Kalam fi mahd al-khair (Arabic Liber de causis)

prop bardenhewer 1 · pattin prop 1 · bardenhewer page 58-61

بسم اللّه الرحمن الرحيم وما توفيقى الّا باللّه كتاب الايضاح لارسطوطاليس فى الخير المحض قال كلّ علّة اوليّة فهى اكثر فيضا على معلولها من العلّة الكلّية الثانية فاذا رفعت العلّة الكلّيّة الثانية قوّتها عن الشىء فانّ العلّة الكلّيّة الاولى لا ترفع قوّتها عنه وذلك انّ العلّة الكلّية الاولى تفعل فى معلول العلّة الثانية قبل ان تفعل فيه العلّة الكلّيّة الثانية التى تليه فاذا فعلت العلّة الثانية التى تلى المعلول لم يستغنِ فعلها عن العلّة الاولى التى فوقها واذا فارقت العلّة الثانية المعلول الذى يليها لم تفارقه العلّة الاولى التى فوقها لانّها علّة لعلّته فالعلّة الاولى اذن اشدّ علّة للشىء من علّته القريبة التى تليه، ونحن ممثّلون ذلك بالانّيّة والحىّ والانسان وذلك انّه ينبغى ان يكون الشىء انّيّة اوّلا ثمّ حيّا ثمّ انسانا فالحىّ هو علّة الانسان القريبة والانّيّة هى علّته البعيدة فالانّيّة اشدّ علّة للانسان من الحىّ لانّها علّة للحىّ الذى هو علّة للانسان وكذلك اذا جعلت النطق علّة للانسان كانت الانّيّة اشدّ علّة للانسان من النطق لانّها علّة لعلّته والدليل على ذلك انّه اذا رفعت القوّة الناطقة عن الانسان لم يبق انسانا وبقى حيّا متنفّسا حسّاسا واذا رفعت عنه الحىّ لم يبق حيّا ويبقى انّيّا لانّ الانّيّة لا ترتفع عنه ويرتفع الحىّ لانّ العلّة لا ترتفع بارتفاع معلولها فيبقى الانسان انّيّا فاذا لم يكن الشخص انسانا كان حيوانا وان لم يكن حيوانا كان انّيّا فقط، فقد بان ووضح انّ العلّة الاولى البعيدة اكثر إحاطة واشدّ علّة للشىء من علّته القريبة ومن اجل ذلك صار فعلها اشدّ لزوما للشىء من فعل علّته القريبة وانّما صار هذا على هذا لانّ الشىء انّما ينفعل اوّلا من القوّة البعيدة ثمّ ينفعل ثانيا من القوّة التى هى دون الاولى والعلّة الاولى قد تعين العلّة الثانية على فعلها لانّ كلّ معلول علّة تفعله العلّة الثانية والعلّة الاولى ايضا لكنّها تفعله بنوع آخر اعلا وارفع واذا رفعت العلّة الثانية عن معلولها لم تفارقه العلّة الاولى لانّ فعل العلّة الاولى اعظم واشدّ لزوما للشىء من فعل علّته القريبة وانّما ثبت معلول العلّة الثانية بقوّة العلّة الاولى وذلك انّ العلّة الثانية اذا فعلت شيئا افاضت العلّة الاولى التى فوقها على ذلك الشىء من قوّتها فتلزمه لزوما شديدا وتحفظه فقد بان ووضح انّ العلّة الاولى هى اشدّ علّة للشىء من علّته القريبة التى تليه وانّها تفيض قوّتها عليه وتحفظه ولا تفارقه مفارقة علّته القريبة وقد تبقى فيه وتلزمه لزوما شديدا على ما بيّنّا واوضحنا

