Super Librum de causis

lectio 1 · prop bardenhewer 1 · parma page 717-719 · leaf n730-n732

Quamdam propositionem praemittit loco principii ad totum tractatum.

He sets down a certain proposition at the start, in place of a principle for the whole treatise.

LemmaOmnis causa primaria plus est influens supra causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda. Cum ergo removet causa universalis secunda virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea. Quod est, quia causa universalis prima agit in causatum causae secundae antequam agat in ipsum causa universalis secunda, quae sequitur ipsum. Cum ergo agit causa secunda, quae sequitur causatum, non excluditur ipsius actio a causa prima, quae est super eam; et quando separatur causa secunda a causato, quae sequitur ipsum, non separatur ab ea prima causa, quae est supra ipsam; quoniam est causa ei. Et nos quidem exemplificamus illud per esse, et vivum, et hominem. Quod est, quia oportet ut sit res esse primo, deinde vivum, postea homo. Vivum ergo est causa hominis propinqua, et esse est causa ejus longinqua; esse ergo vehementius est causa homini quam vivum: quoniam est causa vivo, quod est causa homini. Et similiter quando ponis rationalitatem esse causam hominis, est esse vehementius causa homini magis quam rationalitas, quoniam est causa causae ejus. Et illius quod significatio est: quoniam quando removes virtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet vivum spirans sensibile. Cum autem removes ab eo vivum, et remanet esse, quoniam esse non removetur ab eo, sed removetur vivum, quoniam causa non removetur per remotionem causati sui. Remanet ergo adhuc esse. Cum ergo individuum non est homo, est animal; et si non est animal, est esse tantum. Jam ergo manifestum est et planum, quod causa longinqua est prima, et prima est plus comprehendens et vehementius causa rei, quam causa propinqua. Et propter id fit ejus operatio vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re, quam operatio causae propinquae. Et hoc quidem non fit secundum hoc, nisi quia res in primis non patitur nisi a virtute longinqua. Deinde patitur a secunda virtute, quae est sub prima. Et causa prima adjuvat secundam causam super operationem suam; quoniam omnem operationem, quam causa efficit secunda, prima etiam causa efficit. Verumtamen efficit eam per modum altiorem et sublimiorem. Et quando removetur causa secunda a causato suo, non removetur ab eo causa prima; quoniam causa prima est majoris et vehementioris adhaerentiae cum re, quam causa propinqua. Et non fit igitur causatum causae secundae, nisi per virtutem causae primae: quod est, quia causa secunda quando facit rem, influit causa prima, quae est supra eam, super illam rem de virtute sua. Quare adhaeret illud rei adhaerentia vehementi, et servat eam. Jam ergo manifestum et planum, quod causa longinqua est vehementius causa rei quam causa propinqua, quae sequitur rem: et quod ipsa influit virtutem suam super eam et conservat ipsam, et non separatur ab ea separatione suae causae propinquae, immo remanet in ea, et adhaeret ei adhaerentia vehementi, secundum quod ostendimus et exposuimus.

LemmaEvery primary cause pours more into the thing it causes than does a universal second cause. When, therefore, the universal second cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take away its own power from it. This is because the universal first cause acts upon what the second cause causes before the universal second cause, which follows it, acts upon it. When, therefore, the second cause, which follows the caused thing, acts, its action is not shut out from the first cause, which is over it; and when the second cause is separated from the caused thing, which follows it, the first cause, which is above it, is not separated from that thing, since it is a cause to it. And we for our part illustrate this by being and the living thing and the human being. This is because a thing must first be being, then a living thing, then a human being. The living thing, therefore, is the proximate cause of the human being, and being is its remote cause. Being, therefore, is more strongly the cause of the human being than the living thing is, since it is the cause of the living thing, which is the cause of the human being. And likewise, when you posit that rationality is the cause of the human being, being is more strongly the cause of the human being than rationality is, since it is the cause of its cause. And the sign of this is: that when you remove the rational power from the human being, the human being does not remain, and there remains a living thing, breathing, capable of sensation. And when you remove the living thing from it, being remains, since being is not removed from it, but the living thing is removed, because a cause is not removed by the removal of the thing it causes. Being, therefore, still remains. When, therefore, the individual is not a human being, it is an animal; and if it is not an animal, it is being only. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote cause is first, and that the first embraces more and is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause is. And for that reason its operation clings to the thing more strongly than the operation of the proximate cause does. And this comes about in this way only because a thing is at the first acted upon by nothing but the remote power, and is then acted upon by the second power, which is under the first. And the first cause aids the second cause in its operation, since every operation which the second cause effects, the first cause also effects — yet it effects it in a higher and more sublime way. And when the second cause is removed from the thing it causes, the first cause is not removed from it, since the first cause clings to the thing with a greater and stronger adherence than the proximate cause does. And so what the second cause causes does not come to be except through the power of the first cause. This is because, when the second cause makes a thing, the first cause, which is above it, pours into that thing from its own power. Wherefore it clings to the thing with a strong adherence and preserves it. Now, therefore, it is manifest and plain that the remote cause is more strongly the cause of a thing than the proximate cause which follows the thing, and that it pours its own power into the thing and preserves it, and is not separated from it when its proximate cause is separated from it; rather it remains in it and clings to it with a strong adherence, as we have shown and set forth.

