Proclus prop 123 · creuzer page 182-184

Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἕνωσιν ἄρρητόν ἐστι καὶ ἄγνωστον πᾶσι τοῖς δευτέροις· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν μετεχόντων ληπτόν ἐστι καὶ γνωστόν. Διὸ μόνον τὸ πρῶτον παντελῶς ἄγνωστον, ἅτε ἀμέθεκτον ὄν. Πᾶσα γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου γνῶσις τῶν ὄντων ἐστί, καὶ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν. Καὶ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐφάπτεται, καὶ ἐν νοήσεσιν ὑφέστηκεν· οἱ δὲ θεοὶ πάντων εἰσὶν ἐπέκεινα τῶν ὄντων. Οὔτε οὖν δοξαστὸν τὸ θεῖον, οὔτε διανοητόν, οὔτε νοητόν. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὄν, ἢ αἰσθητόν ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δοξαστόν, ἢ ὄντως ὄν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο νοητόν, ἢ μεταξὺ τούτων, ὂν ἅμα καὶ γεννητόν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο διανοητόν. Εἰ οὖν οἱ θεοὶ ὑπερούσιοι καὶ πρὸ τῶν ὄντων ὑφεστήκασιν, οὔτε δόξα ἔστιν αὐτῶν, οὔτε ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια, οὔτε νόησις. Ἀλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξηρτημένων, οἷαί πέρ εἰσιν αὐτῶν αἱ ἰδιότητες, γνωρίζονται, καὶ τοῦτο ἀναγκαίως. Κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν μετεχομένων ἰδιότητας καὶ αἱ τῶν μετεχόντων συνδιαιροῦνται διαφορότητες. Καὶ οὔτε πᾶν μετέχει παντὸς (οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνταξις τῶν πάντῃ ἀνομοίων) οὔτε τὸ τυχὸν τοῦ τυχόντος μετέχει, ἀλλὰ τὸ συγγενὲς ἑκάστῳ συνῆπται, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστου πρόεισιν.

Everything divine is in itself, because of its unification beyond essence, ineffable and unknowable to all secondary things; but from the things that participate in it, it is apprehensible and knowable. Therefore only the first is wholly unknowable, since it is unparticipated. For all knowledge that comes through reason is of beings, and it has its power of apprehending truth in the beings. For it lays hold of objects of thought and has its hypostasis in acts of thinking; but the gods are beyond all beings. The divine, then, is not an object of opinion, nor of discursive thought, nor of intellection. For every being is either perceptible, and for that reason an object of opinion; or truly being, and for that reason an object of intellection; or between these, at once being and generated, and for that reason an object of discursive thought. If, then, the gods are beyond essence and have their hypostasis before beings, there is no opinion of them, nor knowledge and discursive thought, nor intellection. But they are known from the things that depend on them, according to what their distinctive properties are; and this necessarily. For it is according to the distinctive properties of the things participated that the differences of the things participating are divided along with them. And neither does everything participate in everything (for there is no ordering together of things wholly unlike), nor does any chance thing participate in any chance thing; rather, what is akin to each is joined to it and proceeds from it.

Source of LdC 5 (the first cause above every name, knowable only through its effect). ⚠ Two readings Bardenhewer disputes are confirmed here as Creuzer's text with codex A against him: Creuzer prints τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν where Bardenhewer would read τῆς οὐσίας (Creuzer's note 5 records A's οὐσίας), and Creuzer prints καὶ διάνοια where Bardenhewer would read ἡ διάνοια (note 7). Both are edition-level variants, not OCR artefacts — flag them in the crux apparatus rather than silently choosing. Phase 3 translation notes — two edition-level variants translated AS PRINTED, not emended. (a) Creuzer prints ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἔχει τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας καταληπτικόν, rendered 'it has its power of apprehending truth in the beings'; codex A reads τῆς οὐσίας (Creuzer's note 5), which would give 'of essence' and is the reading Bardenhewer prefers. The English follows Creuzer. (b) Creuzer prints οὔτε ἐπιστήμη καὶ διάνοια, rendered 'nor knowledge and discursive thought'; Bardenhewer would read ἡ διάνοια (Creuzer's note 7). Neither variant is silently adopted. ὑπερούσιος is 'beyond essence', holding οὐσία = 'essence' across the Greek units.

creuzer_numeral=ρκγ΄

In the crux Liber de causis, proposition 5