Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars

part.question.article I.65.4 · parts resp., ad 2 · parma page 257-258

Respondeo dicendum, quod opinio fuit quorumdam, quod omnes formae corporales derivantur a substantiis spiritualibus, quas Angelos dicimus. Et hoc quidem dupliciter aliqui posuerunt. Plato enim posuit formas quae sunt in materia corporali, derivari a formis sine materia subsistentibus per modum participationis cujusdam. Ponebat enim hominem quemdam immaterialiter subsistentem, et similiter equum, et sic de aliis, ex quibus constituuntur haec singularia sensibilia, secundum quod in materia corporali remanet quaedam impressio ab illis formis separatis per modum assimilationis cujusdam, quam participationem vocabat. Et secundum ordinem formarum ponebant Platonici ordinem substantiarum separatarum; puta quod una substantia separata est quae est equus, quae est causa omnium equorum, supra quam est quaedam vita separata, quam dicebant per se vitam et causam omnis vitae; et ulterius quamdam quam nominabant ipsum esse, et causam omnis esse. Avicenna vero et quidam alii non posuerunt formas rerum corporalium in materia per se subsistere, sed solum in intellectu. A formis ergo in intellectu creaturarum spiritualium existentibus, quas quidem ipsi intelligentias, nos autem Angelos dicimus, dicebant procedere omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, sicut a formis quae sunt in mente artificis, procedunt formae artificiatorum. Et in idem videtur redire quod quidam moderni haeretici ponunt, dicentes quidem Deum creatorem omnium, sed materiam corporalem a diabolo formatam, et per varias species distinctam. Omnes autem haec opiniones ex una radice processisse videntur. Quaerebant enim causam formarum, ac si ipsae formae fierent secundum seipsas. Sed, sicut probat Aristoteles (in 7 Metaph., text. 26 et 27), id quod proprie fit, est compositum. Formae autem corruptibilium rerum habent ut aliquando sint, aliquando non sint, absque hoc quod ipsae generentur aut corrumpantur, sed compositis generatis aut corruptis: quia etiam formae non habent esse, sed composita habent esse per eas; sic enim alicui competit fieri, sicut et esse. Et ideo cum simile fiat a suo simili, non est quaerenda causa formarum corporalium aliqua forma immaterialis, sed aliquod compositum, secundum quod hic ignis generatur ab hoc igne. Sic igitur formae corporales causantur, non quasi influxae ab aliqua immateriali forma, sed quasi materia reducta de potentia in actum ab aliquo agente composito. Sed quia agens compositum, quod est corpus, movetur a substantia spirituali creata, ut Augustinus dicit (3 de Trin. cap. 4 et 5), sequitur ulterius quod etiam formae corporales a substantiis spiritualibus deriventur, non tamquam influentibus formas, sed tamquam moventibus ad formas. Ulterius autem reducuntur in Deum, sicut in primam causam, etiam species angelici intellectus, quae sunt quaedam seminales rationes corporalium formarum. In prima autem corporalis creaturae productione non consideratur aliqua transmutatio de potentia in actum; et ideo formae corporales quas in prima productione corpora habuerunt, sunt immediate a Deo productae, cui soli ad nutum obedit materia tamquam proprie causae. Unde ad hoc significandum Moyses singulis operibus praemittit: Dixit Deus. Fiat hoc, vel illud; in quo significatur formatio rerum per Verbum Dei facta, a quo secundum Augustinum (tract. 1 in Joan., a med., et 1 super Gen. ad litt. cap. 4), est omnis forma, et compago, et concordia partium. Ad secundum dicendum, quod formae participatae in materia reducuntur non ad formas aliquas per se subsistentes rationis ejusdem, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed ad formas intelligibiles vel intellectus angelici, a quibus per motum procedunt; vel ulterius ad rationes intellectus divini, a quibus etiam formarum semina sunt rebus creatis indita, ut per motum in actum educi possint.