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. My success is in God alone. The Book of the Exposition by Aristotle on the Pure Good. He said: Every primary cause pours more upon the thing it causes than the universal second cause does. So when the universal second cause removes its power from the thing, the universal first cause does not remove its power from it. That is because the universal first cause acts upon what the second cause causes before the universal second cause which follows it acts upon it. So when the second cause, which follows the thing caused, acts, its action is not independent of the first cause which is above it; and when the second cause departs from the thing it causes, which follows it, the first cause which is above it does not depart from it, because it is a cause to it. The first cause, then, is a stronger cause to the thing than its proximate cause which follows it. And we illustrate this by being and the living and the human being. For a thing must be being first, then living, then a human being. The living, then, is the proximate cause of the human being, and being is its remote cause. Being, then, is a stronger cause to the human being than the living, because it is the cause of the living, which is the cause of the human being. And likewise, when you make the rational faculty the cause of the human being, being is a stronger cause to the human being than the rational faculty, because it is the cause of its cause. And the proof of this is that when you remove the rational power from the human being, he does not remain a human being, but there remains something living, breathing, sensing; and when the living is removed from him, he does not remain living, but remains being, because being is not removed from him, but the living is removed, since a cause is not removed by the removal of what it causes. So the human being remains a being. So when the individual is not a human being, it is an animal; and if it is not an animal, it is being only. It has now become clear and evident that the first remote cause is more comprehensive and a stronger cause to the thing than its proximate cause; and for that reason its action is more strongly bound to the thing than the action of its proximate cause. And this is so only because the thing is acted upon first by the remote power, and then acted upon secondly by the power which is below the first. And the first cause aids the second cause upon its action, because everything the second cause causes, the first cause causes too, but it causes it in another way, higher and loftier. And when the second cause is removed from the thing it causes, the first cause does not depart from it, because the action of the first cause is greater and more strongly bound to the thing than the action of its proximate cause. And what the second cause causes is established only by the power of the first cause; that is because, when the second cause acts upon something, the first cause which is above it pours upon that thing of its own power, so that it is bound to it strongly and preserves it. So it has become clear and evident that the first cause is a stronger cause to the thing than its proximate cause which follows it, and that it pours its power upon it and preserves it, and does not depart from it with the departure of its proximate cause, but remains in it and is bound to it strongly, according to what we have set out and made clear.

prop bardenhewer 2 · pattin prop 2 · bardenhewer page 61-63

كلّ انّيّة بحقّ امّا تكون اعلا من الدهر وقبله وامّا مع الدهر وامّا بعد الدهر وفوق الزمان وامّا الانّيّة التى قبل الدهر فهى العلّة الاولى لانّها علّة له وامّا الانّيّة التى مع الدهر فهى العقل لانّه الانّيّة الثانية وامّا الانّيّة التى بعد الدهر وفوق الزمان فهى النفس لانّها فى افق الدهر سفلا وفوق الزمان والدليل على انّ العلّة الاولى قبل الدهر بعينه فذلك انّ الانّيّة فيه مستفادة ونقول انّ كلّ دهر انّيّة وليس كلّ انّيّة دهرا فالانّيّة اكثر سَعَةً من الدهر والعلّة الاولى فوق الدهر لانّ الدهر معلول منها والعقل يجارى الدهر لانّه ممتدّ معه ولا يتغيّر ولا يستحيل والنفس لاصقة مع الدهر سفلا لانّها اسفل تأثيرا من العقل ومن فوق الزمان لانّها علّة الزمان

Every true being is either above eternity and before it, or with eternity, or after eternity and above time. As for the being which is before eternity, it is the first cause, because it is the cause of it. As for the being which is with eternity, it is intellect, because it is the second being. And as for the being which is after eternity and above time, it is soul, because it is in the horizon of eternity, below, and above time. The proof that the first cause is before eternity itself is that being in eternity is acquired. And we say that every eternity is being, but not every being is eternity; so being is wider in extent than eternity. And the first cause is above eternity, because eternity is caused by it. And intellect runs level with eternity, because it is extended along with it and does not change and does not alter. And soul is attached to eternity, below, because it is lower in effect than intellect, and it is above time, because it is the cause of time.

