Anonymous (Kalam fi mahd al-khair) prop bardenhewer 6 · pattin prop 6 · bardenhewer page 72-73
العقل جوهر لا يتجزّأ وذلك انّه ان كان ليس بعظم ولا بجسم ولا يتحرّك فلا محالة انّه لا يتجزّأ وايضا فانّ كلّ متجزّأ امّا ان يتجزّأ بالكثرة وامّا فى العظم وامّا فى حركته فاذا كان الشىء على هذه الحال كان تحت الزمان لانّه انّما يقبل التجزئة فى زمان وليس العقل داخلا تحت الزمان بل هو مع الدهر فلذلك صار ارفع واعلى من كلّ جسم وكلّ كثرة فان لُقيت فيه كثرة فانّما تُلقى فيه موحودة كانّها شىء واحد فاذا كان العقل على هذه الصفة لم يقبل التجزئة البتّة والدليل على ذلك رجوعه الى ذاته اعنى انّه لا يميَّز مع الشىء المميَّز فيكون احد طرفيه نابيا من الآخر وذلك انّه اذا اراد علم الشىء الجسمانىّ المميَّز مُيّز معه وهو ثابت قائم على حاله لانّه صورة لا يصيف عنها شىء وليست الاجرام كذلك والدليل ايضا على انّ العقل ليس بجرم ولا يتجزّأ جوهره وفعله فانّهما شىء واحد والعقل كثير من تلقاء الفضائل الآتية اليه من العلّة الاولى وهو وان يكثر بهذا النوع فانّه ما قرب من الواحد صار واحدا لا ينقسم والعقل لا يقبل التقسيم لانّه اوّل مُبْدَعٍ أُبدع من العلّة الاولى فالوحدانيّة أَوْلى به من الانقسام فقد وضح انّ العقل جوهر ليس بعظم ولا جسم ولا يتحرّك بنوع من انواع الحركة الجسمانيّة ولذلك صار فوق الزمان كما بيّنّا
Intellect is a substance which is not divided. That is because, if it is not a magnitude and not a body and does not move, then it cannot but be undivided. And again, everything divided is divided either in multitude, or in magnitude, or in its motion; and when a thing is in this state it is under time, because it receives division only in time. But intellect does not enter under time; rather it is with eternity, and for that reason it came to be higher and loftier than every body and every multitude. And if multitude is met with in it, it is met with there as a unity, as though it were one thing. So when intellect is in this state, it does not receive division at all. And the proof of this is its reversion upon itself — I mean that it is not distinguished along with the thing distinguished, so that one of its two extremes should be set apart from the other. That is because, when it wishes to know the corporeal distinguished thing, it is distinguished along with it, while it itself is fixed and standing in its own state, because it is a form from which nothing departs; but bodies are not so. And the proof also that intellect is not a body and that its substance is not divided is that its substance and its operation are one thing. And intellect is many from the side of the excellences that come to it from the first cause; and although it is made many in this manner, yet what is near to the One has become one and is not divided. And intellect does not receive division, because it is the first created thing brought into being from the first cause, and unity is more proper to it than division. So it has become evident that intellect is a substance which is not a magnitude and not a body and does not move with any of the kinds of bodily motion, and for that reason it came to be above time, as we have set out.
Apparatus
- [p.72] 2 يتجرا, eine spätere Hand setzt dafür an den Rand سحرك (يتحرّك) | 3 يتجرا | متجرا | 4 يتجرا | 5 حركه | 6 التجرية | 7 داخل | لُقيت für ...
- [p.73] 2 لانها für لانّه | 3 يتجرا | 4 فانها | 8 صح für وضح | 9 بشى für بنوع
Plate-verified: transcribed line by line from the page images of Bardenhewer 1882 (leaves n83-n104 of archive.org diepseudoaristo00bardgoog).
- Edition
- Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882 — Arabic text with Latin and German translation
- Scan
- archive.org
- OCR status
- proofed
- Translator
- Wroot Press draft
- Attribution
- Stated: Aristotle (in the wider doxographic tradition that also produced the Theology of Aristotle). Critical: Anonymous compiler, excerpting and paraphrasing Proclus's Elements of Theology. Bardenhewer's edition itself untangles the Kalam from any Aristotelian ascription, but the work circulated in the same Arabic doxographic environment as the (pseudo-)Aristotelian Theology and was read there as part of the Aristotelian corpus before Bardenhewer traced its propositions to Proclus.