Anonymous (Liber de causis) prop bardenhewer 1 · pattin prop 1 · bardenhewer page 163-164

Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super causatum suum quam causa uniuersalis secunda: cum ergo remouet causa uniuersalis secunda uirtutem suam a re, causa uniuersalis prima non aufert uirtutem suam ab ea. quod est quia causa uniuersalis prima agit in causatum causae secundae antequam agat in ipsum causa uniuersalis secunda quae sequitur ipsum. cum ergo agit causa secunda quae sequitur causatum, non excusatur ipsius actio a causa prima quae est supra ipsam, et quando separatur causa secunda a causato quod sequitur ipsam, non separatur ab eo prima quae est supra ipsam quoniam est causa ei. Et nos quidem exemplificamus illud per esse et uiuum et hominem. quod est quia oportet ut sit res esse in primis, deinde uiuum, postea homo. uiuum ergo est causa hominis propinqua, et esse est causa eius longinqua. esse ergo uehementius est causa homini quam uiuum, quoniam est causa uiuo quod est causa homini. et similiter quando ponis rationalitatem causam homini, est esse uehementius causa homini quam rationalitas, quoniam est causa causae eius. et illius quod dicimus significatio est quod quando remoues uirtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet uiuum, spirans, sensibile. et quando remoues ab eo uiuum, non remanet uiuum, et remanet esse, quoniam esse non remouetur ab eo, sed remouetur uiuum, quoniam causa non remouetur per remotionem causati sui. remanet ergo homo esse. cum ergo non est indiuiduum homo, est animal, et si non est animal, est esse tantum. Jam ergo manifestum est et planum quod causa prima longinqua est plus comprehendens et uehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua. et propter illud fit eius operatio uehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam operatio causae propinquae. et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc nisi quia res in primis non patitur nisi a uirtute longinqua, deinde patitur secundo a uirtute quae est sub prima. et causa prima adiuuat secundam causam super operationem suam, quoniam omnem operationem quam causa efficit secunda, prima etiam causa efficit, uerumtamen efficit eam per modum alium altiorem et sublimiorem. et quando remouetur causa secunda a causato suo, non remouetur ab eo causa prima, quoniam causa prima est maioris et uehementioris adhaerentiae cum re quam causa propinqua. et non figitur causatum causae secundae nisi per uirtutem causae primae. quod est quia causa secunda quando facit rem, influit causa prima quae est supra ipsam super illam rem de uirtute sua, quare adhaeret illud rei adhaerentia uehementi et seruat eam. iam ergo manifestum est et planum quod causa longinqua est uehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua quae sequitur eam, et quod ipsa influit uirtutem suam super eam et seruat eam et non separatur ab ea separatione suae causae propinquae, immo remanet in ea et adhaeret ei adhaerentia uehementi, secundum quod ostendimus et exposuimus.

Every primary cause pours more into the thing it causes than does a universal second cause. When, therefore, the universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take away its own power from it. This is because the universal first cause acts upon what the second cause causes before the universal second cause which follows it acts upon it. When, therefore, the second cause which follows the caused thing acts, its action is not exempted from the first cause which is above it; and when the second cause is separated from the caused thing which follows it, the first cause which is above it is not separated from that thing, since it is a cause to it. And we for our part illustrate this by being and the living thing and the human being. This is because a thing must first be being, then a living thing, then a human being. The living thing, therefore, is the proximate cause of the human being, and being is its remote cause. Being, therefore, is more strongly the cause of the human being than the living thing is, since it is the cause of the living thing which is the cause of the human being. And likewise, when you posit rationality as the cause of the human being, being is more strongly the cause of the human being than rationality is, since it is the cause of its cause. And the sign of what we say is this: that when you remove the rational power from the human being, the human being does not remain, and there remains a living thing, breathing, capable of sensation. And when you remove the living thing from it, the living thing does not remain, and being remains — since being is not removed from it, but the living thing is removed, because a cause is not removed by the removal of the thing it causes. The human being, therefore, remains as being. When, therefore, the individual is not a human being, it is an animal; and if it is not an animal, it is being only. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote first cause embraces more and is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause is. And for that reason its operation clings to the thing more strongly than the operation of the proximate cause does. And this comes about in this way only because a thing is first acted upon by nothing but the remote power, and is then acted upon, secondly, by the power which is under the first. And the first cause aids the second cause in its operation, since every operation which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects — yet it effects it in another way, higher and more sublime. And when the second cause is removed from the thing it causes, the first cause is not removed from it, since the first cause clings to the thing with a greater and stronger adherence than the proximate cause does. And what the second cause causes is not held fast except through the power of the first cause. This is because, when the second cause makes a thing, the first cause which is above it pours into that thing from its own power, so that it clings to the thing with a strong adherence and preserves it. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote cause is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause which follows it, and that it pours its own power into the thing and preserves it, and is not separated from it when its proximate cause is separated from it; rather it remains in it and clings to it with a strong adherence, as we have shown and set forth.

⚠ The archive.org OCR layer reads 'causa eins longinqua' here; the plate reads eius. That single class of error (ei-/ein- for eiu-) recurs through the volume, so no section of this text may be shipped from the OCR layer unverified. Phase 3 translation notes. (a) The chain this section shares with El. 70 is held word for word across the two benches: esse / ὄν = 'being', uiuum / ζῷον = 'a living thing', homo / ἄνθρωπος = 'a human being', uirtus rationalis / λογικὴ δύναμις = 'the rational power'. uiuum is therefore 'a living thing' and not 'an animal', because this section itself uses animal for a separate step ('cum ergo non est indiuiduum homo, est animal'), and the English keeps the two Latin words apart so that shift stays visible. (b) esse is rendered 'being' throughout, as the glossary permits; where the text needs the infinitive force it is still 'being' rather than 'to be', because the parallel with El. 70's τὸ ὄν is the point of the page. (c) uehementius is 'more strongly' where the Greek's μειζόνως is 'in greater measure' — two different words in two languages, kept distinct rather than harmonised. (d) Aquinas's lemma reads excluditur where Bardenhewer prints excusatur, and super where Bardenhewer prints supra; the English follows Bardenhewer's text ('is not exempted from', 'above it'). (e) 'cum ergo agit causa secunda quae sequitur causatum' is difficult: elsewhere in this section it is the caused thing that follows the cause ('causato quod sequitur ipsam'), so quae sequitur causatum reads against the section's own usage. Translated literally as printed.

In the crux Liber de causis, proposition 1