first cause or to the secondary; the English takes it of the secondary, which is how the argument runs.

Apparatus

(1) A. νζ.
(2) Adjeci καὶ ex A. Edit. παραγόμενον, ἀπὸ τ. πρ.
(3) A. πρακτικαί. perperam, ut saepius.
(4) Abest τὴν a cod. MS.
(5) Secutus sum codicem A. Edit. τῷ δευτέρῳ τοῦ παράγειν αὐτῷ.
(6) Ita A. Edit. γεννᾷ.
(7) Lectio codicis A. Edit. μετά.
(8) A. ἄλλῳ. Edit. ἄλλο. Sed illud jam conjecerat Portus.

creuzer_numeral=νς΄

Edition: Creuzer, Frankfurt, 1822 — Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta, Pars III
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prop 57 · creuzer page 90

Πᾶν αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. ᾗ γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον, τελειότερόν ἐστι καὶ δυνατώτερον τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτό· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πλειόνων αἴτιον. Δυνάμεως γὰρ μείζονος πλείω παράγειν· ἴσης δὲ τὰ ἴσα, καὶ τῆς ἐλάσσονος ἐλάσσω. Καὶ ἡ μὲν τὰ μείζονα ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις δυναμένη δύναμις καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσονα δύναται· ἡ δὲ τὰ ἐλάσσονα δυναμένη οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μείζω δυνήσεται. Εἰ οὖν δυνατώτερον τὸ αἴτιον, πλειόνων ἐστὶ παρακτικόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα δύναται τὸ αἰτιατόν, μειζόνως ἐκεῖνο δύναται. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως. Συνυφίστησιν ἄρα αὐτῷ πάντα, ὅσα πέφυκε παράγειν· εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ πρότερον παράγει, δῆλον δήπουθεν, ὅτι πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὴν παρακτικὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. ἅπαν ἄρα αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ ἄλλα ὑφίστησιν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν, ὅτι ὅσων μὲν αἰτία ψυχή, καὶ νοῦς αἴτιος. Οὐχ ὅσων δὲ νοῦς, καὶ ψυχὴ αἰτία· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖ. Καὶ ἃ δίδωσι ψυχὴ τοῖς δευτέροις, δίδωσι καὶ νοῦς μειζόνως. Καὶ μηκέτι ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης νοῦς ἐλλάμπει τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δόσεις, οἷς μὴ δέδωκε ψυχὴ ἑαυτήν. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄψυχον, καθόσον εἴδους μετέσχε, νοῦ μετέχει καὶ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ ποιήσεως.

Every cause both acts before the thing it causes and, after that thing, gives hypostasis to more things. For in so far as it is a cause, it is more complete and more powerful than what comes after it; and if so, it is the cause of more things. For it belongs to a greater power to produce more, to an equal power to produce equal things, and to a lesser power to produce less. And the power that is capable of the greater things among things of like kind is capable of the lesser as well, while the power capable of the lesser will not necessarily be capable of the greater. If, then, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more things. And indeed, whatever the thing it causes is capable of, the cause is capable of in greater measure. For everything that is produced by secondary things is produced in greater measure by the prior and more causal things. It therefore gives hypostasis, along with itself, to all that it is of a nature to produce; and if it also produces that thing first, it is surely plain that it acts before it, in accordance with its own productive activity. Every cause, therefore, acts before the thing it causes, and together with it, and after it gives hypostasis to other things. From this it is evident that of whatever soul is the cause, intellect is a cause as well. But soul is not the cause of everything intellect causes; intellect acts before soul as well. And what soul gives to secondary things, intellect gives too, in greater measure. And when soul is no longer acting, intellect still irradiates its own gifts upon the things to which soul has not given itself. For even a soulless thing, in so far as it has participated in form, participates in intellect and in intellect's making.

This proposition restates El. 56 verbatim inside its own proof (Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως) — which is why Aquinas cites 56 and 57 together as the source of LdC 1. Creuzer's note (1) again records codex A one number ahead (νη΄ = 58); the same +1 divergence stands at El. 56, so it is a running feature of codex A here, not an isolated slip. Phase 3 translation note. The sentence Creuzer prints inside this proof is El. 56's own lemma, and the English repeats El. 56's English word for word so that the self-citation is visible on the page. ἐλλάμπειν is rendered 'irradiate' here and at El. 70.

