Plotinus porphyrian IV.3 · chronological 27 · chapter 23 · volkmann page vol. 2, 35-37

τοῦ σώματος πεφωτισμένου τοῦ ἐμψύχου ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλλο ἄλλως μεταλαμβάνειν αὐτοῦ μέρος: καὶ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀργάνου πρὸς τὸ ἔργον ἐπιτηδειότητα, δύναμιν τὴν προσήκουσαν εἰς τὸ ἔργον ἀποδιδοῦσαν, οὕτω τοι λέγεσθαι τὴν μὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς δύναμιν τὴν ὁρατικὴν εἶναι, τὴν δ’ ἐν ὠσὶ τὴν ἀκουστικήν, καὶ γευστικὴν ἐν γλώσσῃ, ὄσφρησιν ἐν ῥισί, τὴν δὲ ἁπτικὴν ἐν παντὶ παρεῖναι: πρὸς γὰρ ταύτην τὴν ἀντίληψιν πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ὄργανον τῇ ψυχῇ παρεῖναι. τῶν δὲ ἁπτικῶν ὀργάνων ἐν πρώτοις τοῖς νεύροις ὄντων, ἃ δὴ καὶ πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ζῴου τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει, ἐνταῦθα τῆς τοιαύτης δούσης ἑαυτήν, ἀρχομένων δὲ ἀπὸ ἐγκεφάλου τῶν νεύρων, τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ὁρμῆς ἀρχὴν καὶ ὅλως παντὸς τοῦ ζῴου ἐνταῦθα ἔθεσαν φέροντες, οὗ δηλονότι αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὀργάνων, ἐκεῖ παρεῖναι τὸ χρησόμενον τιθέμενοι. βέλτιον δὲ λέγειν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς δυνάμεως ἐκεῖ: ὅθεν γὰρ ἔμελλε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὄργανον, ἐκεῖ ἔδει οἷον ἐναπερείδεσθαι τὴν δύναμιν τοῦ τεχνίτου ἐκείνην τὴν τῷ ὀργάνῳ πρόσφορον, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐ τὴν δύναμιν: πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις: ἐκεῖ δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἡ ἀρχή, οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ ὀργάνου. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι δύναμις καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὁρμᾶν ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰσθητικῆς καὶ φανταστικῆς φύσεως ἐπάνω ἑαυτῆς εἶχε τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἂν γειτονοῦσα πρὸς τὸ κάτω οὗ αὐτὴ ἐπάνω, ταύτῃ ἐτέθη τοῖς παλαιοῖς ἐν τοῖς ἄκροις τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς, ὡς οὖσα οὐκ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ, ἀλλ’ ὡς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, ᾧ ἐν τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ ἐκεῖνος ἵδρυτο. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔδει σώματι διδόναι, καὶ τῷ σώματος μάλιστα τῆς ἐνεργείας δεκτικῷ, τὸ δὲ σώματι οὐδαμοῦ κοινωνοῦν πάντως ἐκείνῳ κοινωνεῖν ἔδει, ὃ ψυχῆς εἶδος ἦν καὶ ψυχῆς δυναμένης τὰς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀντιλήψεις ποιεῖσθαι. αἰσθητικὸν γὰρ κριτικόν πως, καὶ φανταστικὸν οἷον νοερόν, καὶ ὁρμὴ καὶ ὄρεξις φαντασίᾳ καὶ λόγῳ ἑπόμενα. ἐκεῖ οὖν τὸ λογιζόμενον οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ, ἀλλ’ ὅτι τὸ ἐκεῖ ἀπολαύει αὐτοῦ. πῶς δὲ τὸ ἐκεῖ ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, εἴρηται. τοῦ δὲ φυτικοῦ αὖ καὶ αὐξητικοῦ καὶ θρεπτικοῦ μηδενὸς ἀπολειπομένου, τρέφοντος δὲ τῷ αἵματι, τοῦ δὲ αἵματος τοῦ τρέφοντος ἐν φλεψὶν ὄντος, ἀρχῆς δὲ καὶ φλεβῶν καὶ αἵματος ἐν ἥπατι, ὅθεν ἐναπερειδομένης ταύτῃ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐνταῦθα ἡ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ μοῖρα τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκεῖν ἀπεδόθη. ὃ γάρ τοι καὶ γεννᾷ καὶ τρέφει καὶ αὔξει, τοῦτο καὶ τούτων ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀνάγκη. τοῦ δὲ λεπτοῦ καὶ κούφου καὶ ὀξέος καὶ καθαροῦ αἵματος θυμῷ προσφόρου [ὄντος] ὀργάνου, ἡ τούτου πηγή: ἐνταῦθα γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον αἷμα ἀποκρίνεται: τῇ τοῦ θυμοῦ ζέσει πεποίηται οἴκησις πρέπουσα.

when the ensouled body has been lit by the soul, each part of it participates in it in a different way; and according to the fitness of the instrument for its work, soul gives the power suited to that work. So it is said that the power in the eyes is the power of sight, that in the ears the power of hearing, taste in the tongue, smell in the nostrils, while the power of touch is present in the whole — for with a view to this perception the whole body is present to the soul as its instrument. Since the instruments of touch are first in the nerves, which also have the power for the living being's movement, and since such a power gives itself there, and the nerves begin from the brain, they placed the principle of perception and impulse, and in general of the whole living being, there — supposing that where the principles of the instruments are, there the one who is to use them is present. But it is better to say that the principle of the power's activity is there. For where the instrument was to be moved from, there the power of the craftsman, the power suited to the instrument, had as it were to bear upon it; or rather not the power, for the power is everywhere, but the principle of its activity is there, where the principle of the instrument is. Since, then, the power of perceiving and the power of impulse, belonging to a soul that is perceptive and imaginative in nature, had reason above them, as neighbouring the lower from above, the ancients placed it at the extremity of the whole living being, in the head: not as being in the brain, but as being in this perceptive part, which was seated in the brain. For the one had to be given to the body, and to the part of the body most receptive of its activity; the other, which shares with body nowhere, had by all means to share with that which was a form of soul — of soul able to receive the apprehensions that come from reason. For the perceptive is in a way a judge, and the imaginative is as it were intellectual, and impulse and desire follow imagination and reason. The reasoning part, then, is there not as in a place, but because what is there enjoys it. How the perceptive part is 'there' has been said. Again, since the vegetative, growing and nourishing part is lacking nowhere, and nourishes by the blood, and the nourishing blood is in the veins, and the principle of the veins and of the blood is in the liver, the power as it were bearing on that point, there the desiring portion of the soul was assigned its dwelling. For what begets and nourishes and grows must also desire these things. And since blood that is thin and light and quick and pure is an instrument suited to spiritedness, its source — for there such blood is separated out — has been made a fitting dwelling for the boiling of spiritedness.

ἐπιτηδειότης is 'fitness' (glossary): the instrument's fitness for its work is what decides which power of soul it receives. ὄργανον is 'instrument' throughout, not 'organ', so that the craftsman's tool in the second paragraph is heard as the same word. The ancients who put reason in the head, desire in the liver, and spiritedness in the heart are Plato, Timaeus 69c-72d; Plotinus does not name the heart ('its source'). Volkmann brackets ὄντος as a deletion.

Greek collated line by line against the Volkmann plate (vol. 2, pp. 35-37); every departure of the First1KGreek transcription from the printed page is corrected and recorded in the apparatus.

In the crux Ennead IV.3 [27], Problems of Soul I, chapter 23