I answer that it was the opinion of some that all bodily forms are derived from the spiritual substances we call angels. And some held this in two ways. Plato held that the forms that are in bodily matter are derived from forms subsisting without matter, by way of a kind of participation. For he held that there is a man subsisting immaterially, and likewise a horse, and so of the rest, and that these sensible singulars are constituted from them, in that there remains in bodily matter a kind of impression from those separate forms, by way of a kind of likening, which he called participation. And the Platonists held an order of separate substances answering to the order of forms: for instance, that there is one separate substance which is horse, the cause of all horses; above it a separate life, which they called life itself and the cause of all life; and beyond that one which they named being itself, the cause of all being. Avicenna, however, and certain others did not hold that the forms of bodily things subsist of themselves in matter, but only in intellect. From forms existing in the intellects of spiritual creatures, then — which they called intelligences and we call angels — they said that all the forms in bodily matter proceed, as the forms of things made by art proceed from the forms in the craftsman's mind. And what certain heretics of our time hold seems to come to the same thing: they say that God is the creator of all things, but that bodily matter was formed by the devil and divided into its various species. All these opinions seem to have come from one root: they looked for a cause of forms as though the forms themselves came to be of themselves. But, as Aristotle proves (Metaphysics VII, texts 26 and 27), what properly comes to be is the composite. The forms of corruptible things have it that they sometimes are and sometimes are not, without themselves being generated or corrupted, but by the composites being generated or corrupted; for forms do not have being, but composites have being through them, and to come to be belongs to a thing as being does. And therefore, since like comes to be from its like, the cause of bodily forms is not to be sought in some immaterial form but in some composite, in the way that this fire is generated by this fire. So bodily forms are caused not as flowing in from some immaterial form, but as matter is brought from potency into act by some composite agent. But because the composite agent, which is a body, is moved by a created spiritual substance, as Augustine says (De Trinitate III, chs. 4 and 5), it follows further that bodily forms too are derived from spiritual substances — not as pouring the forms in, but as moving toward the forms. And further, the species of the angelic intellect, which are a kind of seminal reasons of bodily forms, are traced back to God as to the first cause. In the first production of bodily creation, however, no change from potency into act is in view; and so the bodily forms that bodies had in their first production were produced by God immediately, whom alone matter obeys at a nod as its proper cause. To signify this, Moses puts before each work: God said, Let this or that be made; by which is signified the forming of things done through the Word of God, from whom, according to Augustine (Tractates on John 1, toward the middle; and On Genesis according to the Letter I, ch. 4), is every form and fitting-together and concord of parts. To the second, it must be said that the forms participated in matter are traced back not to forms of the same kind subsisting of themselves, as the Platonists held, but to intelligible forms, or those of the angelic intellect, from which they proceed through motion; or further to the reasons in the divine intellect, from which the seeds of forms too were set in created things, so that they might be drawn out into act through motion.

part.question.article I.115.1 · parts resp. · parma page 439

Respondeo dicendum, quod sensibiliter apparet aliqua corpora esse activa. Sed circa corporum actiones tripliciter aliqui erraverunt. Fuerunt enim aliqui, qui totaliter corporibus actiones subtraxerunt. Et haec est opinio Avicebron in libro Fontis Vitae, ubi per rationes quae tactae sunt, probare nititur, quod nullum corpus agit, sed omnes actiones quae videntur esse corporum, sunt actiones cujusdam virtutis spiritualis quae penetrat per omnia corpora; ita quod ignis, secundum eum, non calefacit, sed virtus spiritualis penetrans per ipsum. Et videtur haec opinio derivata esse ab opinione Platonis. Nam Plato posuit omnes formas quae sunt in materia corporali, esse participatas et determinatas, et contractas ad hanc materiam; formas vero separatas esse absolutas, et quasi universales. Et ideo illas formas separatas dicebat esse causas formarum quae sunt in materia. Secundum hoc ergo quod forma quae est in materia corporali, determinata est ad hanc materiam individuatam per quantitatem, ponebat Avicebron, quod a quantitate, prout est individuationis principium, retinetur et arcetur forma corporalis, ne possit se extendere per actionem in aliam materiam; sed solum forma spiritualis et immaterialis, quae non est coarctata per quantitatem, potest effluere per actionem in aliud. Sed ista ratio non concludit quod forma corporalis non sit agens; sed quod non sit agens universale. Secundum enim quod participatur aliquid, secundum hoc est necessarium quod participetur id quod est proprium ei; sicut quantum participatur de lumine, tantum participatur de ratione visibilis. Agere autem, quod nihil est aliud quam facere aliquid actu, est per se proprium actus, inquantum est actus. Unde et omne agens agit sibi simile Sic ergo ex hoc quod aliquid est forma non determinata per materiam quantitati subjectam, habet quod sit agens indeterminatum et universale; ex hoc vero quod est determinata ad hanc materiam, habet quod sit agens contractum et particulare. Unde si esset forma ignis separata, ut Platonici posuerunt, esset aliquo modo causa omnis ignitionis. Sed haec forma ignis quae est in hac materia corporali, est causa hujus ignitionis, quae est ab hoc corpore in hoc corpus; unde et fit talis actio per contactum duorum corporum. Sed tamen haec opinio Avicebron superexcedit opinionem Platonis. Nam Plato ponebat solum formas substantiales separatas; accidentia vero reducebat ad principia materialia, quae sunt magnum et parvum; quae ponebat esse prima contraria; sicut alii rarum et densum. Et ideo tam Plato, quam Avicenna in aliquo ipsum sequentes, ponebant quod agentia corporalia agunt secundum formas accidentales, disponendo materiam ad formam substantialem; sed ultima perfectio, quae est per inductionem formae substantialis, est a principio immateriali. Et haec est secunda opinio de actione corporum, de qua supra dictum est, qu. 45, art. 8, cum de creatione ageretur. Tertia vero opinio fuit Democriti, qui ponebat actionem esse per effluxionem atomorum a corpore agente et passionem esse per receptionem eorumdem in poris corporis patientis. Quam opinionem improbat Aristoteles (in lib. de Gen., text. 75 et seq.). Sequeretur enim quod corpus non pateretur per totum et quod quantitas corporis agentis diminueretur ex hoc quod agit; quae sunt manifeste falsa. Dicendum est ergo, quod corpus agit secundum quod est in actu, in aliud corpus secundum quod est in potentia.