Apparatus

(1) A. νη.
(2) εἰ adjeci ex A. hac sententia: »et si hoc locum habet.«
(3) Edit. ἡ μὲν μείζονα. Ego articulum adjeci ex cod. A.
(4) A. μὴν καὶ ὅσα.
(5) A. μετ᾽ αὐτό· ἄλλα.
(6) Exhibui lectionem codicis A. In editione deest τοῖς ante δευτέροις et νοῦς ante μειζόνως. Hoc in paraphrasi sua jam expresserat Portus.
(7) A. μετέσχε. Tum τῆς τοῦ νοῦ. Hoc recepi. Argumentum quod attinet cf. Proclum in Platonis Theolog. I. 13 p. 35. II. 4. cum Scholio p. 89 sq. et III. 7. p. 131 sq. ubi, Parmenidis, Platonis, Plotini, aliorum sententiae examinantur.

creuzer_numeral=νζ΄

Edition: Creuzer, Frankfurt, 1822 — Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta, Pars III
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Translator: Wroot Press draft

ProclusElements of Theologyel.70paraphrase

Bardenhewer adds this one on his own account — 'Vgl. indessen auch noch § 70' — because El. 70, not 56 or 57, carries the being / living / human example that this section actually develops.

prop 70 · creuzer page 108-110

Πᾶν τὸ ὁλικώτερον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγικοῖς, καὶ πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν εἰς τὰ μετέχοντα ἐλλάμπει· καὶ δευτέρας ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τι μετασχόν. Καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται πρὸ τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐκείνου παρουσίᾳ πάρεστι. καὶ ἐκείνου μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦντος ἔτι πάρεστι καὶ ἐνεργεῖ τὸ αἰτιώτερον· καὶ οὐκ ἐν διαφόροις μόνοις ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ποτὲ μετεχόντων. Δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῷον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον. Καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔτι ἔστιν ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως· ζῷον δ᾽ ἔστιν ἔμπνεον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον· καὶ τοῦ ζῆν πάλιν ἀπολιπόντος μένει τὸ ὄν· εἰ γάρ, ὅταν μὴ ζῇ, τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων ὡσαύτως. Αἴτιον δέ, ὅτι δραστικώτερον ὑπάρχον τὸ αἰτιώτερον, πρότερον εἰς τὸ μετέχον ἐνεργεῖ. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου προτέρου πάσχει· καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου πάλιν ἐνεργοῦντος κἀκεῖνο συνεργεῖ. Διότι πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν ποιῇ τὸ δεύτερον, συναπογεννᾷ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ αἰτιώτερον. Καὶ ἀπολιπόντος ἐκείνου τοῦτο ἔτι πάρεστιν. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου μετάδοσις, δρῶσα μειζόνως, ὑστέρα τὸ μετασχὸν ἀπολείπει. Καὶ γὰρ διὰ τῆς τοῦ δευτέρου μεταδόσεως τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἔλλαμψιν ἐδυνάμωσεν.

Everything that is more universal among the originative principles irradiates the things that participate in it before the more particular principles do; and it leaves what has participated later than they do. For it begins its activity toward secondary things before that which comes after it does, and it is present along with that thing's presence; and when that thing is no longer acting, the more causal is still present and still acts. And this not only in different subjects, but in each single one of the things that participate at any time. For a thing must (to take an example) first come to be being, then a living thing, then a human being. And when the rational power has departed it is no longer a human being, though it is a living thing, breathing and perceiving; and when life in turn has departed, being remains: for when it does not live, to be is still present. It is the same in every case. The reason is that the more causal, being more effective, acts upon the participant first. For the same thing is acted upon first by the more powerful; and when the secondary in its turn acts, the more causal works along with it, because whatever the secondary makes, the more causal joins in generating it. And when the secondary has departed, the more causal is still present. For the imparting of the more powerful, since it acts in greater measure, leaves what has participated later. Indeed it was through the imparting of the secondary that it strengthened its own irradiation.

THE key ancestor for LdC 1. The being/living/human sequence here (Δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῷον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον ... ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως) is what LdC 1 develops as 'oportet ut sit res esse in primis, deinde uiuum, postea homo ... quando remoues uirtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet uiuum, spirans, sensibile'. Bardenhewer adds 70 to Thomas's 56+57 precisely for this. ⚠ Bardenhewer quotes the lemma as πρὸ τῶν μεριστῶν; the plate reads πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν. The plate governs. Creuzer's note (4) cross-refers Dionysius, De divinis nominibus V.5 — a ready-made bridge to Crux Set C. Phase 3 translation notes. (a) The lemma's last clause as Creuzer prints it — καὶ δευτέρας ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τι μετασχόν — will not construe; the English follows the sense the proof's own closing sentence supplies (ὑστέρα τὸ μετασχὸν ἀπολείπει), 'and it leaves what has participated later than they do', and the Greek is left exactly as printed. (b) The English holds the LdC 1 chain word for word: ὄν / esse = 'being', ζῷον / uiuum = 'a living thing', ἄνθρωπος / homo = 'a human being', λογικὴ δύναμις / uirtus rationalis = 'the rational power'. ζῷον is therefore 'a living thing' and not 'an animal' here, because LdC 1 uses uiuum for this member of the sequence and keeps animal for a separate step of its own argument. (c) εἰ γάρ, ὅταν μὴ ζῇ, τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι is printed without an apodosis; rendered as the flat statement the argument needs.

