Thomas Aquinas part.question.article I.65.4 · parts resp., ad 2 · parma page 257-258

Respondeo dicendum, quod opinio fuit quorumdam, quod omnes formae corporales derivantur a substantiis spiritualibus, quas Angelos dicimus. Et hoc quidem dupliciter aliqui posuerunt. Plato enim posuit formas quae sunt in materia corporali, derivari a formis sine materia subsistentibus per modum participationis cujusdam. Ponebat enim hominem quemdam immaterialiter subsistentem, et similiter equum, et sic de aliis, ex quibus constituuntur haec singularia sensibilia, secundum quod in materia corporali remanet quaedam impressio ab illis formis separatis per modum assimilationis cujusdam, quam participationem vocabat. Et secundum ordinem formarum ponebant Platonici ordinem substantiarum separatarum; puta quod una substantia separata est quae est equus, quae est causa omnium equorum, supra quam est quaedam vita separata, quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et ulterius quamdam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causam omnis esse. Avicenna vero et quidam alii non posuerunt formas rerum corporalium in materia per se subsistere, sed solum in intellectu. A formis ergo in intellectu creaturarum spiritualium existentibus, quas quidem ipsi intelligentias, nos autem Angelos dicimus, dicebant procedere omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, sicut a formis quae sunt in mente artificis, procedunt formae artificiatorum. Et in idem videtur redire quod quidam moderni haeretici ponunt, dicentes quidem Deum creatorem omnium, sed materiam corporalem a diabolo formatam, et per varias species distinctam. Omnes autem haec opiniones ex una radice processisse videntur. Quaerebant enim causam formarum, ac si ipsae formae fierent secundum seipsas. Sed, sicut probat Aristoteles (in 7 Metaph., text. 26 et 27), id quod proprie fit, est compositum. Formae autem corruptibilium rerum habent ut aliquando sint, aliquando non sint, absque hoc quod ipsae generentur aut corrumpantur, sed compositis generatis aut corruptis: quia etiam formae non habent esse, sed composita habent esse per eas; sic enim alicui competit fieri, sicut et esse. Et ideo cum simile fiat a suo simili, non est quaerenda causa formarum corporalium aliqua forma immaterialis, sed aliquod compositum, secundum quod hic ignis generatur ab hoc igne. Sic igitur formae corporales causantur, non quasi influxae ab aliqua immateriali forma, sed quasi materia reducta de potentia in actum ab aliquo agente composito. Sed quia agens compositum, quod est corpus, movetur a substantia spirituali creata, ut Augustinus dicit (3 de Trin. cap. 4 et 5), sequitur ulterius quod etiam formae corporales a substantiis spiritualibus deriventur, non tamquam influentibus formas, sed tamquam moventibus ad formas. Ulterius autem reducuntur in Deum, sicut in primam causam, etiam species angelici intellectus, quae sunt quaedam seminales rationes corporalium formarum. In prima autem corporalis creaturae productione non consideratur aliqua transmutatio de potentia in actum; et ideo formae corporales quas in prima productione corpora habuerunt, sunt immediate a Deo productae, cui soli ad nutum obedit materia tamquam proprie causae. Unde ad hoc significandum Moyses singulis operibus praemittit: Dixit Deus. Fiat hoc, vel illud; in quo significatur formatio rerum per Verbum Dei facta, a quo secundum Augustinum (tract. 1 in Joan., a med., et 1 super Gen. ad litt. cap. 4), est omnis forma, et compago, et concordia partium. Ad secundum dicendum, quod formae participatae in materia reducuntur non ad formas aliquas per se subsistentes rationis ejusdem, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed ad formas intelligibiles vel intellectus angelici, a quibus per motum procedunt; vel ulterius ad rationes intellectus divini, a quibus etiam formarum semina sunt rebus creatis indita, ut per motum in actum educi possint.

I answer that it was the opinion of some that all bodily forms are derived from the spiritual substances we call angels. And some held this in two ways. Plato held that the forms that are in bodily matter are derived from forms subsisting without matter, by way of a kind of participation. For he held that there is a man subsisting immaterially, and likewise a horse, and so of the rest, and that these sensible singulars are constituted from them, in that there remains in bodily matter a kind of impression from those separate forms, by way of a kind of likening, which he called participation. And the Platonists held an order of separate substances answering to the order of forms: for instance, that there is one separate substance which is horse, the cause of all horses; above it a separate life, which they called life itself and the cause of all life; and beyond that one which they named being itself, the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others did not hold that the forms of bodily things subsist of themselves in matter, but only in intellect. From forms existing in the intellects of spiritual creatures, then — which they called intelligences and we call angels — they said that all the forms in bodily matter proceed, as the forms of things made by art proceed from the forms in the craftsman's mind. And what certain heretics of our time hold seems to come to the same thing: they say that God is the creator of all things, but that bodily matter was formed by the devil and divided into its various species. All these opinions seem to have come from one root: they looked for a cause of forms as though the forms themselves came to be of themselves. But, as Aristotle proves (Metaphysics VII, texts 26 and 27), what properly comes to be is the composite. The forms of corruptible things have it that they sometimes are and sometimes are not, without themselves being generated or corrupted, but by the composites being generated or corrupted; for forms do not have being, but composites have being through them, and to come to be belongs to a thing as being does. And therefore, since like comes to be from its like, the cause of bodily forms is not to be sought in some immaterial form but in some composite, in the way that this fire is generated by this fire. So bodily forms are caused not as flowing in from some immaterial form, but as matter is brought from potency into act by some composite agent. But because the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trinitate III, chs. 4 and 5), it follows further that bodily forms too are derived from spiritual substances — not as pouring the forms in, but as moving toward the forms. And further, the species of the angelic intellect, which are a kind of seminal reasons of bodily forms, are traced back to God as to the first cause. In the first production of bodily creation, however, no change from potency into act is in view; and so the bodily forms that bodies had in their first production were produced by God immediately, whom alone matter obeys at a nod as its proper cause. To signify this, Moses puts before each work: God said, Let this or that be made; by which is signified the forming of things done through the Word of God, from whom, according to Augustine (Tractates on John 1, toward the middle; and On Genesis according to the Letter I, ch. 4), is every form and fitting-together and concord of parts. To the second, it must be said that the forms participated in matter are traced back not to forms of the same kind subsisting of themselves, as the Platonists held, but to intelligible forms, or those of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed through motion; or further to the reasons in the divine intellect, from which the seeds of forms too were set in created things, so that they might be drawn out into act through motion.

Utrum formae corporum sint ab Angelis. The Respondeo names both positions this thread follows: Plato's separated Forms, and Avicenna's forms in the intelligences, which pour forms into matter as a craftsman's mind does into his work — the giver of forms. Aquinas's answer is Aristotle's (Met. VII.8): what comes to be is the composite, so like comes from like, this fire from this fire. The 'seminal reasons' (seminales rationes) that close the Respondeo are Augustine's term, and the Latin descendant of the rational forms of Enn. III.8 and VI.7. The 'heretics of our time' are the dualists of Thomas's day (Cathars). species is 'species'; forma 'form' (glossary).

Latin transcribed from the Parma plates (vol. 1, pp. 257-258, leaves n296-n297), both columns read with gutter-safe crops.

In the crux Ennead III.8 [30], On Nature and Contemplation and the One, chapter 2