Liber de causis, proposition 4
Prima rerum creatarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud.
The longest section in the pilot, and the one where Aquinas's own lectio division cuts across Bardenhewer's: Lectiones IV and V together cover the ground Bardenhewer prints as a single §4, which is also where his lectio numbering starts running one ahead of Bardenhewer's for the rest of the book. Thomas reads two further Elements propositions into his commentary here (El. 89 and El. 86) as his own comparanda, alongside Bardenhewer's own cross-references back to §§1-2 — a section that carries both kinds of second citation the pilot distinguishes.
What it drew on
ProclusElements of Theologyel.138paraphrase
'Vgl. das Lehrbuch § 138' — Bardenhewer's table names this proposition ('being is the very first and the highest') as the source of the section's opening claim.
prop 138 · creuzer page 204-206
Πάντων τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς θείας ἰδιότητος, ἐκθεουμένων, πρώτιστόν ἐστι καὶ ἀκρότατον τὸ ὄν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς ζωῆς ἐπέκεινα τὸ ὄν, ὡς δέδεικται, εἴπερ πλείστων τοῦτο, μετὰ τὸ ἕν, αἴτιον, ἀκρότατον ἂν εἴη τὸ ὄν· τούτων μὲν γὰρ ἑνικώτερον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάντως σεμνότερον. ἄλλο δὲ πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστι πλὴν τοῦ ἑνός. πρὸ γὰρ τοῦ ἑνιαίου πλήθους τί ἄλλο, ἢ τὸ ἕν; πλῆθος δὲ ἑνιαῖον τὸ ὄν, ὡς ἐκ πέρατος ὂν καὶ ἀπείρου· καὶ ὅλως πρὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ὑπερούσιον ὄν. ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα ἐλλάμψεσι μόνον τὸ ἓν ἐπέκεινα φθάνει τοῦ ὄντος· τὸ δὲ ὂν εὐθὺς κατὰ τὸ ἕν. Τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει ὄν, οὔπω δὲ ὄν, ἕν ἐστι κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν· καὶ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἤδη ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν. Καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἐπέκεινα εὐθὺς τὸ μὴ ὄν, ὡς κρεῖττον τοῦ ὄντος, καὶ ἕν.
Of all the things that participate in the divine distinctive property and are thereby made gods, being is the very first and the highest. For if being is beyond both intellect and life, as has been shown, then, since it is the cause of the most things after the One, being would be the highest; for it is more unitary than these, and for that reason in every way more venerable. And there is nothing else before it except the One. For what else is before a unified manifold but the One? And being is a unified manifold, since it is composed of limit and the unlimited; and in general what is beyond essence is before essence. For in the irradiations into secondary things as well, the One alone reaches beyond being, while being comes immediately after the One. For what is potentially being, but not yet being, is one according to its own nature; and what comes after this is already being in actuality. And so among the principles too, immediately beyond being stands not-being, as better than being, and one.
The source of LdC 4, prima rerum creatarum est esse — already seeded in PLAN.md and here confirmed against the plate. ⚠ Bardenhewer's text prints ἐνθεουμένων; the plate reads ἐκθεουμένων. The plate governs (ἐκθεουμένων is also the sense the argument needs). Pairs with El. 89 (ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπείρου), which this proposition restates and which Thomas cites at the same place. Phase 3 translation notes. (a) The English follows the plate's ἐκθεουμένων ('are made gods'), not Bardenhewer's printed ἐνθεουμένων, per the reading already banked for this unit. (b) πλῆθος is 'manifold' throughout, matching the register's own model sentence. (c) καὶ ὅλως πρὸ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ ὑπερούσιον ὄν is genuinely ambiguous: ὄν may be the copula-participle ('what is beyond essence is before essence') or the substantive ('the being that is beyond essence is before essence'). The English takes the first, which is what the surrounding argument about the One and being requires; the second is defensible. (d) The clause ὡς ἐκ πέρατος ὂν καὶ ἀπείρου repeats El. 89's lemma, and the English repeats El. 89's English so the pairing Aquinas makes at LdC 4 is visible.
creuzer_numeral=ρλη΄ · apparatus notes (8)(9)(10) for this proposition fall on the foot of pp.204 and 206 and were not captured by the crops; transcribe before publication
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ProclusElements of Theologyel.70, el.87paraphrase
Bardenhewer cross-refers these two propositions, already cited at §§ 1 and 2 respectively, as bearing on the same argument rather than naming a second source.