Apparatus

(4) A. ἀρχηγικοῖς et hoc recepi. Edit. ἀρχηγοῖς. Dionys. Areopag. de divinn. nomm. V. 5 p. 691: Πάντων οὖν εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχηγικώτερον, ὡς ὢν ὁ θεός κτλ. qui totus locus cum nostro conferri debet.
(5) A. δεύτερον ἐκεῖνο »et posterius illud« non male. Sed tamen vulgatam mutare nolui, quoniam philosophus hoc perspicuitati tribuere potuit, ut accusativum feminini generis usurparet. Intelligendum autem est αἰτίας vel ἐλλάμψεις.
(6) A. ἐκείνη μηκέτι ἐνεργοῖτο.
(7) A. μόνον. non male.
(8) Ed. οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀπολειπούσης. Sed et antecedentia et sequentia favent lectioni Argentinae; quam praestiti.

creuzer_numeral=ο΄ · apparatus for the continuation on p.110 (notes 1-5 of that page) not yet transcribed - crop excluded the page foot

Edition: Creuzer, Frankfurt, 1822 — Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta, Pars III
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Translator: Wroot Press draft

Anonymous (Kalam fi mahd al-khair)Kalam fi mahd al-khair (Arabic Liber de causis)§ 1, Bardenhewer 1882, Arabic texttranslationnode only

The Arabic through which the Greek reached the Latin. Node only per ruling 6: no Arabic text is carried in the pilot.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882 — Arabic text with Latin and German translation
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Attribution: Stated: Aristotle (in the wider doxographic tradition that also produced the Theology of Aristotle). Critical: Anonymous compiler, excerpting and paraphrasing Proclus's Elements of Theology. Bardenhewer's edition itself untangles the Kalam from any Aristotelian ascription, but the work circulated in the same Arabic doxographic environment as the (pseudo-)Aristotelian Theology and was read there as part of the Aristotelian corpus before Bardenhewer traced its propositions to Proclus. This is one of the five named disputed-attribution cases in PHASES.md Phase 1 step 4.

The text

prop bardenhewer 1 · pattin prop 1 · bardenhewer page 163-164

Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa uniuersalis secunda: cum ergo remouet causa uniuersalis secunda uirtutem suam a re, causa uniuersalis prima non aufert uirtutem suam ab ea. quod est quia causa uniuersalis prima agit in causatum causae secundae antequam agat in ipsum causa uniuersalis secunda quae sequitur ipsum. cum ergo agit causa secunda quae sequitur causatum, non excusatur ipsius actio a causa prima quae est supra ipsam, et quando separatur causa secunda a causato quod sequitur ipsam, non separatur ab eo prima quae est supra ipsam quoniam est causa ei. Et nos quidem exemplificamus illud per esse et uiuum et hominem. quod est quia oportet ut sit res esse in primis, deinde uiuum, postea homo. uiuum ergo est causa hominis propinqua, et esse est causa eius longinqua. esse ergo uehementius est causa homini quam uiuum, quoniam est causa uiuo quod est causa homini. et similiter quando ponis rationalitatem causam homini, est esse uehementius causa homini quam rationalitas, quoniam est causa causae eius. et illius quod dicimus significatio est quod quando remoues uirtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet uiuum, spirans, sensibile. et quando remoues ab eo uiuum, non remanet uiuum, et remanet esse, quoniam esse non remouetur ab eo, sed remouetur uiuum, quoniam causa non remouetur per remotionem causati sui. remanet ergo homo esse. cum ergo non est indiuiduum homo, est animal, et si non est animal, est esse tantum. Jam ergo manifestum est et planum quod causa prima longinqua est plus comprehendens et uehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua. et propter illud fit eius operatio uehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam operatio causae propinquae. et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc nisi quia res in primis non patitur nisi a uirtute longinqua, deinde patitur secundo a uirtute quae est sub prima. et causa prima adiuuat secundam causam super operationem suam, quoniam omnem operationem quam causa efficit secunda, prima etiam causa efficit, uerumtamen efficit eam per modum alium altiorem et sublimiorem. et quando remouetur causa secunda a causato suo, non remouetur ab eo causa prima, quoniam causa prima est maioris et uehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam causa propinqua. et non figitur causatum causae secundae nisi per uirtutem causae primae. quod est quia causa secunda quando facit rem, influit causa prima quae est supra ipsam super illam rem de uirtute sua, quare adhaeret illud rei adhaerentia uehementi et seruat eam. iam ergo manifestum est et planum quod causa longinqua est uehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua quae sequitur eam, et quod ipsa influit uirtutem suam super eam et seruat eam et non separatur ab ea separatione suae causae propinquae, immo remanet in ea et adhaeret ei adhaerentia uehementi, secundum quod ostendimus et exposuimus.