prop bardenhewer 3 · pattin prop 3 · bardenhewer page 63-65

كلّ نفس شريفة فهى ذات ثلثة افاعيل فعل نفسانىّ وفعل عقلىّ وفعل الاهىّ فامّا الفعل الالاهىّ فانّها تدبّر الطبيعة بالقوّة التى فيها من العلّة الاولى وامّا فعلها العقلىّ فانّها تعلم الاشياء بقوّة العقل التى فيها وامّا الفعل النفسانىّ فانّها تحرّك الجرم الاوّل وجميع الاجرام الطبيعيّة لانّها هى علّة حركة الاجرام وفعل الطبيعة وانّما فعلت النفس هذه الافاعيل لانّها مثال من القوّة العالية وذلك انّ العلّة الاولى ابدعت انّيّة النفس بتوسّط العقل ولذلك صارت النفس تفعل فعلا الاهيّا فلمّا ابدعت العلّة الاولى انّيّة النفس صيّرتها كبساط العقل يفعل العقل فيها افاعيله فلذلك صارت النفس العقليّة تفعل فعلا عقليّا فلمّا قبلت النفس تأثير العقل صارت ادنى فعلا منه فى تأثيرها فيما تحتها وذلك لانّها لا تؤثّر فى الاشياء الّا بحركة اعنى لانّه لا يقبل ما تحتها فعلها الّا ان تحرّكه فلهذه العلّة صارت النفس تحرّك الاجرام فانّ من خاصّة النفس ان تحيى الاجسام اذا افاضت عليها قوّتها وتسدّدها ايضا الى الفعل الصواب فقد وضح الآن انّ النفس ذات افاعيل ثلثة لانّها ذات قوًا ثلثة قوّة الاهيّة وقوّة عقليّة وقوّة ذاتيّة على ما وصفنا وبيّنّا

Every noble soul has three operations: a soul-operation, an intellectual operation, and a divine operation. As for the divine operation, it is that soul governs nature by the power that is in it from the first cause. As for its intellectual operation, it is that soul knows things by the power of intellect that is in it. And as for the soul-operation, it is that soul moves the first body and all the natural bodies, because soul is the cause of the motion of bodies and of the operation of nature. And soul performs these operations only because it is an image of the higher power. That is because the first cause brought into being the being of soul through the mediation of intellect, and for that reason soul came to perform a divine operation. For when the first cause brought into being the being of soul, it made it as a carpet for intellect, upon which intellect performs its operations; and for that reason the intellectual soul came to perform an intellectual operation. And when soul received the effect of intellect, it came to have an operation lower than intellect's in its effect upon what is below it. And that is because soul does not act upon things except by motion — I mean because what is below it does not receive its operation unless it moves it. For this cause soul came to move bodies, since it is proper to soul to give life to bodies when it pours its power upon them, and to direct them also to the right operation. It has now become evident that soul has three operations, because it has three powers: a divine power, an intellectual power, and a power of its own, according to what we have described and set out.