prop 70 · creuzer page 108-110
Πᾶν τὸ ὁλικώτερον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχηγικοῖς, καὶ πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν εἰς τὰ μετέχοντα ἐλλάμπει· καὶ δευτέρας ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τι μετασχόν. Καὶ γὰρ ἄρχεται πρὸ τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς εἰς τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ σὺν τῇ ἐκείνου παρουσίᾳ πάρεστι. καὶ ἐκείνου μηκέτι ἐνεργοῦντος ἔτι πάρεστι καὶ ἐνεργεῖ τὸ αἰτιώτερον· καὶ οὐκ ἐν διαφόροις μόνοις ὑποκειμένοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ποτὲ μετεχόντων. Δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῷον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον. Καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔτι ἔστιν ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως· ζῷον δ᾽ ἔστιν ἔμπνεον καὶ αἰσθανόμενον· καὶ τοῦ ζῆν πάλιν ἀπολιπόντος μένει τὸ ὄν· εἰ γάρ, ὅταν μὴ ζῇ, τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ πάντων ὡσαύτως. Αἴτιον δέ, ὅτι δραστικώτερον ὑπάρχον τὸ αἰτιώτερον, πρότερον εἰς τὸ μετέχον ἐνεργεῖ. Τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου προτέρου πάσχει· καὶ τοῦ δευτέρου πάλιν ἐνεργοῦντος κἀκεῖνο συνεργεῖ. Διότι πᾶν, ὅπερ ἂν ποιῇ τὸ δεύτερον, συναπογεννᾷ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ αἰτιώτερον. Καὶ ἀπολιπόντος ἐκείνου τοῦτο ἔτι πάρεστιν. ἡ γὰρ τοῦ δυνατωτέρου μετάδοσις, δρῶσα μειζόνως, ὑστέρα τὸ μετασχὸν ἀπολείπει. Καὶ γὰρ διὰ τῆς τοῦ δευτέρου μεταδόσεως τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἔλλαμψιν ἐδυνάμωσεν.
Everything that is more universal among the originative principles irradiates the things that participate in it before the more particular principles do; and it leaves what has participated later than they do. For it begins its activity toward secondary things before that which comes after it does, and it is present along with that thing's presence; and when that thing is no longer acting, the more causal is still present and still acts. And this not only in different subjects, but in each single one of the things that participate at any time. For a thing must (to take an example) first come to be being, then a living thing, then a human being. And when the rational power has departed it is no longer a human being, though it is a living thing, breathing and perceiving; and when life in turn has departed, being remains: for when it does not live, to be is still present. It is the same in every case. The reason is that the more causal, being more effective, acts upon the participant first. For the same thing is acted upon first by the more powerful; and when the secondary in its turn acts, the more causal works along with it, because whatever the secondary makes, the more causal joins in generating it. And when the secondary has departed, the more causal is still present. For the imparting of the more powerful, since it acts in greater measure, leaves what has participated later. Indeed it was through the imparting of the secondary that it strengthened its own irradiation.
THE key ancestor for LdC 1. The being/living/human sequence here (Δεῖ γὰρ (εἰ τύχοι) γενέσθαι πρῶτον ὄν, εἶτα ζῷον, εἶτα ἄνθρωπον ... ἀπολιπούσης τῆς λογικῆς δυνάμεως) is what LdC 1 develops as 'oportet ut sit res esse in primis, deinde uiuum, postea homo ... quando remoues uirtutem rationalem ab homine, non remanet homo, et remanet uiuum, spirans, sensibile'. Bardenhewer adds 70 to Thomas's 56+57 precisely for this. ⚠ Bardenhewer quotes the lemma as πρὸ τῶν μεριστῶν; the plate reads πρὸ τῶν μερικῶν. The plate governs. Creuzer's note (4) cross-refers Dionysius, De divinis nominibus V.5 — a ready-made bridge to Crux Set C. Phase 3 translation notes. (a) The lemma's last clause as Creuzer prints it — καὶ δευτέρας ἐκείνων ἀπολείπει τι μετασχόν — will not construe; the English follows the sense the proof's own closing sentence supplies (ὑστέρα τὸ μετασχὸν ἀπολείπει), 'and it leaves what has participated later than they do', and the Greek is left exactly as printed. (b) The English holds the LdC 1 chain word for word: ὄν / esse = 'being', ζῷον / uiuum = 'a living thing', ἄνθρωπος / homo = 'a human being', λογικὴ δύναμις / uirtus rationalis = 'the rational power'. ζῷον is therefore 'a living thing' and not 'an animal' here, because LdC 1 uses uiuum for this member of the sequence and keeps animal for a separate step of its own argument. (c) εἰ γάρ, ὅταν μὴ ζῇ, τὸ εἶναι πάρεστι is printed without an apodosis; rendered as the flat statement the argument needs.