Every primary cause pours more into the thing it causes than does a universal second cause. When, therefore, the universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take away its own power from it. This is because the universal first cause acts upon what the second cause causes before the universal second cause which follows it acts upon it. When, therefore, the second cause which follows the caused thing acts, its action is not exempted from the first cause which is above it; and when the second cause is separated from the caused thing which follows it, the first cause which is above it is not separated from that thing, since it is a cause to it. And we for our part illustrate this by being and the living thing and the human being. This is because a thing must first be being, then a living thing, then a human being. The living thing, therefore, is the proximate cause of the human being, and being is its remote cause. Being, therefore, is more strongly the cause of the human being than the living thing is, since it is the cause of the living thing which is the cause of the human being. And likewise, when you posit rationality as the cause of the human being, being is more strongly the cause of the human being than rationality is, since it is the cause of its cause. And the sign of what we say is this: that when you remove the rational power from the human being, the human being does not remain, and there remains a living thing, breathing, capable of sensation. And when you remove the living thing from it, the living thing does not remain, and being remains — since being is not removed from it, but the living thing is removed, because a cause is not removed by the removal of the thing it causes. The human being, therefore, remains as being. When, therefore, the individual is not a human being, it is an animal; and if it is not an animal, it is being only. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote first cause embraces more and is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause is. And for that reason its operation clings to the thing more strongly than the operation of the proximate cause does. And this comes about in this way only because a thing is first acted upon by nothing but the remote power, and is then acted upon, secondly, by the power which is under the first. And the first cause aids the second cause in its operation, since every operation which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects — yet it effects it in another way, higher and more sublime. And when the second cause is removed from the thing it causes, the first cause is not removed from it, since the first cause clings to the thing with a greater and stronger adherence than the proximate cause does. And what the second cause causes is not held fast except through the power of the first cause. This is because, when the second cause makes a thing, the first cause which is above it pours into that thing from its own power, so that it clings to the thing with a strong adherence and preserves it. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote cause is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause which follows it, and that it pours its own power into the thing and preserves it, and is not separated from it when its proximate cause is separated from it; rather it remains in it and clings to it with a strong adherence, as we have shown and set forth.

⚠ The archive.org OCR layer reads 'causa eins longinqua' here; the plate reads eius. That single class of error (ei-/ein- for eiu-) recurs through the volume, so no section of this text may be shipped from the OCR layer unverified. Phase 3 translation notes. (a) The chain this section shares with El. 70 is held word for word across the two benches: esse / ὄν = 'being', uiuum / ζῷον = 'a living thing', homo / ἄνθρωπος = 'a human being', uirtus rationalis / λογικὴ δύναμις = 'the rational power'. uiuum is therefore 'a living thing' and not 'an animal', because this section itself uses animal for a separate step ('cum ergo non est indiuiduum homo, est animal'), and the English keeps the two Latin words apart so that shift stays visible. (b) esse is rendered 'being' throughout, as the glossary permits; where the text needs the infinitive force it is still 'being' rather than 'to be', because the parallel with El. 70's τὸ ὄν is the point of the page. (c) uehementius is 'more strongly' where the Greek's μειζόνως is 'in greater measure' — two different words in two languages, kept distinct rather than harmonised. (d) Aquinas's lemma reads excluditur where Bardenhewer prints excusatur, and super where Bardenhewer prints supra; the English follows Bardenhewer's text ('is not exempted from', 'above it'). (e) 'cum ergo agit causa secunda quae sequitur causatum' is difficult: elsewhere in this section it is the caused thing that follows the cause ('causato quod sequitur ipsam'), so quae sequitur causatum reads against the section's own usage. Translated literally as printed.

Apparatus

(1) [p.163] 3 supra a α
(2) [p.163] 4 secunda uniuersalis b β ‖ enim für ergo b β
(3) [p.163] 4—5 secunda uniuersalis b β
(4) [p.163] 6 quod für quia b
(5) [p.163] 9 sequitur in causatum a ‖ secunda in causatum quod ipsam sequitur b β ‖ excusat a
(6) [p.163] 10 super eam a α ‖ causa fehlt a b β
(7) [p.163] 11 ipsum α ‖ ea α
(8) [p.163] 12 ipsum a b β ‖ quoniam fehlt a
(9) [p.163] 13 exemplificabimus b β
(10) [p.163] 14 quod est für ut sit a ‖ esse fehlt a ‖ in primo a
(11) [p.163] 15 causa hominis est b β
(12) [p.163] 16 est fehlt a b β ‖ est für eius b β
(13) [p.163] 16—17 esse igitur causa est uehementius homini b β
(14) [p.163] 17 quae für quod b
(15) [p.163] 18 rationalitatem esse a α: rationale ohne essè b β
(16) [p.163] 19 esse est causa uehementius homini b β
(17) [p.163] 20 eius esse für causae eius a b β ‖ dicimus fehlt α ‖ signum b α β
(18) [p.163] 21 tu remoues b β
(19) [p.163] 22 cum autem für et quando a α
(20) [p.163] 23 remoues uiuum ab illo, non b β ‖ remanet tamen esse b β
(21) [p.163] 25 causati sui, scilicet (secundum β) causae secundae id est uiui b β ‖ ergo fehlt a
(22) [p.164] 1 hominis b β: homini α ‖ cum ergo nunc est homo indiuiduum, homo non est animal a
(23) [p.164] 2 tamen für tantum a α
(24) [p.164] 3 igitur b β
(25) [p.164] 3—4 et longinqua b β
(26) [p.164] 4 uehementius est causa α
(27) [p.164] 6 operatio fehlt a α ‖ quod für hoc a
(28) [p.164] 7 quidem fehlt a β ‖ sine für secundum α ‖ non fit nisi secundum hoc quod in primis res non β
(29) [p.164] 8 secundo fehlt b β: secunda a
(30) [p.164] 9 sub causa prima β ‖ causam secundam a
(31) [p.164] 9—10 operationem suam, quoniam omnem fehlt a
(32) [p.164] 10 omnem fehlt b β
(33) [p.164] 10—11 quam secunda efficit (ohne causa) b β
(34) [p.164] 11 prima ibi efficit a: et prima efficit b β ‖ medium (für modum) α
(35) [p.164] 13 causa fehlt a ‖ causa prima ab eo b β
(36) [p.164] 14 uehementioris et maioris b β
(37) [p.164] 15 fingitur a b β: dicitur α ‖ esse für causae α
(38) [p.164] 16—17 causa secunda. alias quando efficit rem. influit a causa prima. non efficit rem. sed influit a causa b: causa secunda non efficit rem, sed influit a causa β
(39) [p.164] 17 eam für ipsam a
(40) [p.164] 18 sua qua adheret ei adherentia b β
(41) [p.164] 19 igitur b β
(42) [p.164] 19—20 uehementius est b β
(43) [p.164] 21 causam für eam b β ‖ conseruat ipsam α
(44) [p.164] 22 causae suae b β
(45) [p.164] 23 in ea haec adherentia b β

