Liber de causis, proposition 3

prop bardenhewer 3 · pattin prop 3 · bardenhewer page 165-166

Omnis anima nobilis habet tres operationes. nam ex operationibus eius est operatio animalis et operatio intelligibilis et operatio diuina. operatio autem diuina est quoniam ipsa praeparat naturam cum uirtute quae est in ipsa a causa prima. eius autem operatio intelligibilis est quoniam ipsa scit res per uirtutem intelligentiae quae est in ipsa. operatio autem animalis est quoniam ipsa mouet corpus primum et omnia corpora naturalia, quoniam ipsa est causa motus corporum et causa operationis naturae. et non efficit anima has operationes nisi quoniam ipsa est exemplum superioris uirtutis. quod est quia causa prima creauit esse animae mediante intelligentia, et propter illud facta est anima efficiens operationem diuinam. postquam ergo creauit causa prima esse animae, posuit eam sicut stramentum intelligentiae in quod efficiat operationes suas. propter illud ergo anima intelligibilis efficit operationem intelligibilem. et quia anima suscipit inpressionem intelligentiae, facta est inferioris operationis quam ipsa in inpressione sua in id quod est sub ipsa. quod est quia ipsa non inprimit in res nisi per motum, scilicet quia non recipit quod est sub ea operationem eius, nisi ipsa moueat ipsum. propter hanc ergo causam fit quod anima mouet corpora: de proprietate namque animae est ut uiuificet corpora, quando influit super ea uirtutem suam et directe producit ea ad operationem rectam. manifestum est igitur nunc quod anima habet tres operationes, quoniam habet uirtutes tres: scilicet uirtutem diuinam et uirtutem intelligibilem et uirtutem eius essentiae, secundum quod narrauimus et ostendimus.

Every noble soul has three operations. For among its operations are the operation of soul, the intellectual operation, and the divine operation. The divine operation is that soul prepares nature with the power which is in it from the first cause. Its intellectual operation is that it knows things through the power of intellect which is in it. And the operation of soul is that it moves the first body and all natural bodies, since it is the cause of the motion of bodies and the cause of nature's operation. And soul effects these operations only because it is a likeness of a higher power. This is because the first cause created the being of soul by the mediation of intellect, and for that reason soul was made to effect a divine operation. After the first cause had created the being of soul, therefore, it set soul as a thing spread beneath intellect, in which intellect might effect its operations. For that reason, therefore, the intellectual soul effects the intellectual operation. And because soul receives the impression of intellect, it was made of a lower operation than intellect in its own impressing upon what is beneath it. This is because soul does not impress upon things except through motion — that is, because what is beneath it does not receive its operation unless soul moves it. For this cause, then, it comes about that soul moves bodies; for it belongs to the distinctive property of soul to give life to bodies, when it pours its power into them and leads them straight to right operation. It is manifest now, therefore, that soul has three operations, since it has three powers: namely a divine power, an intellectual power, and the power of its own essence, as we have recounted and shown.

Plate-verified across the p.165/166 break (leaves n190-n191). ⚠ The OCR layer misreads 'eius' as 'eins' at 'uirtutem eins essentiae' near the end of this section — the same eins/eius error class documented for §1. It also misreads 'suscipit' as 'sqscipit' ('anima sqscipit inpressionem'), matching the §1 provenance note's predicted error class. Both corrected from the plate. Apparatus not captured. Phase 3 translation notes — the section that answers El. 201. (a) ⚠ operatio animalis is the operation belonging to ANIMA, not to an animal, and is rendered 'the operation of soul'. LdC 1 uses animal in its ordinary sense a page earlier, so the two words look alike and are not; the English keeps them apart on purpose. It answers Proclus's ἐνεργοῦσιν ψυχικῶς, rendered 'they act in the manner of soul' at El. 201. (b) operatio intelligibilis is 'the intellectual operation' rather than the literal 'intelligible operation': it names the operation belonging to intelligentia, and 'intellectual' is what El. 201's and El. 173's νοερῶς is rendered by, so the threefold division reads the same on both benches. (c) stramentum is rendered 'a thing spread beneath', not with a smoother word, because Proclus at El. 201 says the divine souls are ὑπεστρωμέναι ταῖς νοεραῖς οὐσίαις — 'spread out beneath the intellectual essences' — from the same image; that is one of the clearest verbal joins between the two texts on this page. (d) LdC has anima nobilis where Proclus has αἱ θεῖαι ψυχαί; 'noble' is kept, not assimilated to 'divine'. (e) exemplum superioris uirtutis is ambiguous between model and copy; the sense required here is the derived one, so it is rendered 'a likeness of a higher power'.