Sicut Philosophus dicit in decimo Ethicorum, ultima felicitas hominis consistit in optima hominis operatione quae est supremae potentiae, idest intellectus, respectu optimi intelligibilis. Quia vero effectus per causam cognoscitur, manifestum est quod causa secundum sui naturam est magis intelligibilis quam effectus: etsi aliquando quo ad nos effectus sint notiores causis, propter hoc quod ex particularibus sub sensu cadentibus universalium et intelligibilium causarum cognitionem accepimus. Oportet igitur, quod, simpliciter loquendo, primae rerum causae sint secundum se maxima et optima intelligibilia, eo quod sunt maxima entia et maxima vera, cum sint aliis essentiae et veritatis causa, ut patet per Philosophum in secundo Metaphysicorum; quamvis hujus primae causae sint minus et posterius notae quoad nos. Habet enim se ad ea intellectus noster sicut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, quam propter excedentem claritatem perfecte percipere non potest. Oportet igitur quod ultima felicitas hominis quae in hac vita haberi potest, consistat in consideratione primarum causarum; quia illud modicum quod de eis sciri potest, est magis amabile et nobilius omnibus his quae de rebus inferioribus cognosci possunt, ut patet per Philosophum in primo de Partibus animalium. Et quia haec cognitio in nobis perficitur post hanc vitam, homo perfecte beatus constituitur, secundum illud Evangelii: «Haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te Deum verum vivum.» Et inde est, quod philosophorum intentio ad hoc principaliter erat, ut per omnia quae in rebus considerabant ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirent. Unde scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cujus considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae deputarent. Primo quidem incipientes a logica, quae modum scientiarum tradit. Secundo procedentes ad mathematicas: cujus etiam pueri possunt esse capaces. Tertio ad naturalem philosophiam, quae propter experientiam tempore indiget. Quarto ad moralem philosophiam: cujus juvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest. Ultimo autem scientiae divinae insistebant, quae considerat primas entium causas. Inveniuntur igitur quaedam de primis principiis conscripta per diversas propositiones distincta, quasi per modum sigillatim considerantium aliquas veritates. Et in graeco quidem invenitur, scilicet traditus liber Proculi Platonici, continens ducentas et novem propositiones, qui intitulatur Elevatio theologica. In arabico vero invenitur hic liber, qui apud latinos de Causis dicitur, quem constat de arabico esse translatum, et in graeco penitus non haberi. Unde videtur ab aliquo philosophorum arabum ex praedicto libro Proculi excerptus; praesertim quia omnia quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo. Intentio igitur hujus libri, quod de causis dicitur, est determinare de primis causis rerum: et quia nomen causae ordinem quemdam importat, et in causis ordo ad invicem invenitur, praemittit quasi quoddam principium totius sequentis operis quamdam propositionem, ad ordinem earum pertinentem, quae talis est. Omnis causa primaria plus est influens super suum causatum quam causa secunda universalis. Ad cujus manifestationem unum corollarium inducit, per quod manifestatur primum sicut per quoddam signum. Unde subdit: Cum ergo removet causa universalis virtutem suam a re, causa universalis prima non aufert virtutem suam ab ea: et ad hujus probationem inducit secundum: dicens quod est quia universalis causa prima agit in causatum causae secundae, antequam agat in ipsum causa universalis secunda. Et ex hoc concludit quod secundo positum est; et convenienter. Necessarium est enim, id quod prius advenit, ultimo abscedere. Videmus enim quae sunt priora in compositione esse ultima in resolutione. Sic igitur intentio hujus propositionis in his tribus consistit. Quorum primum est, quod causa prima plus influit in effectum quam secunda. Secundum est quod impressio causae primae tardius recedit ab effectu. Tertium