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Elements of Theology — Στοιχείωσις θεολογική

Proclus · Creuzer, Frankfurt 1822 — Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta, Pars III

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Creuzer, Frankfurt, 1822 — Initia philosophiae ac theologiae ex Platonicis fontibus ducta, Pars III
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  • NOT on First1KGreek (verified 2026-09-09; only In Rem publicam is) -- requires vision OCR from the Creuzer scan, Phase 2.
  • Dodds 1933/1963 is in copyright in the US until 1 Jan 2029 [CHECK URAA restoration applies; confirm]; Dodds's proposition numbering is nonetheless the reference standard and Creuzer's numbering diverges in places -- build a creuzer-dodds concordance in Phase 2.
  • [CHECK] PHASES.md notes SOURCES.md's original text said "vol. 1"; corrected here to Pars III (1822), per PHASES.md's verified table -- t.1 (1820) and t.2 (1821) are the Alcibiades commentaries, not the Elements.

prop 12 · creuzer page 20-22

Πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὴ καὶ αἰτία πρωτίστη τὸ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν. Εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς αἰτίας πάντα πρόεισιν, ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν ἢ τἀγαθὸν χρὴ λέγειν ἢ τἀγαθοῦ κρεῖττον. Ἀλλ᾽ εἰ μὲν κρείττων ἐκείνη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, πότερον ἥκει τι καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης εἰς τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὴν φύσιν τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὐδέν; καὶ εἰ μὲν μηδέν, ἄτοπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι φυλάττοιμεν αὐτὴν ἐν αἰτίας τάξει· δέον πανταχοῦ παρεῖναί τι τοῖς αἰτίοις ἐκ τῆς αἰτίας, καὶ διαφερόντως ἐκ τῆς πρωτίσης, ἐξ ἧς πάντα ἐξήρτηται, καὶ δι᾽ ἣν ἔστιν ἕκαστα τῶν ὄντων. Εἰ δὲ ἔστι μετουσία κἀκείνοις τοῖς οὖσιν, ὥσπερ καὶ τἀγαθοῦ, ἔσται τι τῆς ἀγαθότητος κρεῖσσον ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐφῆκον ἀπὸ τῆς πρωτίστης αἰτίας.

Of all beings the principle and the very first cause is the Good. For if all things proceed from a single cause, that cause must be called either the Good or something higher than the Good. But if it is higher than the Good, does anything come from it too into beings and into the nature of beings, or nothing? And if nothing, that is absurd; for we would no longer be keeping it in the rank of a cause, since in every case something must be present to the things caused from the cause, and especially from the very first cause, on which all things depend and through which each of the beings is. But if there is a participation in it as well for those beings, just as there is of the Good, then there will be in beings something better than goodness, come down from the very first cause.

prop 56 · creuzer page 88

Πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ τὰ δεύτερα παρήγετο. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ δεύτερον ὅλην ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ τοῦ παράγειν ἐκεῖθεν (καὶ γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις παρακτικαὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς παράγουσι, καὶ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν)· εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παράγειν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης αἰτίας ἔλαχε, παρ᾽ ἐκείνης ἔχει τὸ εἶναι αἴτιον, ὧν ἐστιν αἴτιον, μετρηθὲν ἐκεῖθεν κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν δύναμιν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ προϊόντα αἰτιατά ἐστι διὰ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ θάτερον ἀποτελέσαι αἴτιον, καὶ θάτερον αἰτιατὸν ἀποτελεῖ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἐκεῖθεν ἀποτελεῖται τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὅτι καὶ μειζόνως ἐκεῖθεν, δῆλον. Εἰ γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παράγειν αὐτὸ τῷ δευτέρῳ δέδωκεν, εἶχεν ἄρα πρώτως ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἐγέννα, τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου γεννᾶν δύναμιν ἐκεῖθεν λαβόν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐγένετο παρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μετάδοσιν καὶ πρώτως, μειζόνως αἴτιον ἐκεῖνο, τὸ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῆς γεννητικῆς τῷ ἐφεξῆς δυνάμεως μεταδεδωκός.

