Liber de causis

prop bardenhewer 1 · pattin prop 1 · bardenhewer page 163-164

Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa uniuersalis secunda: cum ergo remouet causa uniuersalis secunda uirtutem suam a re, causa uniuersalis prima non aufert uirtutem suam ab ea. quod est quia causa uniuersalis prima agit in causatum causae secundae antequam agat in ipsum causa uniuersalis secunda quae sequitur ipsum. cum ergo agit causa secunda quae sequitur causatum, non excusatur ipsius actio a causa prima quae est supra ipsam, et quando separatur causa secunda a causato quod sequitur ipsam, non separatur ab eo prima quae est supra ipsam quoniam est causa ei. Et nos quidem exemplificamus illud per esse et uiuum et hominem. quod est quia oportet ut sit res esse in primis, deinde uiuum, postea homo. uiuum ergo est causa hominis propinqua, et esse est causa eius longinqua. esse ergo uehementius est causa homini quam uiuum, quoniam est causa uiuo quod est causa homini. et similiter quando ponis rationalitatem causam homini, est esse uehementius causa homini quam rationalitas, quoniam est causa causae eius. et illius quod dicimus significatio est quod quando remoues uirtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet uiuum, spirans, sensibile. et quando remoues ab eo uiuum, non remanet uiuum, et remanet esse, quoniam esse non remouetur ab eo, sed remouetur uiuum, quoniam causa non remouetur per remotionem causati sui. remanet ergo homo esse. cum ergo non est indiuiduum homo, est animal, et si non est animal, est esse tantum. Jam ergo manifestum est et planum quod causa prima longinqua est plus comprehendens et uehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua. et propter illud fit eius operatio uehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam operatio causae propinquae. et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc nisi quia res in primis non patitur nisi a uirtute longinqua, deinde patitur secundo a uirtute quae est sub prima. et causa prima adiuuat secundam causam super operationem suam, quoniam omnem operationem quam causa efficit secunda, prima etiam causa efficit, uerumtamen efficit eam per modum alium altiorem et sublimiorem. et quando remouetur causa secunda a causato suo, non remouetur ab eo causa prima, quoniam causa prima est maioris et uehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam causa propinqua. et non figitur causatum causae secundae nisi per uirtutem causae primae. quod est quia causa secunda quando facit rem, influit causa prima quae est supra ipsam super illam rem de uirtute sua, quare adhaeret illud rei adhaerentia uehementi et seruat eam. iam ergo manifestum est et planum quod causa longinqua est uehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua quae sequitur eam, et quod ipsa influit uirtutem suam super eam et seruat eam et non separatur ab ea separatione suae causae propinquae, immo remanet in ea et adhaeret ei adhaerentia uehementi, secundum quod ostendimus et exposuimus.

Every primary cause pours more into the thing it causes than does a universal second cause. When, therefore, the universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take away its own power from it. This is because the universal first cause acts upon what the second cause causes before the universal second cause which follows it acts upon it. When, therefore, the second cause which follows the caused thing acts, its action is not exempted from the first cause which is above it; and when the second cause is separated from the caused thing which follows it, the first cause which is above it is not separated from that thing, since it is a cause to it. And we for our part illustrate this by being and the living thing and the human being. This is because a thing must first be being, then a living thing, then a human being. The living thing, therefore, is the proximate cause of the human being, and being is its remote cause. Being, therefore, is more strongly the cause of the human being than the living thing is, since it is the cause of the living thing which is the cause of the human being. And likewise, when you posit rationality as the cause of the human being, being is more strongly the cause of the human being than rationality is, since it is the cause of its cause. And the sign of what we say is this: that when you remove the rational power from the human being, the human being does not remain, and there remains a living thing, breathing, capable of sensation. And when you remove the living thing from it, the living thing does not remain, and being remains — since being is not removed from it, but the living thing is removed, because a cause is not removed by the removal of the thing it causes. The human being, therefore, remains as being. When, therefore, the individual is not a human being, it is an animal; and if it is not an animal, it is being only. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote first cause embraces more and is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause is. And for that reason its operation clings to the thing more strongly than the operation of the proximate cause does. And this comes about in this way only because a thing is first acted upon by nothing but the remote power, and is then acted upon, secondly, by the power which is under the first. And the first cause aids the second cause in its operation, since every operation which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects — yet it effects it in another way, higher and more sublime. And when the second cause is removed from the thing it causes, the first cause is not removed from it, since the first cause clings to the thing with a greater and stronger adherence than the proximate cause does. And what the second cause causes is not held fast except through the power of the first cause. This is because, when the second cause makes a thing, the first cause which is above it pours into that thing from its own power, so that it clings to the thing with a strong adherence and preserves it. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote cause is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause which follows it, and that it pours its own power into the thing and preserves it, and is not separated from it when its proximate cause is separated from it; rather it remains in it and clings to it with a strong adherence, as we have shown and set forth.