est, quod prius ei advenit. Quae quidem tria praedicta proponit in duabus propositionibus. Primum in prima propositione sui libri, quae est talis: Omne quod producitur a secundis causis prioribus et universalioribus producitur eminentius, a quibus et secunda producebantur. Alia vero ponit in sequenti propositione, quae talis est: Omnis causa et ante causatum operatur, et post ipsum plurium est subsistentium. His autem tribus praemissis, ad ea manifestanda procedit. Primo quidem per exemplum. Secundo per rationem, ibi, «Et causa prima adjuvat.» Exemplum autem videtur pertinere ad causas formales, in quibus quanto forma est universalior, tanto prior esse videtur. Si igitur accipiamus aliquem hominem, forma quidem specifica ejus attenditur in hoc quod est rationabilis. Forma autem generis ejus attenditur in hoc quod est vivum vel animal. Ulterius autem id quod est omnibus commune est esse. Manifestum est autem in generatione unius particularis hominis, quod in naturali subjecto primo invenitur esse, deinde invenitur vivum, postmodum autem est homo: prius enim ipse est animal quam homo, ut dicitur in secundo de Generatione animalium. Rursus, quia in via corruptionis primo amittit usum rationis et remanet vivum et spiratio; secundo amittit vivum et spirans, et remanet ipsum ens, quia sic corrumpitur in nihilum. Et sic potest intelligi hoc exemplum secundum viam generationis et corruptionis alicujus individui. Et haec est ejus intentio: quod patet ex hoc quod dicit: Cum ergo individuum non est homo, idest secundum actum proprium hominis, est animal, quia adhuc remanet in eo operatio animalis, quae consistit in motu et sensu; et cum non est animal, est esse tamen, quia remanet corpus penitus inanimatum. Verificatur hoc exemplum in ipso rerum ordine: nam priora sunt essentia in viventibus et viventia hominibus; quia remoto homine non removetur animal secundum continentiam, sed e converso: quia si non est animal non est homo: et eadem ratio est de animali et esse. Secundo ibi «et causa prima» Probat tria praedicta per rationem. Primum autem, scilicet quod causa prima plus influat quam secunda, sic probat. Eminentius contingit aliquid causae quam causato. Sed operatio qua secunda causa causat effectum, causatur a causa prima. Nam causa prima adjuvat causam secundam faciens eam operari. Ergo hujus operationis secundum quam effectus producitur a causa secunda, magis est causa prima quam causa secunda. Proculus autem expressius hoc sic probat. Causa enim secunda, cum sit effectus causae primae, substantiam suam habet a causa prima. Sed a quo habet aliquid substantiam, ab eo habet potentiam sive virtutem operandi. Ergo causa secunda habet potentiam sive virtutem operandi a causa prima. Sed causa secunda per suam potentiam vel virtutem est causa effectus. Ergo hoc ipsum quod causa secunda sit causa effectus, habet a prima causa: esse ergo causam effectus inest primo primae causae, secundo autem causae secundae. Quod autem est prius in omnibus, est magis, quia perfectiora sunt priora naturaliter. Ergo prima causa est magis causa effectus quam causa secunda. Secundum, scilicet quod impressio causae primae tardius recedit ab effectu, Probat ibi «et quando removetur» Et inducit talem rationem. Quod vehementius inest, magis inhaeret. Sed prima causa vehementius imprimit in effectu quam causa secunda, ut probatum est. Ergo ejus impressio magis inhaeret, ergo tardius recedit. Tertium, scilicet quod prius adveniat, Probat ibi «et non fit igitur» Tali ratione. Causa secunda non agit in causatum suum nisi virtute causae primae. Ergo et causatum non procedit a causa secunda nisi per virtutem causae primae. Sic ergo virtus causae primae dat effectum secundae, ut attingatur a virtute causae secundae. Prima enim attingitur a virtute causae primae. Hoc autem uno modo Proculus sic probat. Causa prima est magis causa quam secunda; ergo est perfectioris virtutis. Sed quanto virtus alicujus causae est perfectior, tanto ad plura se extendit; ergo virtus causae primae ad plura se extendit quam virtus causae