Everything that is produced by secondary things is also produced, in greater measure, by the prior and more causal things from which the secondary things too were produced. For if the secondary has its whole essence from what is prior to it, its power of producing also comes from there (for productive powers are in producers in accordance with their essence, and fill out their essence); and if it obtained the power of producing from the cause set above it, then it has from that cause its being a cause of the things it causes, measured from there by its power of giving hypostasis. And if this is so, the things that proceed from it are caused things because of what is prior to it. For to make the one a cause is also to make the other a caused thing; and if this is so, the caused thing too is made what it is from there. That it is so from there in greater measure is plain. For if it gave the secondary the cause of producing, then it had this cause primarily, and for that reason it generated the secondary as well, the secondary having received from there its power of generating. And if the one became productive by participation, while the other is productive by imparting and primarily, then that one is the cause in greater measure — the one that imparted the generative power to another, to what comes next after it.

prop 57 · creuzer page 90

Πᾶν αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν. ᾗ γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον, τελειότερόν ἐστι καὶ δυνατώτερον τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτό· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πλειόνων αἴτιον. Δυνάμεως γὰρ μείζονος πλείω παράγειν· ἴσης δὲ τὰ ἴσα, καὶ τῆς ἐλάσσονος ἐλάσσω. Καὶ ἡ μὲν τὰ μείζονα ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις δυναμένη δύναμις καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσονα δύναται· ἡ δὲ τὰ ἐλάσσονα δυναμένη οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μείζω δυνήσεται. Εἰ οὖν δυνατώτερον τὸ αἴτιον, πλειόνων ἐστὶ παρακτικόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα δύναται τὸ αἰτιατόν, μειζόνως ἐκεῖνο δύναται. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως. Συνυφίστησιν ἄρα αὐτῷ πάντα, ὅσα πέφυκε παράγειν· εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ πρότερον παράγει, δῆλον δήπουθεν, ὅτι πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὴν παρακτικὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. ἅπαν ἄρα αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ ἄλλα ὑφίστησιν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν, ὅτι ὅσων μὲν αἰτία ψυχή, καὶ νοῦς αἴτιος. Οὐχ ὅσων δὲ νοῦς, καὶ ψυχὴ αἰτία· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖ. Καὶ ἃ δίδωσι ψυχὴ τοῖς δευτέροις, δίδωσι καὶ νοῦς μειζόνως. Καὶ μηκέτι ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης νοῦς ἐλλάμπει τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δόσεις, οἷς μὴ δέδωκε ψυχὴ ἑαυτήν. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄψυχον, καθόσον εἴδους μετέσχε, νοῦ μετέχει καὶ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ ποιήσεως.

Every cause both acts before the thing it causes and, after that thing, gives hypostasis to more things. For in so far as it is a cause, it is more complete and more powerful than what comes after it; and if so, it is the cause of more things. For it belongs to a greater power to produce more, to an equal power to produce equal things, and to a lesser power to produce less. And the power that is capable of the greater things among things of like kind is capable of the lesser as well, while the power capable of the lesser will not necessarily be capable of the greater. If, then, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more things. And indeed, whatever the thing it causes is capable of, the cause is capable of in greater measure. For everything that is produced by secondary things is produced in greater measure by the prior and more causal things. It therefore gives hypostasis, along with itself, to all that it is of a nature to produce; and if it also produces that thing first, it is surely plain that it acts before it, in accordance with its own productive activity. Every cause, therefore, acts before the thing it causes, and together with it, and after it gives hypostasis to other things. From this it is evident that of whatever soul is the cause, intellect is a cause as well. But soul is not the cause of everything intellect causes; intellect acts before soul as well. And what soul gives to secondary things, intellect gives too, in greater measure. And when soul is no longer acting, intellect still irradiates its own gifts upon the things to which soul has not given itself. For even a soulless thing, in so far as it has participated in form, participates in intellect and in intellect's making.