Edition: Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: none
Translator: Wroot Press draft

In the thread Proclus to Aquinas, step i of v.

What drew on it

Thomas AquinasSuper Librum de causislect.1commentary

Aquinas's Lectio I, plate-verified. His lemma is not Bardenhewer's text — the two translation branches diverge in five places in this proposition alone — and the lemma is shown as he prints it rather than harmonised.

lectio 1 · prop bardenhewer 1 · parma page 717-719 · leaf n730-n732

Quamdam propositionem praemittit loco principii ad totum tractatum.

LemmaOmnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda. Cum ergo removet causa universalis secunda virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea. Quod est, quia causa universalis prima agit in causatum causae secundae antequam agat in ipsum causa universalis secunda, quae sequitur ipsum. Cum ergo agit causa secunda, quae sequitur causatum, non excluditur ipsius actio a causa prima, quae est super eam; et quando separatur causa secunda a causato, quae sequitur ipsum, non separatur ab ea prima causa, quae est supra ipsam; quoniam est causa ei. Et nos quidem exemplificamus illud per esse, et vivum, et hominem. Quod est, quia oportet ut sit res esse primo, deinde vivum, postea homo. Vivum ergo est causa hominis propinqua, et esse est causa ejus longinqua; esse ergo vehementius est causa homini quam vivum: quoniam est causa vivo, quod est causa homini. Et similiter quando ponis rationalitatem esse causam hominis, est esse vehementius causa homini magis quam rationalitas, quoniam est causa causae ejus. Et illius quod significatio est: quoniam quando removes virtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet vivum spirans sensibile. Cum autem removes ab eo vivum, et remanet esse, quoniam esse non removetur ab eo, sed removetur vivum, quoniam causa non removetur per remotionem causati sui. Remanet ergo adhuc esse. Cum ergo individuum non est homo, est animal; et si non est animal, est esse tantum. Jam ergo manifestum est et planum, quod causa longinqua est prima, et prima est plus comprehendens et vehementius causa rei, quam causa propinqua. Et propter id fit ejus operatio vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re, quam operatio causae propinquae. Et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc, nisi quia res in primis non patitur nisi a virtute longinqua. Deinde patitur a secunda virtute, quae est sub prima. Et causa prima adjuvat secundam causam super operationem suam; quoniam omnem operationem, quam causa efficit secunda, prima etiam causa efficit. Verumtamen efficit eam per modum altiorem et sublimiorem. Et quando removetur causa secunda a causato suo, non removetur ab eo causa prima; quoniam causa prima est majoris et vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re, quam causa propinqua. Et non fit igitur causatum causae secundae, nisi per virtutem causae primae: quod est, quia causa secunda quando facit rem, influit causa prima, quae est supra eam, super illam rem de virtute sua. Quare adhaeret illud rei adhaerentia vehementi, et servat eam. Jam ergo manifestum et planum, quod causa longinqua est vehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua, quae sequitur rem: et quod ipsa influit virtutem suam super eam et conservat ipsam, et non separatur ab ea separatione suae causae propinquae, immo remanet in ea, et adhaeret ei adhaerentia vehementi, secundum quod ostendimus et exposuimus.