prop bardenhewer 4 · pattin prop 4 · bardenhewer page 65-69

انّ اوّل الاشياء المبتدعة الانّيّة وليس من ورائها مبتدع آخر وذلك انّ الانّيّة فوق الحسّ وفوق النفس وفوق العقل وليس بعد العلّة الاولى اوسع ولا اكثر معلولات منها ولذلك صارت اعلا الاشياء المبتدعة كلّها واشدّها اتّحادا وانّما صارت كذلك لقربها من الانّيّة المحضة الواحد الحقّ الذى ليس فيه كثرة من الجهات الاشخاص والانّيّة المبتدعة وان كانت واحدة فانّها تتكثّر اعنى انّها تقبل الكثير وانّما صارت كثيرة لانّها وان كانت بسيطة وليس فى المبتدعات ابسط منها فانّها مركّبة من نهاية ولانهاية وذلك انّ كلّ ما كان منها يلى العلّة الاولى فهو عقل تامّ كامل فى غاية القوّة وسائر الفضائل والصور العقليّة فيه اوسع واشدّ كلّيّة والاسفل منه فهو عقل ايضا الّا انّه دون ذلك العقل فى التمام والقوّة والفضائل وليست الصور العقليّة فيه اوسع كسعتها فى ذلك العقل والانّيّة المبتدعة الاولى عقل كلّها الّا انّ العقل فيها مختلف بالنوع الذى ذكرنا فلمّا اختلف العقل صار هناك صور عقليّة مختلفة وكما ان الصورة الواحدة اذا اختلفت فى العالم السفلىّ حدث منها اشخاص لا نهاية لها فى الكثرة كذلك الانّيّة الاولى المبتدعة لمّا اختلفت ظهر الصور التى لا نهاية لها الّا انّها وان اختلفت فانّها لا تتباين بعضها من بعض كمباينة الاشخاص وذلك انّها تتّحد من غير تفاسد وتنفرق من غير تباين لانّها واحد ذات كثرة وكثرة وحدانيّة والعقول الأوّل تفيض على العقول الثوانى الفضائل التى تنال من العلّة الاولى وتسلك الفضائل فيها الى ان تبلغ آخرها والعقول العالية الاول التى تلى العلّة الاولى تؤثّر الصور الثابتة القائمة التى لا تدثر فيحتاج الى إعادتها مرّة آخرة وامّا العقول الثوانى فتؤثّر الصور المائلة الزائلة كما هى النفس فانّها من تأثير العقول الثوانى التى تلى الانّيّة المبتدعة سفلا وانّما كثرت الانفس بالنوع الذى به تكثّرت العقول وذلك انّ انّيّة النفس ايضا ذات نهاية وما كان منها سفلا فغير متناهٍ فالانفس التى تلى العقل تامّة كاملة قليلة الميل والزوال والانفس التى تلى الانّيّة سفلا هى فى التمام والكمال دون الانفس العالية والانفس العالية تفيض بالفضائل التى تقبل من العقل على الانفس السفليّة وكلّ نفس تقبل من العقل قوّة اكثر فهى على التأثير اقوى ويكون المؤثّر منها ثابتا باقيا ويكون حركته حركةً مستديرة متّصلة وما كان منها قوّة العقل فيه اقلّ يكون فى التأثير دون الانفس الاول ويكون المؤثّر منها ضعيفا مستحيلا داثرا الّا انّه وان كان كذلك فانّه يدوم بالكون فقد استبان لم صارت الصور العقليّة كثيرة وانّما هى انّيّة واحدة مبسوطة ولم صارت الانفس كثيرة بعضها اقوى من بعض وانّيّتها واحدة مبسوطة لا خلاف فيها

The first of created things is being, and there is no other created thing before it. That is because being is above sense and above soul and above intellect, and after the first cause there is nothing wider than it nor with more things caused by it. For that reason it came to be the highest of all created things and the most strongly unified. And it came to be so only because of its nearness to the pure being, the true One, in which there is no multiplicity of the aspects of individuals. Created being, although it is one, is yet multiplied — I mean that it receives the many. And it came to be many only because, although it is simple, and there is nothing among created things simpler than it, it is composed of the finite and the infinite. For everything among them that is next to the first cause is a complete and perfect intellect, at the utmost of power, and the other excellences, and the intellectual forms in it are wider and more strongly universal; and what is lower than it is intellect also, except that it is below that intellect in completeness and power and the excellences, and the intellectual forms in it are not as wide as their width in that intellect. And created being, the first, is all of it intellect, except that intellect in it differs in the manner we have mentioned. And when intellect differed, there came to be there differing intellectual forms. And just as the one form, when it differs in the lower world, individuals without end in multitude arise from it, so the first created being, when it differed, the forms which have no end appeared — except that they, although they differ, are not distinct one from another as individuals are distinct; that is because they are united without corruption and are separated without distinction, because they are one that has multiplicity, and a multiplicity that has unity. And the first intellects pour upon the second intellects the excellences they receive from the first cause, and the excellences pass through them until they reach the last of them. And the high first intellects, which are next to the first cause, effect the fixed abiding forms which do not pass away, so as to need to be made over again; but the second intellects effect the inclining, passing forms, such as soul is, for soul is from the effect of the second intellects which are next to created being, below. And souls came to be many only in the manner in which intellects came to be many; that is because the being of soul also has an end, and what of it is lower is without end. So the souls which are next to intellect are complete and perfect, of little inclination and passing away; and the souls which are next to being, below, are below the high souls in completeness and perfection. And the high souls pour upon the lower souls the excellences they receive from intellect. And every soul that receives more power from intellect is stronger upon its effect, and what it effects is fixed and abiding, and its motion is a continuous circular motion. And what of them has less of the power of intellect in it is below the first souls in its effect, and what it effects is weak, alterable, passing away — except that, though it be so, it endures by coming to be. It has now become clear why the intellectual forms came to be many, though being is one and simple; and why souls came to be many, some stronger than others, though their being is one and simple, with no difference in it.