prop 70 · creuzer page 108-110

Πᾶν τὸ ὁλικώτερον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγικοῖς, καὶ πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν εἰς τὰ μετέχοντα ἐλλάμπει· καὶ δευτέρας ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τι μετασχόν. Καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται πρὸ τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐκείνου παρουσίᾳ πάρεστι. καὶ ἐκείνου μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦντος ἔτι πάρεστι καὶ ἐνεργεῖ τὸ αἰτιώτερον· καὶ οὐκ ἐν διαφόροις μόνοις ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ποτὲ μετεχόντων. Δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῷον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον. Καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔτι ἔστιν ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως· ζῷον δ᾽ ἔστιν ἔμπνεον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον· καὶ τοῦ ζῆν πάλιν ἀπολιπόντος μένει τὸ ὄν· εἰ γάρ, ὅταν μὴ ζῇ, τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων ὡσαύτως. Αἴτιον δέ, ὅτι δραστικώτερον ὑπάρχον τὸ αἰτιώτερον, πρότερον εἰς τὸ μετέχον ἐνεργεῖ. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου προτέρου πάσχει· καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου πάλιν ἐνεργοῦντος κἀκεῖνο συνεργεῖ. Διότι πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν ποιῇ τὸ δεύτερον, συναπογεννᾷ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ αἰτιώτερον. Καὶ ἀπολιπόντος ἐκείνου τοῦτο ἔτι πάρεστιν. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου μετάδοσις, δρῶσα μειζόνως, ὑστέρα τὸ μετασχὸν ἀπολείπει. Καὶ γὰρ διὰ τῆς τοῦ δευτέρου μεταδόσεως τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἔλλαμψιν ἐδυνάμωσεν.

Everything that is more universal among the originative principles irradiates the things that participate in it before the more particular principles do; and it leaves what has participated later than they do. For it begins its activity toward secondary things before that which comes after it does, and it is present along with that thing's presence; and when that thing is no longer acting, the more causal is still present and still acts. And this not only in different subjects, but in each single one of the things that participate at any time. For a thing must (to take an example) first come to be being, then a living thing, then a human being. And when the rational power has departed it is no longer a human being, though it is a living thing, breathing and perceiving; and when life in turn has departed, being remains: for when it does not live, to be is still present. It is the same in every case. The reason is that the more causal, being more effective, acts upon the participant first. For the same thing is acted upon first by the more powerful; and when the secondary in its turn acts, the more causal works along with it, because whatever the secondary makes, the more causal joins in generating it. And when the secondary has departed, the more causal is still present. For the imparting of the more powerful, since it acts in greater measure, leaves what has participated later. Indeed it was through the imparting of the secondary that it strengthened its own irradiation.

prop 87 · creuzer page 132

Πᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὂν αἰώνιον. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ὑπάρχει πως τοῦ ὄντος μέθεξις, καθ᾽ ὅσον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον οὐδαμῶς ὄν, ἔστι πως ὄν. Τὸ δὲ αἰώνιον οὐδαμῇ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ὑπάρχει, καὶ μάλισθ᾽ ὅσα μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ χρόνον τὸν ὅλον ἀϊδιότητος μετείληφεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ἀεί ἐστι. Μετέχει γὰρ αἰῶνος, ὃς τὸ ἀεί τι εἶναι δίδωσιν, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἂν μετέχηται. Τὸ ἄρα ὂν ὑπὸ πλειόνων μετέχεται, ἢ ὁ αἰών. ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸ ὄν. οἷς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ αἰῶνος μέτεστι, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος· οἷς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος, οὐ πᾶσι καὶ αἰῶνος.