prop bardenhewer 2 · pattin prop 2 · bardenhewer page 165

Omne esse superius aut est superius aeternitate et ante ipsam aut est cum aeternitate aut est post aeternitatem et supra tempus. esse uero quod est ante aeternitatem est causa prima, quoniam est causa ei. sed esse quod est cum aeternitate est intelligentia, quoniam est esse secundum habitudinem unam quod non patitur neque destruitur. esse autem quod est post aeternitatem et supra tempus est anima, quoniam est in orizonte aeternitatis inferius et supra tempus. et significatio quod causa prima est ante aeternitatem ipsam, est quod esse in ipsa est adquisitum. et dico quod omnis aeternitas est esse, sed non omne esse est aeternitas. ergo esse est plus commune quam aeternitas. et causa prima est supra aeternitatem, quoniam aeternitas est causatum ipsius. et intelligentia opponitur aeternitati, quoniam extenditur cum ea et non alteratur neque destruitur. et anima annexa est cum aeternitate inferius, quoniam est susceptibilior inpressionis quam intelligentia, et est supra tempus, quoniam est causa temporis.

Every higher being either is higher than eternity and before it, or is with eternity, or is after eternity and above time. But the being which is before eternity is the first cause, since it is a cause to eternity. And the being which is with eternity is intellect, since it is a being according to one single condition, which neither undergoes anything nor is destroyed. And the being which is after eternity and above time is soul, since it is on the horizon of eternity, below it, and above time. And the sign that the first cause is before eternity itself is that being in eternity is acquired. And I say that every eternity is being, but not every being is eternity. Therefore being is more common than eternity. And the first cause is above eternity, since eternity is what it causes. And intellect stands over against eternity, since it is extended along with it and is neither altered nor destroyed. And soul is joined to eternity from below, since it is more receptive of impression than intellect is; and it is above time, since it is the cause of time.

prop bardenhewer 3 · pattin prop 3 · bardenhewer page 165-166

Omnis anima nobilis habet tres operationes. nam ex operationibus eius est operatio animalis et operatio intelligibilis et operatio diuina. operatio autem diuina est quoniam ipsa praeparat naturam cum uirtute quae est in ipsa a causa prima. eius autem operatio intelligibilis est quoniam ipsa scit res per uirtutem intelligentiae quae est in ipsa. operatio autem animalis est quoniam ipsa mouet corpus primum et omnia corpora naturalia, quoniam ipsa est causa motus corporum et causa operationis naturae. et non efficit anima has operationes nisi quoniam ipsa est exemplum superioris uirtutis. quod est quia causa prima creauit esse animae mediante intelligentia, et propter illud facta est anima efficiens operationem diuinam. postquam ergo creauit causa prima esse animae, posuit eam sicut stramentum intelligentiae in quod efficiat operationes suas. propter illud ergo anima intelligibilis efficit operationem intelligibilem. et quia anima suscipit inpressionem intelligentiae, facta est inferioris operationis quam ipsa in inpressione sua in id quod est sub ipsa. quod est quia ipsa non inprimit in res nisi per motum, scilicet quia non recipit quod est sub ea operationem eius, nisi ipsa moueat ipsum. propter hanc ergo causam fit quod anima mouet corpora: de proprietate namque animae est ut uiuificet corpora, quando influit super ea uirtutem suam et directe producit ea ad operationem rectam. manifestum est igitur nunc quod anima habet tres operationes, quoniam habet uirtutes tres: scilicet uirtutem diuinam et uirtutem intelligibilem et uirtutem eius essentiae, secundum quod narrauimus et ostendimus.