prop bardenhewer 5 · pattin prop 5 · bardenhewer page 69-71

انّ العلّة الاولى اعلا من الصفة وانّما عجزت الالسن عن صفتها من اجل وصف انّيّتها لانّها فوق كلّ علّة واحدة وانّما وصفت بالعلل الثوانى التى استنارت من نور العلّة الاولى وذلك انّ العلّة التى تنير تنير اوّلا تنير معلولها وهى لا تستنير من نور آخر لانّها هى النور المحض الذى ليس فوقه نور فمن ذلك صار الاوّل وحده يفوت الصفة وانّما كان كذلك لانّه ليس فوقه علّة يُعرف بها وكلّ شىء انّما يعرف ويوصف من تلقاء علّته فاذا كان الشىء علّةً فقط وليس بمعلولٍ لم يعلم بعلّة اولى ولا يوصف لانّه اعلى من الصفة وليس يبلغه المنطق وذلك انّ الصفة انّما تكون بالمنطق والمنطق بالعقل والعقل بالفكر والفكر بالوهم والوهم بالحواسّ والعلّة الاولى فوق الاشياء كلّها لانّها علّة لها فلذلك صارت لا تقع تحت الحسّ والوهم والفكر والعقل والمنطق فليست اذا بموصوفة واقول ايضا انّ الشىء امّا ان يكون محسوسا فيقع تحت الحواسّ وامّا ان يكون متوهّما فيقع تحت الوهم وامّا ان يكون ثابتا قائما على حال واحدة لا يتغيّر فيكون معقولا وامّا ان يكون متغيّرا داثرا واقعا تحت الكون والفساد فيكون واقعا تحت الفكرة والعلّة الاولى فوق الاشياء العقليّة الدائمة وفوق الاشياء الداثرة ولذلك لا يقع عليها الحواسّ ولا الوهم ولا الفكرة ولا العقل وانّما يُستدلّ عليها من العلّة الثانية وهى العقل وانّما تسمّى باسم معلولها الاوّل بنوع ارفع وافضل لانّ الذى المعلول هو العلّة ايضا الّا انّه بنوع ارفع وافضل واكرم كما بيّنّا

The first cause is higher than description. Tongues fall short of describing it only because of describing its being, since that being is above every single cause, and it is described only through the second causes, which are illumined by the light of the first cause. That is because the cause which illumines illumines first the thing it causes, and it is not illumined by another light, because it is the pure light above which there is no light. For that reason the first alone came to escape description. And it is so only because there is no cause above it by which it may be known, and everything is known and described only from the side of its cause. So when the thing is a cause only, and is not caused, it is not known by a first cause and is not described, because it is higher than description, and speech does not reach it. That is because description comes about by speech, and speech by intellect, and intellect by thought, and thought by imagination, and imagination by the senses. But the first cause is above all things, because it is a cause to them; and for that reason it came to be that it does not fall under sense, nor imagination, nor thought, nor intellect, nor speech, and so it is not described. And I say also that a thing is either perceptible, and so falls under the senses; or imagined, and so falls under imagination; or fixed and standing in one state, not changing, and so is intelligible; or changing, passing away, falling under coming-to-be and corruption, and so falls under thought. But the first cause is above the everlasting intellectual things and above the things that pass away, and therefore the senses do not light upon it, nor imagination, nor thought, nor intellect. It is inferred only from the second cause, which is intellect. And it is named by the name of the thing it first causes, but in a higher and more excellent way; because what is caused is a cause also, but in a higher and more excellent and nobler way, as we have set out.