I answer that it is plain to the senses that some bodies are active. But about the actions of bodies some have erred in three ways. For there were some who took actions away from bodies altogether. This is the opinion of Avicebron in the book Fons vitae, where by the reasons touched on above he tries to prove that no body acts, but that all the actions which seem to be those of bodies are actions of a certain spiritual power which penetrates through all bodies; so that fire, on his view, does not heat, but a spiritual power penetrating through it does. And this opinion seems to be derived from the opinion of Plato. For Plato held that all the forms that are in bodily matter are participated and determined, and contracted to this matter, while the separate forms are absolute and, as it were, universal. And so he said that those separate forms are the causes of the forms in matter. Taking it, then, that the form in bodily matter is determined to this matter individuated by quantity, Avicebron held that the bodily form is held back and confined by quantity, as the principle of individuation, so that it cannot extend itself by action into other matter; only a spiritual and immaterial form, not confined by quantity, can flow out by action into another. But this reasoning does not conclude that the bodily form is not an agent, but that it is not a universal agent. For in the measure that something is participated, in that measure what is proper to it must be participated; as, however much of light is participated, that much is participated of the character of the visible. Now to act, which is nothing other than to make something in act, is proper to act as such, in so far as it is act. Hence too every agent produces its like. So, from being a form not determined by matter subject to quantity, a thing has it that it is an undetermined and universal agent; and from being determined to this matter, it has it that it is a contracted and particular agent. Hence if there were a separate form of fire, as the Platonists held, it would in some way be the cause of all burning. But this form of fire, which is in this bodily matter, is the cause of this burning, which passes from this body into this body; hence such action takes place by the contact of two bodies. And yet this opinion of Avicebron goes beyond Plato's. For Plato held only the substantial forms to be separate, and traced accidents back to material principles, the great and the small, which he held to be the first contraries, as others held the rare and the dense. And so both Plato, and Avicenna following him in some respect, held that bodily agents act by their accidental forms, disposing matter for the substantial form, but that the final perfection, which comes by the bringing in of the substantial form, is from an immaterial principle. And this is the second opinion about the action of bodies, of which we spoke above, q. 45, a. 8, when creation was treated. The third opinion was that of Democritus, who held that action takes place through an outflow of atoms from the acting body, and being acted on through their reception in the pores of the body acted on. Aristotle refutes this opinion (On Generation, texts 75 and following). For it would follow that a body is not acted on through the whole of it, and that the quantity of an acting body would be diminished by its acting; both plainly false. It must be said, then, that a body acts in so far as it is in act, upon another body in so far as that is in potency.