Apparatus
- (4) A. ἀρχηγικοῖς et hoc recepi. Edit. ἀρχηγοῖς. Dionys. Areopag. de divinn. nomm. V. 5 p. 691: Πάντων οὖν εἰκότως τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχηγικώτερον, ὡς ὢν ὁ θεός κτλ. qui totus locus cum nostro conferri debet.
- (5) A. δεύτερον ἐκεῖνο »et posterius illud« non male. Sed tamen vulgatam mutare nolui, quoniam philosophus hoc perspicuitati tribuere potuit, ut accusativum feminini generis usurparet. Intelligendum autem est αἰτίας vel ἐλλάμψεις.
- (6) A. ἐκείνη μηκέτι ἐνεργοῖτο.
- (7) A. μόνον. non male.
- (8) Ed. οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀπολειπούσης. Sed et antecedentia et sequentia favent lectioni Argentinae; quam praestiti.
creuzer_numeral=ο΄ · apparatus for the continuation on p.110 (notes 1-5 of that page) not yet transcribed - crop excluded the page foot
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Πᾶν μὲν τὸ αἰώνιον ὄν ἐστιν, οὐ πᾶν δὲ τὸ ὂν αἰώνιον. καὶ γὰρ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ὑπάρχει πως τοῦ ὄντος μέθεξις, καθ᾽ ὅσον οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα τὸ μηδαμῶς ὄν. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι τὸ γινόμενον οὐδαμῶς ὄν, ἔστι πως ὄν. Τὸ δὲ αἰώνιον οὐδαμῇ τοῖς γεννητοῖς ὑπάρχει, καὶ μάλισθ᾽ ὅσα μηδὲ τῆς κατὰ χρόνον τὸν ὅλον ἀϊδιότητος μετείληφεν. ἀλλὰ μὴν πᾶν τὸ αἰώνιον ἀεί ἐστι. Μετέχει γὰρ αἰῶνος, ὃς τὸ ἀεί τι εἶναι δίδωσιν, ὑφ᾽ ὧν ἂν μετέχηται. Τὸ ἄρα ὂν ὑπὸ πλειόνων μετέχεται, ἢ ὁ αἰών. ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸ ὄν. οἷς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ αἰῶνος μέτεστι, καὶ τοῦ ὄντος· οἷς δὲ τοῦ ὄντος, οὐ πᾶσι καὶ αἰῶνος.
Everything eternal is being, but not every being is eternal. For even things that come to be have in some way a participation in being, in so far as they are not what is in no way being; and if what comes to be is not in no way being, then it is in some way being. But the eternal belongs in no way to things that come to be, and least of all to those that have not even shared in everlastingness through the whole of time. And indeed everything eternal always is. For it participates in eternity, which gives always to be to whatever participates in it. Being, then, is participated in by more things than eternity is. Being, therefore, is beyond eternity. For the things that have a share in eternity have a share in being as well; but not all the things that have a share in being have a share in eternity too.
Source of LdC 2's proof that the first cause stands above eternity. Bardenhewer: 'Der Beweis für die Stellung der ersten Ursache vor und über der Ewigkeit ... findet sich in dem Lehrbuche § 87.' The operative clause is ἐπέκεινα ἄρα τοῦ αἰῶνος τὸ ὄν. Creuzer's note (4) on the facing proposition gathers the whole doxography for this argument (Plato Phileb.; Arist. Metaph. X.10; Plotinus; Porphyry Sent. 33 and 36; Proclus Theol. Plat. II.1) and is worth quoting in the crux headnote. Phase 3 translation note — glossary departure, deliberate. The glossary fixes ἀΐδιος as 'eternal', but this proposition turns on Proclus's distinction between αἰών / αἰώνιος (timeless eternity) and ἀϊδιότης (perpetuity through the whole of time). 'Eternal' and 'eternity' are therefore reserved here for the αἰών family, and ἀϊδιότης is rendered 'everlastingness' — the glossary's own reading for Latin sempiternus. Collapsing the two would destroy the argument that being is beyond eternity, which is the sentence LdC 2 is built on.