Every noble soul has three operations. For among its operations are the operation of soul, the intellectual operation, and the divine operation. The divine operation is that soul prepares nature with the power which is in it from the first cause. Its intellectual operation is that it knows things through the power of intellect which is in it. And the operation of soul is that it moves the first body and all natural bodies, since it is the cause of the motion of bodies and the cause of nature's operation. And soul effects these operations only because it is a likeness of a higher power. This is because the first cause created the being of soul by the mediation of intellect, and for that reason soul was made to effect a divine operation. After the first cause had created the being of soul, therefore, it set soul as a thing spread beneath intellect, in which intellect might effect its operations. For that reason, therefore, the intellectual soul effects the intellectual operation. And because soul receives the impression of intellect, it was made of a lower operation than intellect in its own impressing upon what is beneath it. This is because soul does not impress upon things except through motion — that is, because what is beneath it does not receive its operation unless soul moves it. For this cause, then, it comes about that soul moves bodies; for it belongs to the distinctive property of soul to give life to bodies, when it pours its power into them and leads them straight to right operation. It is manifest now, therefore, that soul has three operations, since it has three powers: namely a divine power, an intellectual power, and the power of its own essence, as we have recounted and shown.

prop bardenhewer 4 · pattin prop 4 · bardenhewer page 166-168

Prima rerum creatarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud. quod est quia esse est supra sensum et supra animam et supra intelligentiam: et non est post causam primam latius neque prius causatum ipso. propter illud ergo factum est superius creatis rebus omnibus et uehementius unitum. et non est factum ita nisi propter suam propinquitatem esse puro et uni uero in quo non est multitudo aliquorum modorum. et esse creatum quamuis sit unum, tamen multiplicatur: scilicet quia ipsum recipit multiplicitatem. et ipsum quidem non est factum multa nisi quia ipsum, quamuis sit simplex et non sit in creatis simplicius ipso, tamen est compositum ex finito et infinito. quod est quia omne quod ex eo sequitur causam primam est achili id est intelligentia completa et ultima in potentia et reliquis bonitatibus, et formae intelligibiles in ipso sunt latiores et uehementius uniuersales. et quod ex eo est inferius est intelligentia, uerumtamen est sub illa intelligentia in complemento et uirtute et bonitatibus, et non sunt formae intelligibiles in illa ita dilatatae sicut est earum latitudo in illa intelligentia. et esse quidem creatum primum est intelligentia totum, uerumtamen intelligentia in ipso est diuersa per modum quem diximus. et quia diuersificatur intelligentia, fit illic forma intelligibilis diuersa: et sicut ex forma una propterea quod diuersificatur in mundo inferiori, proueniunt indiuidua infinita in multitudine, similiter ex esse causato primo propterea quod diuersificatur, adparent formae intelligibiles infinitae: uerumtamen quamuis diuersificentur, non seiunguntur ab inuicem, sicut est seiunctio indiuiduorum. quod est quoniam ipsae uniuntur absque corruptione et separantur absque seiunctione, quoniam sunt unum habens multitudinem et multitudo in unitate. et intelligentiae primae influunt supra intelligentias secundas bonitates quas recipiunt a causa prima et intendunt bonitatem in eis usquequo consequuntur ultimum earum. et intelligentiae superiores primae quae sequuntur causam primam, inprimunt formas secundas stantes quae non destruuntur, ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas uice alia. intelligentiae autem secundae inprimunt formas declines, separabiles, sicut est anima. ipsa namque est ex inpressione intelligentiae secundae quae sequitur esse creatum inferius. et non multiplicantur animae nisi per modum quo multiplicantur intelligentiae. quod est quia esse iterum animae habet finem, sed quod ex eo est inferius est infinitum. igitur animae quae sequuntur alachili id est intelligentiam sunt completae, perfectae, paucae declinationis et separationis, et animae quae sequuntur esse inferius sunt in complemento et declinatione sub animabus superioribus. et animae superiores etiam influunt bonitates quas recipiunt ab intelligentia super animas inferiores, et omnis anima recipiens ab intelligentia uirtutem plus, est super inpressionem fortior, et quod inpressum est ab ea est fixum, stans et est motus eius motus aequalis, continuus. et illa in qua ex ea est uirtus intelligentiae minus, est in inpressione sub animabus primis, et est quod ab ea inpressum est debile, euanescens, destructibile: uerumtamen quamuis sit ita, tamen permanet per generationem. iam ergo ostensum est quare factae sunt formae intelligibiles multae, et non est esse nisi unum simplex, et quare factae sunt multae animae quarum quaedam sunt fortiores quibusdam, et esse earum est unum, simplex in quo non est diuersitas.