Sicut Philosophus dicit in decimo Ethicorum, ultima felicitas hominis consistit in optima hominis operatione quae est supremae potentiae, idest intellectus, respectu optimi intelligibilis. Quia vero effectus per causam cognoscitur, manifestum est quod causa secundum sui naturam est magis intelligibilis quam effectus: etsi aliquando quo ad nos effectus sint notiores causis, propter hoc quod ex particularibus sub sensu cadentibus universalium et intelligibilium causarum cognitionem accepimus. Oportet igitur, quod, simpliciter loquendo, primae rerum causae sint secundum se maxima et optima intelligibilia, eo quod sunt maxima entia et maxima vera, cum sint aliis essentiae et veritatis causa, ut patet per Philosophum in secundo Metaphysicorum; quamvis hujus primae causae sint minus et posterius notae quoad nos. Habet enim se ad ea intellectus noster sicut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, quam propter excedentem claritatem perfecte percipere non potest. Oportet igitur quod ultima felicitas hominis quae in hac vita haberi potest, consistat in consideratione primarum causarum; quia illud modicum quod de eis sciri potest, est magis amabile et nobilius omnibus his quae de rebus inferioribus cognosci possunt, ut patet per Philosophum in primo de Partibus animalium. Et quia haec cognitio in nobis perficitur post hanc vitam, homo perfecte beatus constituitur, secundum illud Evangelii: «Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum verum vivum.» Et inde est, quod philosophorum intentio ad hoc principaliter erat, ut per omnia quae in rebus considerabant ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirent. Unde scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cujus considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae deputarent. Primo quidem incipientes a logica, quae modum scientiarum tradit. Secundo procedentes ad mathematicas: cujus etiam pueri possunt esse capaces. Tertio ad naturalem philosophiam, quae propter experientiam tempore indiget. Quarto ad moralem philosophiam: cujus juvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest. Ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant, quae considerat primas entium causas. Inveniuntur igitur quaedam de primis principiis conscripta per diversas propositiones distincta, quasi per modum sigillatim considerantium aliquas veritates. Et in graeco quidem invenitur, scilicet traditus liber Proculi Platonici, continens ducentas et novem propositiones, qui intitulatur Elevatio theologica. In arabico vero invenitur hic liber, qui apud latinos de Causis dicitur, quem constat de arabico esse translatum, et in graeco penitus non haberi. Unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum arabum ex praedicto libro Proculi excerptus; praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo. Intentio igitur hujus libri, quod de causis dicitur, est determinare de primis causis rerum: et quia nomen causae ordinem quemdam importat, et in causis ordo ad invicem invenitur, praemittit quasi quoddam principium totius sequentis operis quamdam propositionem, ad ordinem earum pertinentem, quae talis est. Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis. Ad cujus manifestationem unum corollarium inducit, per quod manifestatur primum sicut per quoddam signum. Unde subdit: Cum ergo removet causa universalis virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea: et ad hujus probationem inducit secundum: dicens quod est quia universalis causa prima agit in causatum causae secundae, antequam agat in ipsum causa universalis secunda. Et ex hoc concludit quod secundo positum est; et convenienter. Necessarium est enim, id quod prius advenit, ultimo abscedere. Videmus enim quae sunt priora in compositione esse ultima in resolutione. Sic igitur intentio hujus propositionis in his tribus consistit. Quorum primum est, quod causa prima plus influit in effectum quam secunda. Secundum est quod impressio causae primae tardius recedit ab effectu. Tertium est, quod prius ei advenit. Quae quidem tria praedicta proponit in duabus propositionibus. Primum in prima propositione sui libri, quae est talis: Omne quod producitur a secundis causis prioribus et universalioribus producitur eminentius, a quibus et secunda producebantur. Alia vero ponit in sequenti propositione, quae talis est: Omnis causa et ante causatum operatur, et post ipsum plurium est subsistentium. His autem tribus praemissis, ad ea manifestanda procedit. Primo quidem per exemplum. Secundo per rationem, ibi, «Et causa prima adjuvat.» Exemplum autem videtur pertinere ad causas formales, in quibus quanto forma est universalior, tanto prior esse videtur. Si igitur accipiamus aliquem hominem, forma quidem specifica ejus attenditur in hoc quod est rationabilis. Forma autem generis ejus attenditur in hoc quod est vivum vel animal. Ulterius autem id quod est omnibus commune est esse. Manifestum est autem in generatione unius particularis hominis, quod in naturali subjecto primo invenitur esse, deinde invenitur vivum, postmodum autem est homo: prius enim ipse est animal quam homo, ut dicitur in secundo de Generatione animalium. Rursus, quia in via corruptionis primo amittit usum rationis et remanet vivum et spiratio; secundo amittit vivum et spirans, et remanet ipsum ens, quia sic corrumpitur in nihilum. Et sic potest intelligi hoc exemplum secundum viam generationis et corruptionis alicujus individui. Et haec est ejus intentio: quod patet ex hoc quod dicit: Cum ergo individuum non est homo, idest secundum actum proprium hominis, est animal, quia adhuc remanet in eo operatio animalis, quae consistit in motu et sensu; et cum non est animal, est esse tamen, quia remanet corpus penitus inanimatum. Verificatur hoc exemplum in ipso rerum ordine: nam priora sunt entia in viventibus et viventia hominibus; quia remoto homine non removetur animal secundum continentiam, sed e converso: quia si non est animal non est homo: et eadem ratio est de animali et esse. Secundo ibi «et causa prima» Probat tria praedicta per