Apparatus
- (5) A. πη.
- (6) A. καὶ ὄν ἐστιν.
- (7) Ita A. Edit. τοῖς. Sed illud jam conjecisse videtur Portus. Ad argumentum cf. Porphyrii Sententt. cap. 27 p. 229.
- (8) A. μάλιστα ὅσα.
- (9) Abest τι a cod A. commode. Schw.
- (10) Ita A. Ab edit. abest τό.
- (11) Ita cod A. Edit: οἷς μὲν γὰρ αἰῶνος.
creuzer_numeral=πζ΄
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Anonymous (Kalam fi mahd al-khair)Kalam fi mahd al-khair (Arabic Liber de causis)§ 4, Bardenhewer 1882, Arabic texttranslationnode only
The Arabic through which the Greek reached the Latin. Node only per ruling 6: no Arabic text is carried in the pilot.
No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.
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- Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882 — Arabic text with Latin and German translation
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- Attribution
- Stated: Aristotle (in the wider doxographic tradition that also produced the Theology of Aristotle). Critical: Anonymous compiler, excerpting and paraphrasing Proclus's Elements of Theology. Bardenhewer's edition itself untangles the Kalam from any Aristotelian ascription, but the work circulated in the same Arabic doxographic environment as the (pseudo-)Aristotelian Theology and was read there as part of the Aristotelian corpus before Bardenhewer traced its propositions to Proclus. This is one of the five named disputed-attribution cases in PHASES.md Phase 1 step 4.
The text
prop bardenhewer 4 · pattin prop 4 · bardenhewer page 166-168
Prima rerum creatarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum aliud. quod est quia esse est supra sensum et supra animam et supra intelligentiam: et non est post causam primam latius neque prius causatum ipso. propter illud ergo factum est superius creatis rebus omnibus et uehementius unitum. et non est factum ita nisi propter suam propinquitatem esse puro et uni uero in quo non est multitudo aliquorum modorum. et esse creatum quamuis sit unum, tamen multiplicatur: scilicet quia ipsum recipit multiplicitatem. et ipsum quidem non est factum multa nisi quia ipsum, quamuis sit simplex et non sit in creatis simplicius ipso, tamen est compositum ex finito et infinito. quod est quia omne quod ex eo sequitur causam primam est achili id est intelligentia completa et ultima in potentia et reliquis bonitatibus, et formae intelligibiles in ipso sunt latiores et uehementius uniuersales. et quod ex eo est inferius est intelligentia, uerumtamen est sub illa intelligentia in complemento et uirtute et bonitatibus, et non sunt formae intelligibiles in illa ita dilatatae sicut est earum latitudo in illa intelligentia. et esse quidem creatum primum est intelligentia totum, uerumtamen intelligentia in ipso est diuersa per modum quem diximus. et quia diuersificatur intelligentia, fit illic forma intelligibilis diuersa: et sicut ex forma una propterea quod diuersificatur in mundo inferiori, proueniunt indiuidua infinita in multitudine, similiter ex esse causato primo propterea quod diuersificatur, adparent formae intelligibiles infinitae: uerumtamen quamuis diuersificentur, non seiunguntur ab inuicem, sicut est seiunctio indiuiduorum. quod est quoniam ipsae uniuntur absque corruptione et separantur absque seiunctione, quoniam sunt unum habens multitudinem et multitudo in unitate. et intelligentiae primae influunt supra intelligentias secundas bonitates quas recipiunt a causa prima et intendunt bonitatem in eis usquequo consequuntur ultimum earum. et intelligentiae superiores primae quae sequuntur causam primam, inprimunt formas secundas stantes quae non destruuntur, ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas uice alia. intelligentiae autem secundae inprimunt formas declines, separabiles, sicut est anima. ipsa namque est ex inpressione intelligentiae secundae quae sequitur esse creatum inferius. et non multiplicantur animae nisi per modum quo multiplicantur intelligentiae. quod est quia esse iterum animae habet finem, sed quod ex eo est inferius est infinitum. igitur animae quae sequuntur alachili id est intelligentiam sunt completae, perfectae, paucae declinationis et separationis, et animae quae sequuntur esse inferius sunt in complemento et declinatione sub animabus superioribus. et animae superiores etiam influunt bonitates quas recipiunt ab intelligentia super animas inferiores, et omnis anima recipiens ab intelligentia uirtutem plus, est super inpressionem fortior, et quod inpressum est ab ea est fixum, stans et est motus eius motus aequalis, continuus. et illa in qua ex ea est uirtus intelligentiae minus, est in inpressione sub animabus primis, et est quod ab ea inpressum est debile, euanescens, destructibile: uerumtamen quamuis sit ita, tamen permanet per generationem. iam ergo ostensum est quare factae sunt formae intelligibiles multae, et non est esse nisi unum simplex, et quare factae sunt multae animae quarum quaedam sunt fortiores quibusdam, et esse earum est unum, simplex in quo non est diuersitas.