Everything eternal is being, but not every being is eternal. For even things that come to be have in some way a participation in being, in so far as they are not what is in no way being; and if what comes to be is not in no way being, then it is in some way being. But the eternal belongs in no way to things that come to be, and least of all to those that have not even shared in everlastingness through the whole of time. And indeed everything eternal always is. For it participates in eternity, which gives always to be to whatever participates in it. Being, then, is participated in by more things than eternity is. Being, therefore, is beyond eternity. For the things that have a share in eternity have a share in being as well; but not all the things that have a share in being have a share in eternity too.

prop 88 · creuzer page 134

Πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἢ πρὸ αἰῶνός ἐστιν, ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι, ἢ μετέχον αἰῶνος. Ὅτι μὲν γάρ ἐστι πρὸ αἰῶνος, δέδεικται. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι. ὁ γὰρ αἰὼν τὸ ἀεὶ μετὰ τοῦ ὄντος ἔχει καὶ τὸ μετέχον αἰῶνος. τὸ γὰρ αἰώνιον πᾶν μεθέξει καὶ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ ὄντος. τοῦτο μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἄμφω ἔχει, καὶ τὸ ἀεὶ καὶ τὸ ὄν. ὁ δὲ αἰὼν τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ πρώτως, τὸ δὲ ὂν κατὰ μέθεξιν· τὸ δὲ ὂν αὐτὸ πρώτως ὄν ἐστιν.

Everything that is truly being is either before eternity, or in eternity, or participating in eternity. That there is what is before eternity has been shown. But there is also what is in eternity, for eternity holds the always together with being; and there is what participates in eternity. For everything eternal will participate both in the always and in being. This last has both by participation, both the always and being; eternity has the always primarily and being by participation; and being itself is being primarily.

prop 89 · creuzer page 134

Πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὂν ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπείρου. εἰ γὰρ ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι ἄπειρόν ἐστι, καὶ ταύτῃ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου ὑφέστηκεν. εἰ δὲ ἀμερὲς καὶ ἑνοειδές, ταύτῃ πέρατος μετείληφε. τὸ γὰρ ἑνὸς μετασχὸν πεπέρασται. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀμερὲς ἅμα καὶ ἀπειροδύναμόν ἐστιν. ἐκ πέρατος ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπείρου πᾶν τὸ ὄντως ὄν.

Everything that is truly being is composed of limit and the unlimited. For if it is of unlimited power, it is clear that it is unlimited, and in that respect it has its hypostasis from the unlimited. And if it is without parts and of the form of unity, in that respect it has shared in limit; for what has participated in unity is limited. But it is at once without parts and of unlimited power. Everything that is truly being, therefore, is composed of limit and the unlimited.

prop 123 · creuzer page 182-184

Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἕνωσιν ἄρρητόν ἐστι καὶ ἄγνωστον πᾶσι τοῖς δευτέροις· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ληπτόν ἐστι καὶ γνωστόν. Διὸ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον παντελῶς ἄγνωστον, ἅτε ἀμέθεκτον ὄν. Πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν. Καὶ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐφάπτεται, καὶ ἐν νοήσεσιν ὑφέστηκεν· οἱ δὲ θεοὶ πάντων εἰσὶν ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων. Οὔτε οὖν δοξαστὸν τὸ θεῖον, οὔτε διανοητόν, οὔτε νοητόν. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὄν, ἢ αἰσθητόν ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοξαστόν, ἢ ὄντως ὄν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν, ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, ὂν ἅμα καὶ γεννητόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διανοητόν. Εἰ οὖν οἱ θεοὶ ὑπερούσιοι καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων ὑφεστήκασιν, οὔτε δόξα ἔστιν αὐτῶν, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια, οὔτε νόησις. Ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξηρτημένων, οἷαί πέρ εἰσιν αὐτῶν αἱ ἰδιότητες, γνωρίζονται, καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαίως. Κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν μετεχομένων ἰδιότητας καὶ αἱ τῶν μετεχόντων συνδιαιροῦνται διαφορότητες. Καὶ οὔτε πᾶν μετέχει παντὸς (οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνταξις τῶν πάντῃ ἀνομοίων) οὔτε τὸ τυχὸν τοῦ τυχόντος μετέχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑκάστῳ συνῆπται, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστου πρόεισιν.