rationem. Primum autem, scilicet quod causa prima plus influat quam secunda, sic probat. Eminentius convenit aliquid causae quam causato. Sed operatio qua secunda causa causat effectum, causatur a causa prima. Nam causa prima adjuvat causam secundam faciens eam operari. Ergo hujus operationis secundum quam effectus producitur a causa secunda, magis est causa prima quam causa secunda. Proculus autem expressius hoc sic probat. Causa enim secunda, cum sit effectus causae primae, substantiam suam habet a causa prima. Sed a quo habet aliquid substantiam, ab eo habet potentiam sive virtutem operandi. Ergo causa secunda habet potentiam sive virtutem operandi a causa prima. Sed causa secunda per suam potentiam vel virtutem est causa effectus. Ergo hoc ipsum quod causa secunda sit causa effectus, habet a prima causa: esse ergo causam effectus inest primo primae causae, secundo autem causae secundae. Quod autem est prius in omnibus, est magis, quia perfectiora sunt priora naturaliter. Ergo prima causa est magis causa effectus quam causa secunda. Secundum, scilicet quod impressio causae primae tardius recedit ab effectu, Probat ibi «et quando removetur» Et inducit talem rationem. Quod vehementius inest, magis inhaeret. Sed prima causa vehementius imprimit in effectu quam causa secunda, ut probatum est. Ergo ejus impressio magis inhaeret, ergo tardius recedit. Tertium, scilicet quod prius adveniat, Probat ibi «et non fit igitur» Tali ratione. Causa secunda non agit in causatum suum nisi virtute causae primae. Ergo et causatum non procedit a causa secunda nisi per virtutem causae primae. Sic ergo virtus causae primae dat effectum secundae, ut attingatur a virtute causae secundae. Prima enim attingitur a virtute causae primae. Hoc autem uno modo Proculus sic probat. Causa prima est magis causa quam secunda; ergo est perfectioris virtutis. Sed quanto virtus alicujus causae est perfectior, tanto ad plura se extendit; ergo virtus causae primae ad plura se extendit quam virtus causae secundae. Sed id quod in pluribus est, prius est etiam in adveniendo, et ultimum in recedendo; ergo impressio causae primae primo advenit et ultimo recedit. Est autem considerandum in quibus causis haec propositio habeat virtutem. Et si quidem ad genera causarum quaestio referatur, manifestum est quod habet veritatem in quolibet genere causarum suo modo. Et in causis quidem formalibus, exemplum inductum est. In causis autem materialibus similis ratio invenitur. Nam id quod primo subsistit ut materia, causa est propinquiori modo, ut et ipsa materialiter subsistat; sicut materia prima elementis, quae sunt quodammodo materia mixtorum corporum. Ostenditur idem esse et in efficientibus causis. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua causa efficiens est prior, tanto ejus virtus ad plura se extendit. Inde oportet ut proprius effectus ejus communior sit: causae vero secundae proprius effectus in paucioribus invenitur, unde et particularior est. Ipsa enim causa prima producit vel movet causam secundo agentem, et sic fit ei causa ut agat. Inveniuntur igitur praedicta tria, quae tacta sunt, primordialiter quidem in causis efficientibus, et ex hoc manifestum est quod derivatur ad causas formales: unde et hic ponitur verbum influendi, et Proculus utitur verbo productionis quae exprimit causalitatem causae efficientis. Quod autem ex causis efficientibus derivetur ad causas materiales, non est adeo manifestum, eo quod causae efficientes, quae sunt apud nos, non producunt materiam sed formam. Sed si consideremus causas universales cum quibus procedunt et materialia rerum principia, necesse est quod hic ordo derivetur et ad materiales causas ex causis efficientibus. Quia enim primae causae et supremae causae efficacia seu causalitas ad plura se extendit, necessarium est quod id quod primo subsistit in omnibus sit a prima omnium causa, deinde a causis secundis adduntur dispositiones, quibus materiae appropriantur singulis rebus. Quod etiam utcumque in his, quae apud nos sunt, apparet. Nam omnibus artificialibus materiam primam exhibet natura. Deinde per artes quasdam priores materia disponitur, ut congruat particularibus artificiis. Comparatur enim prima omnium causa ad totam naturam, sicut natura ad artem. Unde id quod primo subsistit in tota natura, est prima omnium causa quae appropriatur singulis rebus officio secundarum causarum. In causis etiam finalibus manifestum est verificari omnia praedicta. Nam propter ultimum finem qui est universalis, alii fines appetuntur, quorum appetitus advenit post appetitum ultimi finis, et ante ipsum cessat: sed et hujus ordinis ratio ad genus causae efficientis reducitur. Nam finis inquantum est causa inquantum movet efficientem ad agendum; et sic prout habet rationem moventis pertinet quodammodo ad causae efficientis genus. Si autem quaeratur in unoquoque causarum genere, utrum praedicta verificentur in omnibus causis quomodolibet ordinatis, manifestum est quod non. Invenimus enim causas ordinari dupliciter. Uno modo per se, alio modo per accidens. Per se quidem, intentio primae causae respicit usque ad ultimum effectum per omnes causas medias. Sicut enim ars fabri movet manum, manus martellum, qui ferrum percussum excedit, ad quod fertur intentio artis. Per accidens autem quando intentio causae non procedit nisi ad proximum effectum. Quod autem ab illo effectu efficiatur iterum aliud, est praeter intentionem primi efficientis; sicut cum aliquis accendat candelam, praeter intentionem ejus est quod iterum accensa candela accendat aliam, et illa aliam. Quod autem praeter intentionem est, dicimus esse per accidens. In causis igitur per se ordinatis haec propositio habet veritatem, in quibus causa prima movet omnes causas medias ad effectum. In causis autem ordinatis per accidens, est e converso. Nam effectus qui per se producitur a causa proxima, per accidens producitur a causa prima, praeter intentionem ejus existens. Quod autem est per se, potius est eo quod est per accidens. Et ad hoc significandum dicit, Causa universalis est causa per se.