The first of created things is being, and there is no other created thing before it. This is because being is above sense and above soul and above intellect; and after the first cause there is nothing more ample, nor anything caused before it. For that reason, therefore, it was made higher than all created things and more strongly unified. And it was made so only because of its nearness to pure being and to the true one, in which there is no multitude of any modes. And created being, although it is one, is nevertheless multiplied — that is, because it receives multiplicity. And it was not made many except because, although it is simple, and among created things there is nothing simpler than it, it is nevertheless composed of the finite and the infinite. This is because everything of it that follows immediately upon the first cause is achili, that is, intellect complete and ultimate in power and in the remaining goodnesses; and the intelligible forms in it are more ample and more strongly universal. And what of it is lower is intellect as well, yet it is below that intellect in completeness and in power and in goodnesses, and the intelligible forms in it are not extended so widely as their extent is in that intellect. And the first created being is wholly intellect, yet intellect in it is diverse in the way we have said. And because intellect is diversified, the intelligible form there becomes diverse. And just as from one form, because it is diversified in the lower world, individuals infinite in multitude come forth, so from the first caused being, because it is diversified, infinite intelligible forms appear. Yet although they are diversified, they are not sundered from one another as individuals are sundered. This is because they are united without corruption and are separated without sundering, since they are a one having multitude, and a multitude in unity. And the first intellects pour into the second intellects the goodnesses which they receive from the first cause, and they extend goodness in them until they reach the last of them. And the higher first intellects, which follow the first cause, impress second forms, standing forms which are not destroyed in such a way that it would be necessary to repeat them a second time. But the second intellects impress forms that decline and are separable, such as soul is; for soul comes from the impression of the second intellect which follows the lower created being. And souls are not multiplied except in the way in which intellects are multiplied. This is because the being of soul again has an end, but what is lower than it is infinite. Therefore the souls which follow alachili, that is, intellect, are complete, perfect, of little declination and separation; and the souls which follow the lower being are below the higher souls in completeness and in declination. And the higher souls also pour into the lower souls the goodnesses which they receive from intellect; and every soul that receives more power from intellect is the stronger in its impressing, and what is impressed by it is fixed and standing, and its motion is a motion even and continuous. And that soul in which there is less of the power of intellect is below the first souls in impressing, and what is impressed by it is weak, vanishing, destructible; yet although it is so, it endures through generation. Now, therefore, it has been shown why intelligible forms came to be many, though being is nothing but one and simple; and why many souls came to be, of which some are stronger than others, though their being is one and simple, and in it there is no diversity.

prop bardenhewer 5 · pattin prop 5 · bardenhewer page 168-169

Causa prima superior est omni narratione: et non deficiunt linguae a narratione eius nisi propter narrationem esse ipsius, quoniam ipsa est supra omnem causam, et non narratur nisi per causas secundas quae inluminantur a lumine causae primae. quod est quoniam causa prima non cessat inluminare causatum suum, et ipsa non inluminatur a lumine alio, quoniam ipsa est lumen purum supra quod non est lumen. ex illo ergo facta est prima sola cuius deficit narratio, et non est ita nisi quia supra ipsam non est causa per quam cognoscatur, quia omnis quidem res non cognoscitur et narratur nisi ex ipsa causa sua. cum ergo res est causa tantum et non est causatum, non scitur per causam primam neque narratur, quoniam est superior narratione neque consequitur eam loquela. quod est quia narratio non fit nisi per loquelam, et loquela per intelligentiam, et intelligentia per cogitationem, et cogitatio per meditationem, et meditatio per sensum. causa autem prima est supra res omnes quoniam est causa eis: propter illud fit quod ipsa non cadit sub sensu et meditatione et cogitatione et intelligentia et loquela: non est ergo narrabilis. et dico iterum quod res aut est sensibilis, et cadit sub sensu: aut est meditabilis, et cadit sub meditatione: aut est fixa, stans secundum dispositionem unam, et est intelligibilis: aut conuertibilis, destructibilis, cadens sub generatione et corruptione, et est cadens sub cogitatione. et causa prima est supra res intelligibiles, sempiternas et supra res destructibiles, quapropter non cadunt super eam sensus neque meditatio neque cogitatio neque intelligentia. et ipsa quidem non significatur nisi ex causa secunda quae est intelligentia, et non nominatur per nomen causati sui primi nisi per modum altiorem et meliorem: quoniam quod est causatum, est causa iterum, uerumtamen per modum sublimiorem et meliorem et nobiliorem, sicut ostendimus.

