Anonymous (Kalam fi mahd al-khair) prop bardenhewer 5 · pattin prop 5 · bardenhewer page 69-71

انّ العلّة الاولى اعلا من الصفة وانّما عجزت الالسن عن صفتها من اجل وصف انّيّتها لانّها فوق كلّ علّة واحدة وانّما وصفت بالعلل الثوانى التى استنارت من نور العلّة الاولى وذلك انّ العلّة التى تنير تنير اوّلا تنير معلولها وهى لا تستنير من نور آخر لانّها هى النور المحض الذى ليس فوقه نور فمن ذلك صار الاوّل وحده يفوت الصفة وانّما كان كذلك لانّه ليس فوقه علّة يُعرف بها وكلّ شىء انّما يعرف ويوصف من تلقاء علّته فاذا كان الشىء علّةً فقط وليس بمعلولٍ لم يعلم بعلّة اولى ولا يوصف لانّه اعلى من الصفة وليس يبلغه المنطق وذلك انّ الصفة انّما تكون بالمنطق والمنطق بالعقل والعقل بالفكر والفكر بالوهم والوهم بالحواسّ والعلّة الاولى فوق الاشياء كلّها لانّها علّة لها فلذلك صارت لا تقع تحت الحسّ والوهم والفكر والعقل والمنطق فليست اذا بموصوفة واقول ايضا انّ الشىء امّا ان يكون محسوسا فيقع تحت الحواسّ وامّا ان يكون متوهّما فيقع تحت الوهم وامّا ان يكون ثابتا قائما على حال واحدة لا يتغيّر فيكون معقولا وامّا ان يكون متغيّرا داثرا واقعا تحت الكون والفساد فيكون واقعا تحت الفكرة والعلّة الاولى فوق الاشياء العقليّة الدائمة وفوق الاشياء الداثرة ولذلك لا يقع عليها الحواسّ ولا الوهم ولا الفكرة ولا العقل وانّما يُستدلّ عليها من العلّة الثانية وهى العقل وانّما تسمّى باسم معلولها الاوّل بنوع ارفع وافضل لانّ الذى المعلول هو العلّة ايضا الّا انّه بنوع ارفع وافضل واكرم كما بيّنّا

The first cause is higher than description. Tongues fall short of describing it only because of describing its being, since that being is above every single cause, and it is described only through the second causes, which are illumined by the light of the first cause. That is because the cause which illumines illumines first the thing it causes, and it is not illumined by another light, because it is the pure light above which there is no light. For that reason the first alone came to escape description. And it is so only because there is no cause above it by which it may be known, and everything is known and described only from the side of its cause. So when the thing is a cause only, and is not caused, it is not known by a first cause and is not described, because it is higher than description, and speech does not reach it. That is because description comes about by speech, and speech by intellect, and intellect by thought, and thought by imagination, and imagination by the senses. But the first cause is above all things, because it is a cause to them; and for that reason it came to be that it does not fall under sense, nor imagination, nor thought, nor intellect, nor speech, and so it is not described. And I say also that a thing is either perceptible, and so falls under the senses; or imagined, and so falls under imagination; or fixed and standing in one state, not changing, and so is intelligible; or changing, passing away, falling under coming-to-be and corruption, and so falls under thought. But the first cause is above the everlasting intellectual things and above the things that pass away, and therefore the senses do not light upon it, nor imagination, nor thought, nor intellect. It is inferred only from the second cause, which is intellect. And it is named by the name of the thing it first causes, but in a higher and more excellent way; because what is caused is a cause also, but in a higher and more excellent and nobler way, as we have set out.

Plate-verified: transcribed line by line from the page images of Bardenhewer 1882 (leaves n83-n104 of archive.org diepseudoaristo00bardgoog).

In the crux Liber de causis, proposition 5