English not yet written

Aquinas's lemma is NOT Bardenhewer's text. At this proposition alone the Parma text reads 'supra causatum suum' (Bardenhewer: 'super'), 'non excluditur ipsius actio' (Bardenhewer: 'excusatur'), 'a causa prima quae est super eam' (Bardenhewer: 'supra ipsam'), 'oportet ut sit res esse primo' (Bardenhewer: 'in primis') and 'rationalitatem esse causam hominis' (Bardenhewer: 'rationalitatem causam homini'). These are the divergence between the translation branches, not OCR noise, and the crux page shows them rather than harmonising them. — In the proem Parma prints 'liber Proculi Platonici, continens ducentas et novem propositiones, qui intitulatur Elevatio theologica': the spelling 'Proculi', the count 209 (the Elements has 211) and the title 'Elevatio' for 'Elementatio' are all Parma's printed readings, verified on the plate 2026-09-09 and left exactly as printed. A former owner of this copy has written '2 Elementatio' in pencil at the foot of p.718 and keyed it to 'Elevatio' with a superscript 2; the hand is not the edition and is recorded here so that a later vision pass does not read it as printed text.

Apparatus

(1) [p.718, left column foot] Lege hujusmodi.
(1) [p.718, right column foot] Lege: nam priora sunt entia viventibus.
(2) [p.718, right column foot] Lege convenit.

verified_against_plate=true (leaves n730-n732 = printed pp.717-719, item sanctithomaeaqu21thom) · translation pending: Phase 3 translated the twenty-one Proclus and Liber de causis units only; this descendant witness ships in Latin, per notes/PHASE-5-REPORT.md.

Edition: Parma, Parma, 1852-1873 — Opera omnia (Parma/Vives)
Digital base: Saffrey 1954 base text (Corpus Thomisticum); Parma/Vives 19th-c. text is the actual PD ingestion source (Corpus Thomisticum, finding aid only, not embedded [ruling 5])
OCR status: none
Translator: — pending

Albert the GreatDe causis et processu universitatislib. II, tract. I, cap. V (Borgnet vol. 10)commentarynode only

Albert does not gloss the Liber de causis lemma by lemma; he argues its positions in his own order and his own words. Cap. V restates this proposition's thesis almost verbatim in its title. Node only per ruling 9: the block is lightly-cleaned OCR, not plate-verified.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: Borgnet, Paris, 1891 — Opera omnia
OCR status: none

Translated and read

Thomas TaylorElements of Theology (in Six Books of Proclus)props. 56, 57, 70 (Theology of Plato vol. 2, 1816)translationnode only

Taylor's English Elements is appended to volume 2 of his Theology of Plato (1816). Its scan OCRs badly and it has not been extracted, so it stands as a node. It is not only a later English version: Creuzer's own apparatus quotes and weighs Taylor, and at El. 201 adopts his reading against both the printed edition and codex A.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: Taylor, London, 1816
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: raw

ProclusElements of Theology (Portus's Latin)props. 56, 57, 70 (Hamburg 1618)translationnode only

Portus's Latin Elements is printed in the 1618 Hamburg volume (confirmed from its preface) but has not yet been located within the scan, so it stands as a node. Creuzer's facing Latin is a reworking of Portus and may never be quoted as his.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: Aemilius Portus, Hamburg, 1618
Scan: archive.org
OCR status: none

William of MoerbekeElementatio theologica (Latin translation of Proclus's Elements)props. 56, 57, 70translationnode only

William of Moerbeke's Latin Elements (1268) is the version the Latin west read beside the Liber de causis, and is what let Aquinas identify the source. Node only per ruling 6: no public-domain edition of it exists.

No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.

Edition: 1268
OCR status: none

What is not here

Aquinas's Lectio I is the only descendant carrying text. Its English is not yet written: Phase 3 translated the twenty-one Proclus and Liber de causis units only.

This page is draft — the English on it has not yet been through review.