secundae. Sed id quod in pluribus est, prius est etiam in adveniendo, et ultimum in recedendo; ergo impressio causae primae primo advenit et ultimo recedit. Est autem considerandum in quibus causis haec propositio habeat virtutem. Et si quidem ad genera causarum quaestio referatur, manifestum est quod habet veritatem in quolibet genere causarum suo modo. Et in causis quidem formalibus, exemplum inductum est. In causis autem materialibus similis ratio invenitur. Nam id quod primo subsistit ut materia, causa est propinquiori modo, ut et ipsa materialiter subsistat; sicut materia prima elementis, quae sunt quodammodo materia mixtorum corporum. Ostendit idem esse et in efficientibus causis. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua causa efficiens est prior, tanto ejus virtus ad plura se extendit. Inde oportet ut proprius effectus ejus communior sit: causae vero secundae proprius effectus in paucioribus invenitur, unde et particularior est. Ipsa enim causa prima producit vel movet causam secundo agentem, et sic fit ei causa ut agat. Inveniuntur igitur praedicta tria, quae tacta sunt, primordialiter quidem in causis efficientibus, et ex hoc manifestum est quod derivatur ad causas formales: unde et hic ponitur verbum influendi, et Proculus utitur verbo productionis quae exprimit causalitatem causae efficientis. Quod autem ex causis efficientibus derivetur ad causas materiales, non est adeo manifestum, eo quod causae efficientes, quae sunt apud nos, non producunt materiam sed formam. Sed si consideremus causas universales cum quibus procedunt et materialia rerum principia, necesse est quod hic ordo derivetur et ad materiales causas ex causis efficientibus. Quia enim primae causae et supremae causae efficacia seu causalitas ad plura se extendit, necessarium est quod id quod primo subsistit in omnibus sit a prima omnium causa, deinde a causis secundis adduntur dispositiones, quibus materiae appropriantur singulis rebus. Quod etiam utcumque in his, quae apud nos sunt, apparet. Nam omnibus artificialibus materiam primam exhibet natura. Deinde per artes quasdam priores materia disponitur, ut congruat particularibus artificiis. Comparatur enim prima omnium causa ad totam naturam, sicut natura ad artem. Unde id quod primo subsistit in tota natura, est prima omnium causa quae appropriatur singulis rebus officio secundarum causarum. In causis etiam finalibus manifestum est verificari omnia praedicta. Nam propter ultimum finem qui est universalis, alii fines appetuntur, quorum appetitus advenit post appetitum ultimi finis, et ante ipsum cessat: sed et hujus ordinis ratio ad genus causae efficientis reducitur. Nam finis intantum est causa inquantum movet efficientem ad agendum; et sic prout habet rationem moventis pertinet quodammodo ad causae efficientis genus. Si autem quaeratur in unoquoque causarum genere, utrum praedicta verificentur in omnibus causis quomodolibet ordinatis, manifestum est quod non. Invenimus enim causas ordinari dupliciter. Uno modo per se, alio modo per accidens. Per se quidem, intentio primae causae respicit usque ad ultimum effectum per omnes causas medias. Sicut enim ars fabri movet manum, manus martellum, qui ferrum percussum excedit, ad quod fertur intentio artis. Per accidens autem quando intentio causae non procedit nisi ad proximum effectum. Quod autem ab illo effectu efficiatur iterum aliud, est praeter intentionem primi efficientis; sicut cum aliquis accendat candelam, praeter intentionem ejus est quod iterum accensa candela accendat aliam, et illa aliam. Quod autem praeter intentionem est, dicimus esse per accidens. In causis igitur per se ordinatis haec propositio habet veritatem, in quibus causa prima movet omnes causas medias ad effectum. In causis autem ordinatis per accidens, est e converso. Nam effectus qui per se producitur a causa proxima, per accidens producitur a causa prima, praeter intentionem ejus existens. Quod autem est per se, potius est eo quod est per accidens. Et ad hoc significandum dicit, Causa universalis est causa per se.

