Plotinus porphyrian VI.7 · chronological 38 · chapter 11 · volkmann page vol. 2, 437-440

λέγεται δὲ οὐδ’ ὁ οὐρανός, καὶ πολλὰ δὲ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἀτιμάσαι τὴν τῶν ζῴων πάντων φύσιν: ἐπεὶ καὶ τόδε τὸ πᾶν πάντα ἔχει. πόθεν οὖν ἔχει; πάντα οὖν ἔχει ὅσα ἐνταῦθα τὰ ἐκεῖ; ἢ ὅσα λόγῳ πεποίηται καὶ κατ’ εἶδος. ἀλλ’ ὅταν πῦρ ἔχῃ, καὶ ὕδωρ ἔχει, ἔχει δὲ πάντως καὶ φυτά. πῶς οὖν τὰ φυτὰ ἐκεῖ; καὶ πῶς πῦρ ζῇ; καὶ πῶς γῆ; ἢ γὰρ ζῇ, ἢ οἷον νεκρὰ ἔσται ἐκεῖ, ὥστε μὴ πᾶν τὸ ἐκεῖ ζῆν. καὶ τί ὅλως ἐστὶν ἐκεῖ καὶ ταῦτα; τὰ μὲν οὖν φυτὰ δύναιτ’ ἂν τῷ λόγῳ συναρμόσαι: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ τῇδε φυτὸν λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν ζωῇ κείμενος. εἰ δὴ ὁ ἔνυλος λόγος ὁ τοῦ φυτοῦ, καθ’ ὃν τὸ φυτόν ἐστι, ζωή τις ἐστὶ τοιάδε καὶ ψυχή τις καὶ ὁ λόγος ἕν τι, ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον φυτόν ἐστιν οὗτος ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ πρὸ αὐτοῦ φυτὸν τὸ πρῶτον, ἀφ’ οὗ καὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο ἕν, ταῦτα δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἀφ’ ἑνὸς ἐξ ἀνάγκης. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο, δεῖ πολὺ πρότερον ἐκεῖνο ζῆν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο φυτὸν εἶναι, ἀπ’ ἐκείνου δὲ ταῦτα δευτέρως καὶ τρίτως καὶ κατ’ ἴχνος ἐκείνου ζῆν. γῆ δὲ πῶς; καὶ τί τὸ γῇ εἶναι; καὶ τίς ἡ ἐκεῖ γῆ τὸ ζῆν ἔχουσα; ἢ πρότερον τίς αὕτη: τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τί τὸ εἶναι ταύτῃ. δεῖ δὴ μορφήν τινα εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ λόγον. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τοῦ φυτοῦ ἔζη καὶ ὁ τῇδε αὐτοῦ λόγος. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἐν τῇδε τῇ γῇ; ἤ, εἰ λάβοιμεν τὰ μάλιστα γήινα γεννώμενα καὶ πλαττόμενα ἐν αὐτῇ, εὕροιμεν ἂν καὶ ἐνταῦθα τὴν γῆς φύσιν. λίθων τοίνυν αὐξήσεις τε καὶ πλάσεις καὶ ὀρῶν ἀναφυομένων ἔνδον μορφώσεις πάντως που λόγου ἐμψύχου δημιουργοῦντος ἔνδοθεν καὶ εἰδοποιοῦντος χρὴ νομίζειν γίνεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ εἶδος τῆς γῆς τὸ ποιοῦν, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δένδροις τὴν λεγομένην φύσιν, τῷ δὲ ξύλῳ τοῦ δένδρου ἀνάλογον τὴν λεγομένην εἶναι γῆν, καὶ ἀποτμηθέντα τὸν λίθον οὕτως ἔχειν, ὡς εἰ ἐκ τοῦ δένδρου τι κοπείη, μὴ παθόντος δὲ τούτου, ἀλλ’ ἔτι συνηρτημένου, ὡς τὸ μὴ κοπὲν ἐκ τοῦ ζῶντος φυτοῦ. τὴν [δὴ] δημιουργοῦσαν ἐγκαθημένην τῇ γῇ φύσιν ζωὴν ἐν λόγῳ ἀνευρόντες πιστοίμεθα ἂν τὸ ἐντεῦθεν ῥᾳδίως τὴν ἐκεῖ γῆν πολὺ πρότερον ζῶσαν εἶναι καὶ ζωὴν ἔλλογον γῆς, αὐτογῆν καὶ πρώτως γῆν, ἀφ’ ἧς καὶ ἡ ἐνταῦθα γῆ. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ πῦρ λόγος τις ἐν ὕλῃ ἐστὶ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτομάτου πῦρ — πόθεν γάρ; οὐ γὰρ ἐκ παρατρίψεως, ὡς ἄν τις οἰηθείη: ἤδη γὰρ ὄντος ἐν τῷ παντὶ πυρὸς ἡ παράτριψις ἐχόντων τῶν παρατριβομένων σωμάτων: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη οὕτως δυνάμει, ὥστε παρ’ αὐτῆς: εἰ δὴ κατὰ λόγον δεῖ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι ὡς μορφοῦν, τί ἂν εἴη; ἢ ψυχὴ ποιεῖν πῦρ δυναμένη: τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ ζωὴ καὶ λόγος, ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἄμφω. διὸ καὶ Πλάτων ἐν ἑκάστῳ τούτων ψυχήν φησιν εἶναι οὐκ ἄλλως ἢ ὡς ποιοῦσαν τοῦτο δὴ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πῦρ. ἔστιν οὖν καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα ποιοῦν πῦρ ζωή τις πυρίνη, ἀληθέστερον πῦρ. τὸ ἄρα ἐπέκεινα πῦρ μᾶλλον ὂν πῦρ μᾶλλον ἂν εἴη ἐν ζωῇ: ζῇ ἄρα καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ. ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος. ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οὐκ ἔμψυχα καὶ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ; ὅτι μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα ἐν ζῴῳ τῷ παντί, δῆλόν που, καὶ ὅτι μέρη ζῴου: οὐ φαίνεται δὲ ζωὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ οὐδ’ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς: συλλογίζεσθαι δ’ ἦν κἀκεῖ καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων ἐν αὐτῇ: ἀλλὰ γίνεται καὶ ἐν πυρὶ ζῷα, καὶ ἐν ὕδατι δὲ φανερώτερον: καὶ ἀέρινοι δὲ ζῴων συστάσεις. γινόμενον δὲ τὸ πῦρ ἕκαστον καὶ ταχὺ σβεννύμενον τὴν ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ψυχὴν παρέρχεται εἴς τε ὄγκον οὐ γεγένηται μένον, ἵν’ [ἂν] ἔδειξε τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχήν, ἀήρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ ὡσαύτως: ἐπεί, εἰ παγείη πως κατὰ φύσιν, δείξειεν ἄν: ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἔδει εἶναι κεχυμένα, ἣν ἔχει οὐ δείκνυσι. καὶ κινδυνεύει ὅμοιον εἶναι οἷον τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ὑγρῶν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, οἷον αἵματος: ἡ μὲν γὰρ σὰρξ ἔχειν δοκεῖ καὶ ὅ τι ἂν σὰρξ γένηται ἐκ τοῦ αἵματος, τὸ δ’ αἷμα αἴσθησιν οὐ παρεχόμενον ἔχειν οὐ δοκεῖ. καίτοι ἀνάγκη ἐνεῖναι καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ: ἐπεὶ καὶ οὐδέν ἐστι βίαιον γινόμενον περὶ αὐτό, ἀλλ’ ἕτοιμόν ἐστι διεστάναι τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης ψυχῆς, οἷον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν τριῶν δεῖ νομίζειν εἶναι: ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅσα ἐξ ἀέρος συστάντος μᾶλλον ζῷα ἔχει τὸ μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἰς τὸ παθεῖν. ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ τὸ φῶς ἀτενὲς ὂν καὶ μένον, ἕως μένει αὐτός, παρέρχεται, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πάρεισι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ κύκλῳ καὶ οὐ πάρεισι: καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡσαύτως.