Everything divine is in itself, because of its unification beyond essence, ineffable and unknowable to all secondary things; but from the things that participate in it, it is apprehensible and knowable. Therefore only the first is wholly unknowable, since it is unparticipated. For all knowledge that comes through reason is of beings, and it has its power of apprehending truth in the beings. For it lays hold of objects of thought and has its hypostasis in acts of thinking; but the gods are beyond all beings. The divine, then, is not an object of opinion, nor of discursive thought, nor of intellection. For every being is either perceptible, and for that reason an object of opinion; or truly being, and for that reason an object of intellection; or between these, at once being and generated, and for that reason an object of discursive thought. If, then, the gods are beyond essence and have their hypostasis before beings, there is no opinion of them, nor knowledge and discursive thought, nor intellection. But they are known from the things that depend on them, according to what their distinctive properties are; and this necessarily. For it is according to the distinctive properties of the things participated that the differences of the things participating are divided along with them. And neither does everything participate in everything (for there is no ordering together of things wholly unlike), nor does any chance thing participate in any chance thing; rather, what is akin to each is joined to it and proceeds from it.

prop 138 · creuzer page 204-206

Πάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς θείας ἰδιότητος, ἐκθεουμένων, πρώτιστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀκρότατον τὸ ὄν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἐπέκεινα τὸ ὄν, ὡς δέδεικται, εἴπερ πλείστων τοῦτο, μετὰ τὸ ἕν, αἴτιον, ἀκρότατον ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν· τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἑνικώτερον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως σεμνότερον. ἄλλο δὲ πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι πλὴν τοῦ ἑνός. πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἑνιαίου πλήθους τί ἄλλο, ἢ τὸ ἕν; πλῆθος δὲ ἑνιαῖον τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἐκ πέρατος ὂν καὶ ἀπείρου· καὶ ὅλως πρὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ὑπερούσιον ὄν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα ἐλλάμψεσι μόνον τὸ ἓν ἐπέκεινα φθάνει τοῦ ὄντος· τὸ δὲ ὂν εὐθὺς κατὰ τὸ ἕν. Τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὄν, οὔπω δὲ ὄν, ἕν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν· καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν. Καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἐπέκεινα εὐθὺς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς κρεῖττον τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ ἕν.

Of all the things that participate in the divine distinctive property and are thereby made gods, being is the very first and the highest. For if being is beyond both intellect and life, as has been shown, then, since it is the cause of the most things after the One, being would be the highest; for it is more unitary than these, and for that reason in every way more venerable. And there is nothing else before it except the One. For what else is before a unified manifold but the One? And being is a unified manifold, since it is composed of limit and the unlimited; and in general what is beyond essence is before essence. For in the irradiations into secondary things as well, the One alone reaches beyond being, while being comes immediately after the One. For what is potentially being, but not yet being, is one according to its own nature; and what comes after this is already being in actuality. And so among the principles too, immediately beyond being stands not-being, as better than being, and one.

prop 171 · creuzer page 254

Πᾶς νοῦς ἀμέριστός ἐστιν οὐσία. εἰ γὰρ ἀμεγέθης καὶ ἀσώματος καὶ ἀκίνητος, ἀμέριστόν ἐστι. πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὁπωσοῦν μεριστόν, ἢ κατὰ μέγεθος, ἢ κατὰ πλῆθος, ἢ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ μεριστὸν ἐν χρόνῳ φερομένας· ὁ δὲ νοῦς κατὰ πάντα αἰώνιος, καὶ ἐπέκεινα σωμάτων, καὶ ἥνωται τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ πλῆθος. Ἀμέριστος ἄρα ἐστίν. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀσώματος ὁ νοῦς, ἡ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιστροφὴ δηλοῖ. τῶν γὰρ σωμάτων οὐδὲν πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἐπιστρέφεται. Ὅτι δὲ αἰώνιος ἡ τῆς ἐνεργείας ταυτότης πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν· οὕτω γὰρ δέδεικται πρότερον. Ὅτι δὲ ἥνωται τὸ πλῆθος, ἡ πρὸς τὰς ἑνάδας τὰς θείας τοῦ νοεροῦ πλήθους συνέχεια. Αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι πρῶτον πλῆθος· οἱ δὲ νόες μετ᾽ ἐκείνας.