prop bardenhewer 6 · pattin prop 6 · bardenhewer page 72-73

العقل جوهر لا يتجزّأ وذلك انّه ان كان ليس بعظم ولا بجسم ولا يتحرّك فلا محالة انّه لا يتجزّأ وايضا فانّ كلّ متجزّأ امّا ان يتجزّأ بالكثرة وامّا فى العظم وامّا فى حركته فاذا كان الشىء على هذه الحال كان تحت الزمان لانّه انّما يقبل التجزئة فى زمان وليس العقل داخلا تحت الزمان بل هو مع الدهر فلذلك صار ارفع واعلى من كلّ جسم وكلّ كثرة فان لُقيت فيه كثرة فانّما تُلقى فيه موحودة كانّها شىء واحد فاذا كان العقل على هذه الصفة لم يقبل التجزئة البتّة والدليل على ذلك رجوعه الى ذاته اعنى انّه لا يميَّز مع الشىء المميَّز فيكون احد طرفيه نابيا من الآخر وذلك انّه اذا اراد علم الشىء الجسمانىّ المميَّز مُيّز معه وهو ثابت قائم على حاله لانّه صورة لا يصيف عنها شىء وليست الاجرام كذلك والدليل ايضا على انّ العقل ليس بجرم ولا يتجزّأ جوهره وفعله فانّهما شىء واحد والعقل كثير من تلقاء الفضائل الآتية اليه من العلّة الاولى وهو وان يكثر بهذا النوع فانّه ما قرب من الواحد صار واحدا لا ينقسم والعقل لا يقبل التقسيم لانّه اوّل مُبْدَعٍ أُبدع من العلّة الاولى فالوحدانيّة أَوْلى به من الانقسام فقد وضح انّ العقل جوهر ليس بعظم ولا جسم ولا يتحرّك بنوع من انواع الحركة الجسمانيّة ولذلك صار فوق الزمان كما بيّنّا

Intellect is a substance which is not divided. That is because, if it is not a magnitude and not a body and does not move, then it cannot but be undivided. And again, everything divided is divided either in multitude, or in magnitude, or in its motion; and when a thing is in this state it is under time, because it receives division only in time. But intellect does not enter under time; rather it is with eternity, and for that reason it came to be higher and loftier than every body and every multitude. And if multitude is met with in it, it is met with there as a unity, as though it were one thing. So when intellect is in this state, it does not receive division at all. And the proof of this is its reversion upon itself — I mean that it is not distinguished along with the thing distinguished, so that one of its two extremes should be set apart from the other. That is because, when it wishes to know the corporeal distinguished thing, it is distinguished along with it, while it itself is fixed and standing in its own state, because it is a form from which nothing departs; but bodies are not so. And the proof also that intellect is not a body and that its substance is not divided is that its substance and its operation are one thing. And intellect is many from the side of the excellences that come to it from the first cause; and although it is made many in this manner, yet what is near to the One has become one and is not divided. And intellect does not receive division, because it is the first created thing brought into being from the first cause, and unity is more proper to it than division. So it has become evident that intellect is a substance which is not a magnitude and not a body and does not move with any of the kinds of bodily motion, and for that reason it came to be above time, as we have set out.