The first cause is higher than all description; and tongues fail to describe it only because of the description of its own being, since it is above every cause, and it is described only through the second causes which are illuminated by the light of the first cause. This is because the first cause does not cease to illuminate what it causes, while it is not itself illuminated by another light, since it is pure light above which there is no light. From this, therefore, it came about that the first alone is that of which description fails; and it is so only because above it there is no cause through which it might be known, since indeed no thing is known and described except from its own cause. When, therefore, a thing is a cause only and is not caused, it is not known through a first cause nor described, since it is higher than description and speech does not reach it. This is because description comes about only through speech, and speech through intellect, and intellect through thought, and thought through reflection, and reflection through sense. But the first cause is above all things, since it is a cause to them; and for that reason it comes about that it does not fall under sense, or reflection, or thought, or intellect, or speech. It is not, therefore, describable. And I say again that a thing either is perceptible, and falls under sense; or is an object of reflection, and falls under reflection; or is fixed, standing according to one single disposition, and is intelligible; or is changeable, destructible, falling under generation and corruption, and falls under thought. And the first cause is above intelligible, everlasting things and above destructible things; wherefore neither sense nor reflection nor thought nor intellect falls upon it. And it is signified only from the second cause, which is intellect; and it is not named by the name of what it first causes except in a higher and better way, since what is caused is in turn a cause, yet in a more sublime and better and nobler way, as we have shown.

prop bardenhewer 6 · pattin prop 6 · bardenhewer page 169-170

Intelligentia est substantia quae non diuiditur. quod est quia si non est cum magnitudine neque corpus neque mouetur, tunc procul dubio non diuiditur. et iterum omne diuisibile non diuiditur nisi aut in multitudinem aut in magnitudinem aut in motum suum. cum ergo res est secundum hanc dispositionem, est sub tempore, quoniam non recipit diuisionem nisi in tempore. et intelligentia quidem non est cum tempore, immo est cum aeternitate, quapropter facta est altior et superior omni corpore et omni multitudine. quod si inueniatur in ea multitudo, non inuenitur nisi quasi res existens una. cum ergo intelligentia sit secundum hunc modum, penitus diuisionem non recipit. et significatio quidem illius est reditio sui super essentiam suam: scilicet quia non extenditur cum re extensa, ita ut sit una suarum extremitatum secunda ab alia. quod est quia cum uult scientiam rei corporalis, extenditur cum ea, et ipsa stat fixa secundum suam dispositionem: quoniam est forma a qua non pertransit aliquid. et corpora quidem non sunt ita. et significatio quod intelligentia non est corpus neque diuiditur eius substantia et operatio eius, est quod utraeque sunt res una. et intelligentia quidem est multa propter bonitates quae adueniunt ei a causa prima: et ipsa quamuis multiplicetur per hunc modum, tamen quia adpropinquat uni, fit unum et non diuiditur. et intelligentia quidem non recipit diuisionem, quoniam est primum causatum quod causatum est a causa prima, et unitas est dignior ea quam diuisio. iam ergo uerificatum est quod intelligentia est substantia quae non est cum magnitudine neque corpus neque mouetur per aliquem modorum motus corporei: quapropter facta est supra tempus et cum aeternitate, sicut ostendimus.