Every intellect is an undivided essence. For if it is without magnitude, and incorporeal, and unmoved, it is undivided. For everything that is divided in any way at all is divided either according to magnitude, or according to multiplicity, or according to its activities as these are borne along in time; but intellect is in every respect eternal, and beyond bodies, and the manifold in it is unified. It is therefore undivided. That intellect is incorporeal is shown by its reversion upon itself, for no body reverts upon itself. That it is eternal is shown by the identity of its activity with its essence, for this has been shown earlier. That its manifold is unified is shown by the continuity of the intellectual manifold with the divine henads. For the henads are the first manifold, and the intellects come after them.

prop 173 · creuzer page 256-258

Πᾶς νοῦς νοερός ἐστι, καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μετ᾽ αὐτόν. τὰ μὲν γάρ ἐστι κατ᾽ αἰτίαν, ὅσα μετ᾽ αὐτόν· τὰ δὲ κατὰ μέθεξιν, ὅσα πρὸ αὐτοῦ. νοῦς δὲ ὁ αὐτός ἐστι καὶ νοερὰν ἔλαχεν οὐσίαν. κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἄρα ὕπαρξιν ἀφορίζει πάντα καὶ ἃ κατ᾽ αἰτίαν ἐστίν, ὡς τὰ κατὰ μέθεξιν. Καὶ γὰρ ἕκαστον, ὡς πέφυκεν, οὕτω μετέχει τῶν κρειττόνων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἐκεῖνα ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν. Ἢ γὰρ ἂν ὡσαύτως ὑπὸ πάντων μετείχετο. μετέχει δὲ ἄλλα ἄλλως. κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα ἄρα τῶν μετεχόντων καὶ δύναμιν αἱ μεθέξεις. Νοερῶς ἄρα ἐν τῷ νῷ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰ μετ᾽ αὐτὸν νοερῶς ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων ἐστίν, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἀλλὰ τὰς αἰτίας τὰς ἐκείνων. ἔστι δὲ πάντων τῷ εἶναι αἴτιος. Τὸ δὲ εἶναι αὐτοῦ νοερόν, καὶ τὰ αἴτια ἄρα νοερῶς ἔχει τῶν πάντων· ὥστε πάντα νοερῶς ἔχει πᾶς νοῦς, καὶ τὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μετ᾽ αὐτόν· ὡς οὖν τὰ νοητὰ νοερῶς ἔχει πᾶς νοῦς, οὕτω καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ νοερῶς.

Every intellect is intellectual, both the things before it and the things after it. For the things after it are in it according to cause, and the things before it according to participation. But intellect is one and the same, and has obtained an intellectual essence. According to its own existence, therefore, it defines all things, both what is in it according to cause and what is in it according to participation. For each thing participates in its superiors as its own nature allows, and not as those superiors are what they are. Otherwise it would be participated in the same way by all things. But different things participate differently. The participations, therefore, follow the distinctive property and the power of the things participating. Intellectually, then, the things before it are in intellect; and the things after it are there intellectually as well. For intellect does not derive from its effects, nor does it hold those effects in itself, but their causes; and it is the cause of all things by its being. And its being is intellectual; therefore it holds the causes of all things intellectually, so that every intellect holds all things intellectually, both the things before it and the things after it. As, then, every intellect holds intelligible things intellectually, so it holds perceptible things intellectually too.