As the Philosopher says in the tenth book of the Ethics, the ultimate happiness of a human being consists in a human being's best operation, which is that of the highest power, namely the intellect, with respect to the best intelligible. And since an effect is known through its cause, it is manifest that the cause, according to its own nature, is more intelligible than the effect, even though effects are sometimes better known to us than their causes, because we take our knowledge of universal and intelligible causes from particulars that fall under the senses. It must be, therefore, that, speaking without qualification, the first causes of things are in themselves the greatest and best intelligibles, since they are the greatest beings and the most true, being the cause of essence and truth to other things, as is clear from the Philosopher in the second book of the Metaphysics; although such first causes are less known to us, and known later. For our intellect stands to them as the eye of the owl stands to the light of the sun, which it cannot perceive perfectly because of its surpassing brightness. It must be, therefore, that the ultimate happiness of a human being that can be had in this life consists in the consideration of the first causes; because the little that can be known of them is more lovable and nobler than all the things that can be known of lower things, as is clear from the Philosopher in the first book of On the Parts of Animals. And since this knowledge is perfected in us after this life, a human being is made perfectly blessed, according to that saying of the Gospel: 'This is eternal life, that they may know you, the true, living God.' And hence it is that the philosophers' intention was chiefly this: that through everything they considered in things they might arrive at the knowledge of the first causes. So they set the science of the first causes last, and assigned the last period of their life to its consideration. First, indeed, they began from logic, which hands down the method of the sciences. Second, they went on to mathematics, of which even children can be capable. Third, to natural philosophy, which needs time because of experience. Fourth, to moral philosophy, of which a young man cannot be a fitting hearer. Last of all they applied themselves to divine science, which considers the first causes of beings. There are found, therefore, certain writings about the first principles, divided into separate propositions, as if in the manner of those who consider certain truths one by one. And in Greek there is found, handed down, a book of Proclus the Platonist containing two hundred and nine propositions, entitled the Elevation of theology. But in Arabic there is found this book, which among the Latins is called On Causes, which is agreed to have been translated from the Arabic and not to exist in Greek at all. So it seems to have been excerpted out of the aforesaid book of Proclus by one of the Arab philosophers, especially because everything contained in this book is contained much more fully and at greater length in that one. The intention of this book, then, which is called On Causes, is to settle the question of the first causes of things; and since the name of cause implies a certain order, and an order is found among causes in relation to one another, he sets down first, as a kind of principle of the whole work that follows, a certain proposition concerning their order, which is this: 'Every primary cause pours more into the thing it causes than does a universal second cause.' To make this manifest he brings in one corollary, through which the first is made manifest as through a kind of sign. So he adds: 'When, therefore, the universal cause removes its power from a thing, the universal first cause does not take away its own power from it.' And to prove this he brings in a second point, saying that this is 'because the universal first cause acts upon what the second cause causes before the universal second cause acts upon it'. And from this he concludes what was set down second; and fittingly. For it is necessary that what arrives first should depart last. For we see that the things that are prior in composition are last in resolution. Thus, then, the intention of this proposition consists in these three points. The first of them is that the first cause pours more into the effect than the second does. The second is that the impression of the first cause withdraws from the effect later. The third is that it arrives at it earlier. These three points he sets out in two propositions: the first in the first proposition of his book, which is this: 'Everything that is produced by second causes is produced more eminently by the prior and more universal causes, by which the second things too were produced.' The others he sets down in the following proposition, which is this: 'Every cause both operates before the thing caused and, after it, gives subsistence to more things.' Having set down these three points, he proceeds to make them manifest: first by an example; second by reasoning, at 'And the first cause aids'. The example seems to belong to formal causes, among which the more universal a form is, the prior it seems to be. If, then, we take some human being, his specific form is found in his being rational; the form of his genus is found in his being living, or an animal; and beyond this, what is common to all things is being. Now it is manifest that in the generation of one particular human being, being is found first in the natural subject, then living, and after that it is a human being: for he is an animal before he is a human being, as is said in the second book of On the Generation of Animals. Again, in the way of corruption he first loses the use of reason, and living and breathing remain; second, he loses living and breathing, and being itself remains, for it is in this way that he is corrupted into nothing. And so this example can be understood according to the way of generation and corruption of some individual. And this is his intention, as is clear from what he says: 'When, therefore, the individual is not a human being' — that is, according to the act proper to a human being — 'it is an animal', because the operation of an animal, which consists in movement and sense, still remains in it; 'and when it is not an animal, it is still being', because a body wholly without soul remains. This example is verified in the very order of things: for beings are prior to living things, and living things to human beings; because when the human being is removed the animal is not removed, in the order of containment, but the converse holds: because if it is not an animal it is not a human being; and the same reasoning holds of animal and being. Second, at 'And the first cause' He proves the three points above by