Intellect is a substance which is not divided. This is because, if it is not with magnitude, and is not a body, and is not moved, then beyond doubt it is not divided. And again, everything divisible is divided only either into multitude, or into magnitude, or into its own motion. When, therefore, a thing is in this disposition, it is under time, since it does not receive division except in time. But intellect is not with time; rather it is with eternity, and therefore it was made higher and above every body and every multitude. And if a multitude is found in it, it is found only as a thing existing as one. Since, then, intellect is in this manner, it receives no division at all. And the sign of this is its reversion upon its own essence — that is, because it is not extended along with an extended thing, so that one of its extremities would be second to another. This is because, when it wants knowledge of a corporeal thing, it is extended along with that thing, while it itself stands fixed according to its own disposition, since it is a form from which nothing passes away. But bodies are not so. And the sign that intellect is not a body, and that its substance and its operation are not divided, is that both are one thing. And intellect is many because of the goodnesses which come to it from the first cause; and although it is multiplied in this way, yet because it draws near to the One it becomes one and is not divided. And intellect does not receive division, since it is the first caused thing caused by the first cause, and unity is more worthy of it than division. Now, therefore, it has been verified that intellect is a substance which is not with magnitude, nor a body, nor moved in any of the modes of bodily motion; and therefore it was made above time and with eternity, as we have shown.

prop bardenhewer 7 · pattin prop 7 · bardenhewer page 170-171

Omnis intelligentia scit quod est supra se et quod est sub se: uerumtamen scit quod est sub se, quoniam est causa ei, et scit quod est supra se, quoniam adquirit ab eo bonitates. et intelligentia quidem est substantia intelligibilis: ergo secundum modum suae substantiae scit res quas adquirit desuper et res quibus est causa. ergo ipsa discernit quod est supra eam et quod est sub ea, et scit quod illud quod est supra eam, est causa ei, et quod est sub ea, est causatum ab ea, et cognoscit causam suam et causatum suum per modum qui est causa eius, scilicet per modum suae substantiae. et similiter omnis sciens non scit rem meliorem et rem inferiorem et deteriorem nisi secundum modum suae substantiae et sui esse, non secundum modum secundum quem res sunt. et si hoc ita est, tunc procul dubio bonitates quae descendunt super intelligentiam a causa prima, sunt in ea intelligibiles, et similiter res corporeae, sensibiles sunt in intelligentia intelligibiles. quod est quoniam res quae sunt in intelligentia non sunt inpressiones ipsae, immo sunt causae inpressionum. et significatio illius est quod intelligentia ipsa est causa rerum quae sunt sub ea per hoc quod est intelligentia. si ergo est intelligentia causa rerum per hoc quod est intelligentia, tunc procul dubio causae rerum in intelligentia sunt intelligibiles etiam. iam ergo manifestum est quod res supra intelligentiam et sub ea sunt per uirtutem intelligibilem, et similiter res corporeae cum intelligentia sunt intelligibiles et res intelligibiles in intelligentia sunt intelligibiles: quoniam ipsa est causa esse earum, et quia ipsa non adprehendit nisi per modum suae substantiae: et ipsa quia est intelligentia, adprehendit res adprehensione intelligibili, siue intelligibiles sunt res siue corporeae.

Every intellect knows what is above it and what is below it; yet it knows what is below it because it is a cause to it, and it knows what is above it because it acquires goodnesses from it. And intellect is an intellectual substance; therefore it knows, according to the mode of its own substance, the things it acquires from above and the things to which it is a cause. Therefore it discerns what is above it and what is below it, and knows that what is above it is a cause to it, and that what is below it is caused by it; and it knows its cause and what it causes in the mode which is its cause, that is, in the mode of its own substance. And likewise every knower knows a better thing, and a lower and worse thing, only according to the mode of its own substance and of its own being, and not according to the mode in which the things themselves are. And if this is so, then beyond doubt the goodnesses which descend upon intellect from the first cause are intelligible in it; and likewise corporeal, perceptible things are intelligible in intellect. This is because the things which are in intellect are not the impressions themselves, but rather the causes of the impressions. And the sign of this is that intellect itself is the cause of the things which are below it by the very fact that it is intellect. If, then, intellect is the cause of things by the fact that it is intellect, then beyond doubt the causes of things in intellect are intelligible as well. Now, therefore, it is manifest that the things above intellect and below it are there by an intellectual power; and likewise corporeal things are intelligible with intellect, and intelligible things in intellect are intelligible, since intellect is the cause of their being, and since it apprehends only according to the mode of its own substance; and because it is intellect, it apprehends things with an intellectual apprehension, whether the things are intelligible or corporeal.

