Liber de causis, proposition 8

prop bardenhewer 8 · pattin prop 8 · bardenhewer page 172-173

Omnis intelligentiae fixio et essentia eius est per bonitatem puram quae est causa prima. et uirtus quidem intelligentiae est uehementioris unitatis quam res secundae quae sunt post eam, quoniam ipsae non accipiunt cognitionem eius. et non est facta ita, nisi quia causa est ei quod est sub ea. et significatio eius est illud cuius rememoramur: intelligentia est regens omnes res quae sunt sub ea per uirtutem diuinam quae est in ea, et per eam retinet res, quoniam per eam est causa rerum: et ipsa retinet omnes res quae sunt sub ea et comprehendit eas. quod est quoniam omne quod est primum rebus et causa eis est retinens illas res et regens eas, et non euadit ab eo ex ipsis aliquid propter uirtutem suam altam. ergo intelligentia est princeps omnium rerum quae sunt sub ea et retinens eas et regens eas, sicut natura regit res quae sunt sub ea per uirtutem intelligentiae. et similiter intelligentia regit naturam per uirtutem diuinam. et intelligentia quidem non facta est retinens res quae sunt post eam et regens eas et suspendens uirtutem suam super eas, nisi quoniam ipsae non sunt uirtus substantialis ei, immo ipsa est uirtus uirtutum substantialium, quoniam est causa eis. et intelligentia quidem comprehendit generata et naturam et orizontem naturae, scilicet animam: nam ipsa est supra naturam. quod est quia natura continet generationem, et anima continet naturam, et intelligentia continet animam. ergo intelligentia continet omnes res. et non est facta intelligentia ita nisi propter causam primam quae supereminet omnibus rebus. et causa quidem prima non est intelligentia neque anima neque natura, immo est supra intelligentiam et animam et naturam, quoniam est creans omnes res: uerumtamen est creans intelligentiam absque medio, et creans animam et naturam et reliquas res mediante intelligentia. et scientia quidem diuina non est sicut scientia intelligibilis neque sicut scientia animalis, immo est supra scientiam intelligentiae et scientiam animae, quoniam est creans scientias. et uirtus quidem diuina est supra omnem uirtutem intelligibilem et animalem et naturalem, quoniam est causa omni uirtuti. et intelligentia est habens helyatin et formam, et similiter anima est habens helyatin et natura est habens helyatin. et causae quidem primae non est helyatin, quoniam ipsa est esse tantum. quod si dixerit aliquis: necesse est ut sit helyatin, dicemus: helyatine id est suum est infinitum, et indiuiduum suum est bonitas pura, effluens super intelligentiam omnes bonitates et super reliquas res mediante intelligentia.

The fixity of every intellect and its essence is through the pure goodness which is the first cause. And the power of intellect is of a stronger unity than the second things which are after it, since they do not receive knowledge of it. And it was not made so except because it is a cause to what is below it. And the sign of it is what we call to mind: intellect rules all the things which are below it by the divine power which is in it, and through that power it holds things fast, since through it intellect is the cause of things; and it holds fast all the things which are below it and embraces them. This is because everything that is first to things and a cause to them holds those things fast and rules them, and nothing of them escapes it, because of its high power. Therefore intellect is the ruler of all the things which are below it, holding them fast and ruling them, just as nature rules the things which are below it by the power of intellect. And likewise intellect rules nature by the divine power. And intellect was not made to hold fast the things which are after it, and to rule them, and to hang its power over them, except because they are not a substantial power to it; rather it is the power of the substantial powers, since it is a cause to them. And intellect embraces the things generated, and nature, and the horizon of nature, that is, soul; for intellect is above nature. This is because nature contains generation, and soul contains nature, and intellect contains soul. Therefore intellect contains all things. And intellect was not made so except on account of the first cause, which is exalted above all things. And the first cause is not intellect, nor soul, nor nature; rather it is above intellect and soul and nature, since it is the creator of all things — yet it creates intellect without a mean, and creates soul and nature and the remaining things by the mediation of intellect. And divine knowledge is not like intellectual knowledge, nor like the knowledge of soul; rather it is above the knowledge of intellect and the knowledge of soul, since it creates the kinds of knowledge. And the divine power is above every intellectual power and every power of soul and every natural power, since it is a cause to every power. And intellect has helyatin and form; and likewise soul has helyatin, and nature has helyatin. But the first cause has no helyatin, since it is being only. And if anyone should say that it must have helyatin, we shall say: its helyatin, that is, its own, is infinite, and its individual is pure goodness, flowing out upon intellect with all the goodnesses, and upon the remaining things by the mediation of intellect.

⚠⚠ NO SOURCE IN THE ELEMENTS — per Bardenhewer (see ACQUISITION-LEDGER.md §3.2): 'De.8 findet sich in dieser Fassung in dem Lehrbuche nicht.' El. 12 and El. 180 are Aquinas's comparanda, not Bardenhewer-identified ancestors; the crux page for this proposition must show the chain breaking. Plate-verified across the p.172/173 break (leaves n197-n198). The transliterated term 'helyatin'/'alachili' (matter, Arabic hayula) is confirmed correct against the OCR on both pages — Bardenhewer devotes pp.247-274 to this word's textual history, and the plate spelling 'helyatin' (not 'heleatin' or 'heliatim', variants the OCR itself throws in its own apparatus transcription) is exactly what is printed in the body text. No eins/eius-type error found in this section. Apparatus not captured — this is the section with the densest apparatus of the eight (editorial curly braces visible in the left margin on p.172 marking a variant-reading group), so a future apparatus pass should prioritise it. Phase 3 translation notes. ⚠ This section has NO source in the Elements — Bardenhewer states it flatly — and the English was made from the Latin alone, with no Greek text consulted and nothing in the wording chosen to echo a Proclus proposition. Nothing here should be read as descending from the Elements. Beyond that: (a) scientia animalis is 'the knowledge of soul', from anima, not from animal — the same trap as operatio animalis at LdC 3; uirtus animalis likewise 'power of soul'. (b) intelligibilis follows the rule stated at LdC 7: 'intellectual' for what belongs to intelligentia, 'intelligible' for objects of intellect. (c) helyatin is left exactly as the text transliterates it (Arabic hayula, matter); Bardenhewer devotes pp. 247-274 to the word's textual history, and no English equivalent is imposed here. (d) The closing sentence, 'helyatine id est suum est infinitum, et indiuiduum suum est bonitas pura', will not construe cleanly as printed; it is translated word for word and flagged rather than repaired. (e) esse tantum is 'being only', matching esse = 'being' across LdC 1 and 4.