prop bardenhewer 7 · pattin prop 7 · bardenhewer page 74-75

كلّ عقل يعلم ما فوقه وما تحته الّا انّه يعلم ما تحته بانّه علّة له ويعلم ما فوقه لانّه يستفيد منه الفضائل والعقل جوهر عقلىّ فعلى نحو جوهره يعلم الاشياء التى يستفيدها من فوق والاشياء التى هو لها علّة فهو مميّز ما فوقه وما تحته ويعلم ان ما فوقه علّة له وما تحته معلول منه ويعرف علّته ومعلوله بالنوع الذى هو عليه اعنى بنوع جوهره وكذلك كلّ عالم انّما يعلم الشىء الافضل والشىء الادنا الارذل على نحو جوهره وذاته لا على نحو ما عليه الاشياء فان كان هذا هاكذى فلا محالة اذا انّ الفضائل التى تتنزّل على العقل من العلّة الاولى تكون فيه عقليّة وكذلك الاشياء الجسمانيّة المحسوسة تكون فى العقل عقليّة وذلك انّ الاشياء التى فى العقل ليست الآثار بعينها بل هى علل الآثار والدليل على ذلك انّ العقل بعينه علّة الاشياء التى تحته بانّه عقل فاذا كان العقل علّة الاشياء بانّه عقل فلا محالة انّ علل الاشياء فى العقل عقليّة ايضا فقد استبان انّ الاشياء فوق العقل وتحته بقوّة عقليّة وكذلك الاشياء الجسمانيّة مع العقل عقليّة والاشياء العقليّة فى العقل عقليّة لانّه علّة انّيّتها ولانّه انّما يدرك الاشياء بنوع جوهره وهو انّه عقل فيدرك الاشياء ادراكا عقليّا عقليّةً كانت الاشياء ام جسمانيّةً

Every intellect knows what is above it and what is below it, except that it knows what is below it in that it is a cause to it, and knows what is above it in that it acquires from it the excellences. And intellect is an intellectual substance, so it is according to the manner of its substance that it knows the things it acquires from above and the things to which it is a cause. It distinguishes, then, what is above it and what is below it, and it knows that what is above it is a cause to it and what is below it is caused by it; and it knows its cause and the thing it causes in the manner in which it itself is — I mean in the manner of its substance. And likewise every knower knows the more excellent thing and the lower, baser thing according to the manner of its own substance and essence, not according to the manner in which the things themselves are. And if this is so, then without doubt the excellences which come down upon intellect from the first cause are intellectual in it, and likewise corporeal perceptible things are intellectual in intellect. That is because the things which are in intellect are not the traces themselves; rather they are the causes of the traces. And the proof of this is that intellect itself is the cause of the things below it in that it is intellect; so if intellect is the cause of things in that it is intellect, then without doubt the causes of the things in intellect are intellectual also. So it has become clear that the things above intellect and below it are by an intellectual power; and likewise corporeal things are intellectual with intellect, and intellectual things are in intellect intellectual, because it is the cause of their being, and because it grasps things only in the manner of its own substance, which is that it is intellect. So it grasps things by an intellectual grasp, whether the things be intellectual or corporeal.