prop bardenhewer 8 · pattin prop 8 · bardenhewer page 172-173

Omnis intelligentiae fixio et essentia eius est per bonitatem puram quae est causa prima. et uirtus quidem intelligentiae est uehementioris unitatis quam res secundae quae sunt post eam, quoniam ipsae non accipiunt cognitionem eius. et non est facta ita, nisi quia causa est ei quod est sub ea. et significatio eius est illud cuius rememoramur: intelligentia est regens omnes res quae sunt sub ea per uirtutem diuinam quae est in ea, et per eam retinet res, quoniam per eam est causa rerum: et ipsa retinet omnes res quae sunt sub ea et comprehendit eas. quod est quoniam omne quod est primum rebus et causa eis est retinens illas res et regens eas, et non euadit ab eo ex ipsis aliquid propter uirtutem suam altam. ergo intelligentia est princeps omnium rerum quae sunt sub ea et retinens eas et regens eas, sicut natura regit res quae sunt sub ea per uirtutem intelligentiae. et similiter intelligentia regit naturam per uirtutem diuinam. et intelligentia quidem non facta est retinens res quae sunt post eam et regens eas et suspendens uirtutem suam super eas, nisi quoniam ipsae non sunt uirtus substantialis ei, immo ipsa est uirtus uirtutum substantialium, quoniam est causa eis. et intelligentia quidem comprehendit generata et naturam et orizontem naturae, scilicet animam: nam ipsa est supra naturam. quod est quia natura continet generationem, et anima continet naturam, et intelligentia continet animam. ergo intelligentia continet omnes res. et non est facta intelligentia ita nisi propter causam primam quae supereminet omnibus rebus. et causa quidem prima non est intelligentia neque anima neque natura, immo est supra intelligentiam et animam et naturam, quoniam est creans omnes res: uerumtamen est creans intelligentiam absque medio, et creans animam et naturam et reliquas res mediante intelligentia. et scientia quidem diuina non est sicut scientia intelligibilis neque sicut scientia animalis, immo est supra scientiam intelligentiae et scientiam animae, quoniam est creans scientias. et uirtus quidem diuina est supra omnem uirtutem intelligibilem et animalem et naturalem, quoniam est causa omni uirtuti. et intelligentia est habens helyatin et formam, et similiter anima est habens helyatin et natura est habens helyatin. et causae quidem primae non est helyatin, quoniam ipsa est esse tantum. quod si dixerit aliquis: necesse est ut sit helyatin, dicemus: helyatine id est suum est infinitum, et indiuiduum suum est bonitas pura, effluens super intelligentiam omnes bonitates et super reliquas res mediante intelligentia.

The fixity of every intellect and its essence is through the pure goodness which is the first cause. And the power of intellect is of a stronger unity than the second things which are after it, since they do not receive knowledge of it. And it was not made so except because it is a cause to what is below it. And the sign of it is what we call to mind: intellect rules all the things which are below it by the divine power which is in it, and through that power it holds things fast, since through it intellect is the cause of things; and it holds fast all the things which are below it and embraces them. This is because everything that is first to things and a cause to them holds those things fast and rules them, and nothing of them escapes it, because of its high power. Therefore intellect is the ruler of all the things which are below it, holding them fast and ruling them, just as nature rules the things which are below it by the power of intellect. And likewise intellect rules nature by the divine power. And intellect was not made to hold fast the things which are after it, and to rule them, and to hang its power over them, except because they are not a substantial power to it; rather it is the power of the substantial powers, since it is a cause to them. And intellect embraces the things generated, and nature, and the horizon of nature, that is, soul; for intellect is above nature. This is because nature contains generation, and soul contains nature, and intellect contains soul. Therefore intellect contains all things. And intellect was not made so except on account of the first cause, which is exalted above all things. And the first cause is not intellect, nor soul, nor nature; rather it is above intellect and soul and nature, since it is the creator of all things — yet it creates intellect without a mean, and creates soul and nature and the remaining things by the mediation of intellect. And divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, nor like the knowledge of soul; rather it is above the knowledge of intellect and the knowledge of soul, since it creates the kinds of knowledge. And the divine power is above every intellectual power and every power of soul and every natural power, since it is a cause to every power. And intellect has helyatin and form; and likewise soul has helyatin, and nature has helyatin. But the first cause has no helyatin, since it is being only. And if anyone should say that it must have helyatin, we shall say: its helyatin, that is, its own, is infinite, and its individual is pure goodness, flowing out upon intellect with all the goodnesses, and upon the remaining things by the mediation of intellect.