reasoning. The first, namely that the first cause pours in more than the second, he proves in this way. Something belongs more eminently to the cause than to the thing caused. But the operation by which the second cause causes the effect is caused by the first cause; for the first cause aids the second cause by making it operate. Therefore the first cause is more the cause of this operation, according to which the effect is produced by the second cause, than the second cause is. Proclus, however, proves this more explicitly, as follows. The second cause, since it is an effect of the first cause, has its substance from the first cause. But that from which a thing has its substance is that from which it has the potency, or power, of operating. Therefore the second cause has the potency, or power, of operating from the first cause. But the second cause is the cause of the effect through its potency or power. Therefore this very thing, that the second cause is the cause of the effect, it has from the first cause: to be the cause of the effect, therefore, belongs first to the first cause, and second to the second cause. And what is prior in all things is more so, because the more perfect things are prior by nature. Therefore the first cause is more the cause of the effect than the second cause is. The second point, namely that the impression of the first cause withdraws from the effect later, He proves at 'And when ... is removed' And he brings in this reasoning. What is in a thing more strongly adheres to it more. But the first cause makes its impression on the effect more strongly than the second cause does, as has been proved. Therefore its impression adheres more, and therefore it withdraws later. The third point, namely that it arrives earlier, He proves at 'And so ... does not come to be' By this reasoning. The second cause does not act upon the thing it causes except by the power of the first cause. Therefore the thing caused does not proceed from the second cause either, except through the power of the first cause. Thus, then, the power of the first cause gives the effect to the second, so that it is reached by the power of the second cause; for it is reached first by the power of the first cause. Proclus, in one way, proves this as follows. The first cause is more a cause than the second; therefore it is of more perfect power. But the more perfect the power of any cause is, the more things it extends to; therefore the power of the first cause extends to more things than the power of the second cause. But what is in more things is also prior in arriving and last in withdrawing; therefore the impression of the first cause arrives first and withdraws last. But it must be considered in which causes this proposition holds. And if the question is referred to the kinds of causes, it is manifest that it holds true in every kind of cause, in its own way. In formal causes, indeed, the example has been brought in. In material causes a like reasoning is found. For what first subsists as matter is a cause in a nearer way, so that it itself too subsists materially; as prime matter is to the elements, which are in a certain way the matter of mixed bodies. The same is shown to hold in efficient causes too. For it is manifest that the prior an efficient cause is, the more things its power extends to. Hence its proper effect must be more common; whereas the proper effect of a second cause is found in fewer things, and so it is more particular. For the first cause itself produces or moves the cause that acts second, and in this way becomes for it the cause of its acting. The three points above, then, which have been touched on, are found primordially in efficient causes, and from this it is manifest that they are derived to formal causes: and so here the verb 'to pour into' is used, and Proclus uses the verb of producing, which expresses the causality of the efficient cause. But that they are derived from efficient causes to material causes is not so manifest, because the efficient causes that are among us produce not matter but form. But if we consider the universal causes, from which the material principles of things also proceed, it is necessary that this order be derived to material causes too, from efficient causes. For since the efficacy or causality of the first and highest cause extends to more things, it is necessary that what first subsists in all things be from the first cause of all, and that then dispositions be added by second causes, by which matters are fitted to single things. This also appears in some fashion in the things that are among us. For nature supplies the first matter to all artificial things. Then matter is disposed by certain prior arts, so that it may suit particular works of art. For the first cause of all stands to the whole of nature as nature stands to art. Hence what first subsists in the whole of nature is the first cause of all, which is fitted to single things by the office of the second causes. In final causes too it is manifest that all the points above are verified. For other ends are desired for the sake of the ultimate end, which is universal; and the desire of these arrives after the desire of the ultimate end, and ceases before it. But the ground of this order too is reduced to the genus of the efficient cause. For the end is a cause to the extent that it moves the efficient cause to act; and so, in so far as it has the character of a mover, it belongs in a certain way to the genus of the efficient cause. If, however, it is asked whether, in each kind of cause, the points above are verified in all causes ordered in any way whatever, it is manifest that they are not. For we find causes ordered in two ways: in one way per se, in the other per accidens. Per se, indeed, when the intention of the first cause looks all the way to the last effect, through all the intermediate causes; as the smith's art moves the hand, the hand the hammer, which beats out the iron it strikes, to which the intention of the art is directed. Per accidens, when the intention of the cause goes only as far as the nearest effect; and that something further should be effected by that effect is beside the intention of the first agent; as when someone lights a candle, it is beside his intention that the lit candle should in turn light another, and that one another. And what is beside the intention we call per accidens. In causes ordered per se, then, this proposition holds true: in them the first cause moves all the intermediate causes to the effect. In causes ordered per accidens it is the reverse. For an effect that is produced per se by the nearest cause is produced per accidens by the first cause, falling outside its intention. And what is per se ranks above what is per accidens. And to signify this he says: 'The universal cause is a cause per se.'