prop 180 · creuzer page 270

Πᾶς νοῦς ὅλος ἐστίν, ὡς ἐκ μερῶν ὑποστὰς ἕκαστος, καὶ ἥνωται τοῖς ἄλλοις, καὶ διακέκριται ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν. Ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἀμέθεκτος νοῦς ἁπλῶς ὅλος, ὡς τὰ μέρη πάντα ὁλικῶς ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ, τῶν δὲ μερικῶν ἕκαστος, ὡς ἐν μέρει τὸ ὅλον ἔχει. Καὶ οὕτω πάντα ἐστὶ μερικῶς· εἰ γὰρ καθ᾽ ἓν πάντα, τὸ δὲ καθ᾽ ἓν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἐστίν, ἢ μερικῶς, τὸ ἄρα ὅλον οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων μερικῶς, καθ᾽ ἕν τι τῶν μερικῶν, ἐπικρατοῦν ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν, ἀφοριζόμενον.

Every intellect is a whole, in that each has its hypostasis out of parts, and is unified with the others, and is distinguished from them. But the unparticipated intellect is a whole without qualification, since it holds all the parts in itself in the manner of a whole; whereas each of the particular intellects holds the whole in a part. And in this way it is all things particularly. For if it is all things singly, and to be singly is nothing other than to be particularly, then the whole is present in each of these in that way, particularly — according to some one of the particular characters, which prevails among them all and marks it off.

prop 201 · creuzer page 300

Πᾶσαι αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαὶ τριπλᾶς ἔχουσιν ἐνεργείας· τὰς μὲν ὡς ψυχαί, τὰς δὲ ὡς νοῦν ὑποδεξάμεναι θεῖον, τὰς δὲ ὡς θεῶν ἐξηρτημέναι. Καὶ προνοοῦσι μὲν τῶν ὅλων ὡς θεοί, γινώσκουσι δὲ τὰ πάντα κατὰ τὴν νοερὰν ζωήν, κινοῦσι δὲ τὰ σώματα κατὰ τὴν αὐτοκίνητον ὕπαρξιν. Διότι γὰρ ψυχικῶς μετέχουσι τῶν ὑπερκειμένων, καὶ εἰσὶν οὐ ψυχαὶ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ θεῖαι ψυχαί, τὴν ἀνάλογον τοῖς θεοῖς ἐν τῷ ψυχικῷ πλάτει προςησάμεναι τάξιν, ἐνεργοῦσιν οὐ ψυχικῶς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ θείως, τὴν ἀκρότητα τῆς ἑαυτῶν οὐσίας ἔνθεον λαχοῦσαι, καὶ διότι νοερὰν ὑπόστασιν ἔχουσι, δι᾽ ἣν καὶ ὑπεστρωμέναι ταῖς νοεραῖς οὐσίαις τυγχάνουσιν. ἐνεργοῦσιν οὖν οὐ θείως μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοερῶς· τὴν μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἐν αὐταῖς· τὴν δὲ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἱδρύσασαι ἐνέργειαν. τρίτη δὲ αὐταῖς πάρεστιν ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν ὕπαρξιν ἐνέργεια, κινητικὴ μὲν ὑπάρχουσα τῶν φύσει ἑτεροκινήτων, ζωοποιὸς δὲ τῶν ἐπείσακτον ἐχόντων τὴν ζωήν. Πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ ἴδιον ἐνέργημα· τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κατὰ μέθεξιν, ὡς τὸ νοεῖν καὶ προνοεῖν.

All divine souls have threefold activities: some as souls, some as having received a divine intellect, and some as depending on gods. And they exercise providence over wholes as gods, they know all things according to their intellectual life, and they move bodies according to their self-moved existence. For because they participate in the things set above them in the manner of soul, and are not souls without qualification but divine souls, having taken on within the breadth of soul the rank that corresponds to the gods, they act not only in the manner of soul but also divinely, having obtained the summit of their own essence as god-filled; and because they have an intellectual hypostasis, by which they are also spread out beneath the intellectual essences, they act, therefore, not only divinely but also intellectually, having established the one activity according to the one within them and the other according to intellect. And a third activity belongs to them, the one according to their own existence, which moves the things that are by nature moved by another and gives life to the things that have their life brought in from outside. For this is the proper work of every soul, while the rest — thinking and exercising providence — belong to it by participation.