Anonymous (Kalam fi mahd al-khair) prop bardenhewer 8 · pattin prop 8 · bardenhewer page 76-79

كلّ عقل انّما ثباته وقوامه بالخير المحض وهى العلّة الاولى وقوّة العقل اشدّ وحدانيّة من الاشياء الثوانى التى بعده لانّها لا تنال معرفته وانّما صار كذلك لانّه علّة لما تحته والدليل على ذلك ما نحن ذاكرون انّ العقل مدبّر لجميع الاشياء التى تحته بالقوّة الالاهيّة التى فيه وبها يمسك الاشياء لانّه بها كان علّة الاشياء وهو يمسك جميع الاشياء التى تحته ويحيط بها وذلك انّ كلّ ما كان اوّلا لاشياء وعلّة لها فهو ماسك لتلك الاشياء ومدبّر لها ولا يفوته منها شىء من اجل قوّته العالية فالعقل اذا رئيس جميع الاشياء التى تحته وممسكها ومدبّرها كما انّ الطبيعة تدبّر الاشياء التى تحتها بقوّة العقل وكذلك العقل يدبّر الطبيعة بالقوّة الالاهيّة وانّما صار العقل يمسك الاشياء التى بعده ويدبّرها ويعلّق قوّته عليها لانّها ليست بقوّة جوهريّة له بل هى قوّة القوى الجوهريّة لانّه علّة لها والعقل يحيط بالاكوان الطبيعيّة وما فوق الطبيعة اعنى النفس فانّها فوق الطبيعة وذلك انّ الطبيعة تحيط بالكون والنفس تحيط بالطبيعة والعقل يحيط بالنفس فالعقل اذا يحيط بالاشياء كلّها وانّما صار العقل كذلك من اجل العلّة الاولى التى تعلوا الاشياء كلّها لانّها علّة العقل والنفس والطبيعة وسائر الاشياء والعلّة الاولى ليست بعقل ولا نفس ولا طبيعة بل هى فوق العقل والنفس والطبيعة لانّها مبدعة لجميع الاشياء الّا انّها مبدعة العقل بلا توسّط ومبدعة النفس والطبيعة وسائر الاشياء بتوسّط العقل والعلم الالاهىّ ليس كالعلم العقلىّ ولا كعلم النفس بل هو فوق علم العقل وعلم النفس لانّه مبدع العلوم والقوّة الالاهيّة فوق كلّ قوّة عقليّة ونفسانيّة وطبيعيّة لانّها علّة لكلّ قوّة والعقل ذو كلّيّة لانّه انّيّة وصورة وكذلك النفس ذات كلّيّة والطبيعة ذات كلّيّة وليس للعلّة الاولى كلّيّة لانّها انّيّة فقط فان قال قائل لا بدّ من ان يكون لها كلّيّة قلنا كلّيّتها لانهايتها وشخصها الخير المحض المفيض على العقل جميع الخيرات وعلى سائر الاشياء بتوسّط العقل

Every intellect has its fixity and its subsistence only through the pure good, which is the first cause. And the power of intellect is more strongly one than the second things which are after it, because they do not attain knowledge of it. And it came to be so only because it is a cause to what is below it. And the proof of this is what we now mention: that intellect governs all the things below it by the divine power that is in it, and by it holds the things fast; because by it it was the cause of the things, and it holds fast all the things below it and encompasses them. That is because everything that is first for things and a cause to them holds those things fast and governs them, and nothing of them escapes it, because of its high power. Intellect, then, is the chief of all the things below it, and their holder and their governor. And just as nature governs the things below it by the power of intellect, so intellect governs nature by the divine power. And intellect came to hold fast the things after it and to govern them and to attach its power to them, because that power is not a substantial power belonging to it; rather it is the power of the substantial powers, because it is a cause to them. And intellect encompasses the natural things that come to be, and what is above nature, I mean soul — for soul is above nature. That is because nature encompasses coming-to-be, and soul encompasses nature, and intellect encompasses soul. Intellect, then, encompasses all things. And intellect came to be so because of the first cause, which is higher than all things, because it is the cause of intellect and soul and nature and all other things. And the first cause is not intellect, nor soul, nor nature; rather it is above intellect and soul and nature, because it brings all things into being — except that it brings intellect into being without mediation, and brings soul and nature and all other things into being through the mediation of intellect. And divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, nor like the knowledge of soul; rather it is above the knowledge of intellect and the knowledge of soul, because it brings the kinds of knowledge into being. And the divine power is above every intellectual and soul-like and natural power, because it is the cause of every power. And intellect is a whole, because it is being and form; and likewise soul is a whole, and nature is a whole. But the first cause is not a whole, because it is being only. And if someone should say that it must have wholeness, we say: its wholeness is its infinity, and its individuality is the pure good, which pours upon intellect all good things, and upon all other things through the mediation of intellect.

Bardenhewer footnotes this section as the one Haneberg had already printed (Sitzungsberichte der k. bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1863, Bd. 1, pp. 369-370), and his apparatus records Haneberg's readings against the manuscript throughout.

Plate-verified: transcribed line by line from the page images of Bardenhewer 1882 (leaves n83-n104 of archive.org diepseudoaristo00bardgoog).

In the crux Liber de causis, proposition 8