Liber de causis, proposition 7

prop bardenhewer 7 · pattin prop 7 · bardenhewer page 170-171

Omnis intelligentia scit quod est supra se et quod est sub se: uerumtamen scit quod est sub se, quoniam est causa ei, et scit quod est supra se, quoniam adquirit ab eo bonitates. et intelligentia quidem est substantia intelligibilis: ergo secundum modum suae substantiae scit res quas adquirit desuper et res quibus est causa. ergo ipsa discernit quod est supra eam et quod est sub ea, et scit quod illud quod est supra eam, est causa ei, et quod est sub ea, est causatum ab ea, et cognoscit causam suam et causatum suum per modum qui est causa eius, scilicet per modum suae substantiae. et similiter omnis sciens non scit rem meliorem et rem inferiorem et deteriorem nisi secundum modum suae substantiae et sui esse, non secundum modum secundum quem res sunt. et si hoc ita est, tunc procul dubio bonitates quae descendunt super intelligentiam a causa prima, sunt in ea intelligibiles, et similiter res corporeae, sensibiles sunt in intelligentia intelligibiles. quod est quoniam res quae sunt in intelligentia non sunt inpressiones ipsae, immo sunt causae inpressionum. et significatio illius est quod intelligentia ipsa est causa rerum quae sunt sub ea per hoc quod est intelligentia. si ergo est intelligentia causa rerum per hoc quod est intelligentia, tunc procul dubio causae rerum in intelligentia sunt intelligibiles etiam. iam ergo manifestum est quod res supra intelligentiam et sub ea sunt per uirtutem intelligibilem, et similiter res corporeae cum intelligentia sunt intelligibiles et res intelligibiles in intelligentia sunt intelligibiles: quoniam ipsa est causa esse earum, et quia ipsa non adprehendit nisi per modum suae substantiae: et ipsa quia est intelligentia, adprehendit res adprehensione intelligibili, siue intelligibiles sunt res siue corporeae.

Every intellect knows what is above it and what is below it; yet it knows what is below it because it is a cause to it, and it knows what is above it because it acquires goodnesses from it. And intellect is an intellectual substance; therefore it knows, according to the mode of its own substance, the things it acquires from above and the things to which it is a cause. Therefore it discerns what is above it and what is below it, and knows that what is above it is a cause to it, and that what is below it is caused by it; and it knows its cause and what it causes in the mode which is its cause, that is, in the mode of its own substance. And likewise every knower knows a better thing, and a lower and worse thing, only according to the mode of its own substance and of its own being, and not according to the mode in which the things themselves are. And if this is so, then beyond doubt the goodnesses which descend upon intellect from the first cause are intelligible in it; and likewise corporeal, perceptible things are intelligible in intellect. This is because the things which are in intellect are not the impressions themselves, but rather the causes of the impressions. And the sign of this is that intellect itself is the cause of the things which are below it by the very fact that it is intellect. If, then, intellect is the cause of things by the fact that it is intellect, then beyond doubt the causes of things in intellect are intelligible as well. Now, therefore, it is manifest that the things above intellect and below it are there by an intellectual power; and likewise corporeal things are intelligible with intellect, and intelligible things in intellect are intelligible, since intellect is the cause of their being, and since it apprehends only according to the mode of its own substance; and because it is intellect, it apprehends things with an intellectual apprehension, whether the things are intelligible or corporeal.

Plate-verified across the p.170/171 break (leaves n195-n196). This section runs entirely clean against the OCR layer at the sentence level — no apparatus-sigla bleed and no dropped words were found in the plate read itself; the provenance file's warning about apparatus sigla bleeding into §7 evidently describes a defect in the separate mechanical `ldc_sections_ocr.json` splitter (raw/_ocr/README.md), not in this plate-verified text. Apparatus not captured here either, so that specific claim was not re-checked against this file — flagged for anyone reconciling the two. Phase 3 translation notes — the section that answers El. 173, and the one where the νοερός / νοερῶς crux is resolved. (a) The Latin lemma says scit, 'knows': 'Every intellect knows what is above it and what is below it.' Creuzer's Greek lemma at El. 173 prints the adjective νοερός and is rendered there 'Every intellect is intellectual, both the things before it and the things after it'; on the adverb νοερῶς, which Creuzer's own body text uses six times and which Aquinas read as intellectualiter, the Greek would run 'is intellectually the things before it and the things after it'. The Latin's supra / sub ('above' / 'below') also stand where the Greek has πρό / μετά ('before' / 'after'). None of these differences is smoothed away in the English. (b) intelligibilis is rendered by a rule held across all eight sections: 'intellectual' where it qualifies something belonging to intelligentia itself (substantia intelligibilis, uirtus intelligibilis, adprehensio intelligibilis, and operatio intelligibilis at LdC 3), 'intelligible' where it qualifies an object of intellect (formae intelligibiles, res intelligibiles). The rule is this translator's, not the Latin's, and is logged in the Phase 3 report. It lets substantia intelligibilis be seen as El. 173's νοερὰ οὐσία and adprehensio intelligibilis as its νοερῶς ἔχει. (c) 'cognoscit causam suam et causatum suum per modum qui est causa eius' is awkward as printed; translated literally rather than repaired.