Not even the heaven, it is said — and many things appear in it — disdained the nature of every kind of living being; for this universe too has all things. From where, then, does it have them? Has it, then, all the things that are here — are they there? Or all that has been made by rational form and according to form. But when it has fire, it also has water, and by all means it has plants too. How, then, are plants there? And how does fire live? And how earth? For either it lives, or it will be there as if dead, so that not everything there lives. And what, at all, are these things there? Plants, then, could be fitted to the account; for the plant here too is a rational form set in life. If, then, the enmattered rational form of the plant, by which the plant is, is a life of a certain kind and a soul of some sort, and the rational form is some one thing, then either it is the first plant or it is not, but before it there is the first plant, from which this one too comes. For that is one, and these are many, and from one of necessity. If so, that one must live much before, and be itself this very thing, plant; and from it these live secondarily and thirdly, and after its track. But earth — how? And what is being earth? And what is the earth there that has life? Or first, what is this earth — that is, what is being, for it? There must be some shape here too, and a rational form. There, in the case of the plant, even its rational form here was living. Is it so in this earth too? Or, if we took the most earthy things begotten and moulded in it, we should find here too the nature of earth. The growths and mouldings of stones, then, and the inner shapings of mountains as they spring up, we must think come about by all means through an ensouled rational form crafting from within and giving form; and this is the form of earth, the one that makes, as in trees what is called nature, while what is called earth is analogous to the wood of the tree; and the stone cut out is as if something were cut from the tree — not when it has suffered this, but while still attached, like what is not cut from the living plant. Having found, then, that the crafting nature seated in the earth is a life in a rational form, we should easily be persuaded from here that the earth there is living much before, a rational life of earth, earth itself and earth primarily, from which the earth here too comes. And if fire too is a rational form in matter, and the other things of this kind, and fire does not come from chance — for from where? Not from rubbing, as one might think, for rubbing happens when there is already fire in the universe and the bodies rubbed have it; nor is matter so potentially fire that fire comes from it — if, then, what makes must make according to rational form, as shaping, what would it be? Or it is a soul able to make fire; and this is a life and a rational form, the two one and the same. This is why Plato says there is a soul in each of these, in no other way than as making this sensible fire. The fire-making thing here, then, is a kind of fiery life, a truer fire. The fire beyond, then, being more fire, would be more in life: fire itself, then, lives. The same account holds of the others, water and air. But why are these not ensouled, as earth is? That they too are in the universal living being is plain, I suppose, and that they are parts of a living being; but life does not show in them, just as it does not in earth either — though there it could be inferred from the things that come to be in it. But living beings come to be in fire too, and in water more plainly, and there are compositions of living beings in air. Each fire, coming to be and quickly quenched, passes by the soul in the whole, and does not become a mass that remains so as to show the soul in it; and air and water likewise. For if they were somehow made firm according to nature, they would show it; but because they had to be diffused, they do not show the soul they have. And it may be as with the liquids in us, such as blood: flesh seems to have soul, and whatever of the blood becomes flesh, but the blood, since it affords no perception, does not seem to have it. Yet it must be in it too, since nothing forced happens to it, but it is ready to separate from the soul present in it; and so we must think it is with the three elements. For even those living beings composed more of air have this: they do not perceive so as to be affected. As air passes by the light, which is unyielding and remains, for as long as the air itself remains, so it passes by the soul around it and does not pass by it; and the others likewise.

λόγος is 'rational form' throughout (glossary), except 'the account' (ὁ λόγος, ordinary sense) and 'the same account' at the end of the fourth paragraph. ζῷον is 'living being'. The chapter is the thread's statement of the tier the handoff calls the logoi: the rational form in a plant or a stone 'crafts from within', and has a living first plant and a first earth before it. 'A soul in each of these' is Plato, Laws X 899b. The opening sentence is disputed: whether 'many things appear' belongs to the heaven or to the argument is not settled by the Greek, and the English keeps the parenthesis. Volkmann brackets δὴ and ἂν as deletions; the English follows the text without them.

Greek collated line by line against the Volkmann plate (vol. 2, pp. 437-440); every departure of the First1KGreek transcription from the printed page is corrected and recorded in the apparatus.

In the crux Ennead VI.7 [38], How the Multitude of Forms Came to Be, and on the Good, chapter 11