prop bardenhewer 8 · pattin prop 8 · bardenhewer page 76-79

كلّ عقل انّما ثباته وقوامه بالخير المحض وهى العلّة الاولى وقوّة العقل اشدّ وحدانيّة من الاشياء الثوانى التى بعده لانّها لا تنال معرفته وانّما صار كذلك لانّه علّة لما تحته والدليل على ذلك ما نحن ذاكرون انّ العقل مدبّر لجميع الاشياء التى تحته بالقوّة الالاهيّة التى فيه وبها يمسك الاشياء لانّه بها كان علّة الاشياء وهو يمسك جميع الاشياء التى تحته ويحيط بها وذلك انّ كلّ ما كان اوّلا لاشياء وعلّة لها فهو ماسك لتلك الاشياء ومدبّر لها ولا يفوته منها شىء من اجل قوّته العالية فالعقل اذا رئيس جميع الاشياء التى تحته وممسكها ومدبّرها كما انّ الطبيعة تدبّر الاشياء التى تحتها بقوّة العقل وكذلك العقل يدبّر الطبيعة بالقوّة الالاهيّة وانّما صار العقل يمسك الاشياء التى بعده ويدبّرها ويعلّق قوّته عليها لانّها ليست بقوّة جوهريّة له بل هى قوّة القوى الجوهريّة لانّه علّة لها والعقل يحيط بالاكوان الطبيعيّة وما فوق الطبيعة اعنى النفس فانّها فوق الطبيعة وذلك انّ الطبيعة تحيط بالكون والنفس تحيط بالطبيعة والعقل يحيط بالنفس فالعقل اذا يحيط بالاشياء كلّها وانّما صار العقل كذلك من اجل العلّة الاولى التى تعلوا الاشياء كلّها لانّها علّة العقل والنفس والطبيعة وسائر الاشياء والعلّة الاولى ليست بعقل ولا نفس ولا طبيعة بل هى فوق العقل والنفس والطبيعة لانّها مبدعة لجميع الاشياء الّا انّها مبدعة العقل بلا توسّط ومبدعة النفس والطبيعة وسائر الاشياء بتوسّط العقل والعلم الالاهىّ ليس كالعلم العقلىّ ولا كعلم النفس بل هو فوق علم العقل وعلم النفس لانّه مبدع العلوم والقوّة الالاهيّة فوق كلّ قوّة عقليّة ونفسانيّة وطبيعيّة لانّها علّة لكلّ قوّة والعقل ذو كلّيّة لانّه انّيّة وصورة وكذلك النفس ذات كلّيّة والطبيعة ذات كلّيّة وليس للعلّة الاولى كلّيّة لانّها انّيّة فقط فان قال قائل لا بدّ من ان يكون لها كلّيّة قلنا كلّيّتها لانهايتها وشخصها الخير المحض المفيض على العقل جميع الخيرات وعلى سائر الاشياء بتوسّط العقل

Every intellect has its fixity and its subsistence only through the pure good, which is the first cause. And the power of intellect is more strongly one than the second things which are after it, because they do not attain knowledge of it. And it came to be so only because it is a cause to what is below it. And the proof of this is what we now mention: that intellect governs all the things below it by the divine power that is in it, and by it holds the things fast; because by it it was the cause of the things, and it holds fast all the things below it and encompasses them. That is because everything that is first for things and a cause to them holds those things fast and governs them, and nothing of them escapes it, because of its high power. Intellect, then, is the chief of all the things below it, and their holder and their governor. And just as nature governs the things below it by the power of intellect, so intellect governs nature by the divine power. And intellect came to hold fast the things after it and to govern them and to attach its power to them, because that power is not a substantial power belonging to it; rather it is the power of the substantial powers, because it is a cause to them. And intellect encompasses the natural things that come to be, and what is above nature, I mean soul — for soul is above nature. That is because nature encompasses coming-to-be, and soul encompasses nature, and intellect encompasses soul. Intellect, then, encompasses all things. And intellect came to be so because of the first cause, which is higher than all things, because it is the cause of intellect and soul and nature and all other things. And the first cause is not intellect, nor soul, nor nature; rather it is above intellect and soul and nature, because it brings all things into being — except that it brings intellect into being without mediation, and brings soul and nature and all other things into being through the mediation of intellect. And divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, nor like the knowledge of soul; rather it is above the knowledge of intellect and the knowledge of soul, because it brings the kinds of knowledge into being. And the divine power is above every intellectual and soul-like and natural power, because it is the cause of every power. And intellect is a whole, because it is being and form; and likewise soul is a whole, and nature is a whole. But the first cause is not a whole, because it is being only. And if someone should say that it must have wholeness, we say: its wholeness is its infinity, and its individuality is the pure good, which pours upon intellect all good things, and upon all other things through the mediation of intellect.