The first of created things is being, and there is no other created thing before it. This is because being is above sense and above soul and above intellect; and after the first cause there is nothing more ample, nor anything caused before it. For that reason, therefore, it was made higher than all created things and more strongly unified. And it was made so only because of its nearness to pure being and to the true one, in which there is no multitude of any modes. And created being, although it is one, is nevertheless multiplied — that is, because it receives multiplicity. And it was not made many except because, although it is simple, and among created things there is nothing simpler than it, it is nevertheless composed of the finite and the infinite. This is because everything of it that follows immediately upon the first cause is achili, that is, intellect complete and ultimate in power and in the remaining goodnesses; and the intelligible forms in it are more ample and more strongly universal. And what of it is lower is intellect as well, yet it is below that intellect in completeness and in power and in goodnesses, and the intelligible forms in it are not extended so widely as their extent is in that intellect. And the first created being is wholly intellect, yet intellect in it is diverse in the way we have said. And because intellect is diversified, the intelligible form there becomes diverse. And just as from one form, because it is diversified in the lower world, individuals infinite in multitude come forth, so from the first caused being, because it is diversified, infinite intelligible forms appear. Yet although they are diversified, they are not sundered from one another as individuals are sundered. This is because they are united without corruption and are separated without sundering, since they are a one having multitude, and a multitude in unity. And the first intellects pour into the second intellects the goodnesses which they receive from the first cause, and they extend goodness in them until they reach the last of them. And the higher first intellects, which follow the first cause, impress second forms, standing forms which are not destroyed in such a way that it would be necessary to repeat them a second time. But the second intellects impress forms that decline and are separable, such as soul is; for soul comes from the impression of the second intellect which follows the lower created being. And souls are not multiplied except in the way in which intellects are multiplied. This is because the being of soul again has an end, but what is lower than it is infinite. Therefore the souls which follow alachili, that is, intellect, are complete, perfect, of little declination and separation; and the souls which follow the lower being are below the higher souls in completeness and in declination. And the higher souls also pour into the lower souls the goodnesses which they receive from intellect; and every soul that receives more power from intellect is the stronger in its impressing, and what is impressed by it is fixed and standing, and its motion is a motion even and continuous. And that soul in which there is less of the power of intellect is below the first souls in impressing, and what is impressed by it is weak, vanishing, destructible; yet although it is so, it endures through generation. Now, therefore, it has been shown why intelligible forms came to be many, though being is nothing but one and simple; and why many souls came to be, of which some are stronger than others, though their being is one and simple, and in it there is no diversity.
Plate-verified, longest section, spanning three pages (166-168, leaves n191-n193). The word 'achili' (transliterated Arabic term Bardenhewer discusses at length pp.247ff, glossed 'id est intelligentia completa et ultima') and 'alachili' both confirmed on the plate — the OCR gets these right, contrary to what might be expected of a transliterated technical term. ⚠ The eins/eius error recurs once more here: 'motus eins motus aequalis' for 'motus eius motus aequalis'. Corrected from the plate. Apparatus not captured (this section alone would carry a large apparatus block across three page-feet). Phase 3 translation notes. (a) 'Prima rerum creatarum est esse' is rendered 'The first of created things is being', matching El. 138's 'being is the very first and the highest' — esse is 'being', as at LdC 1. (b) 'compositum ex finito et infinito' is 'composed of the finite and the infinite'; El. 89's Greek behind it is ἐκ πέρατός ἐστι καὶ ἀπείρου, rendered there 'composed of limit and the unlimited'. The two English phrasings differ because the Latin words themselves differ, and the divergence is the medieval translator's; the crux page should show it rather than hide it. Likewise 'esse animae habet finem' is 'has an end', where the Greek behind the thought is πέρας, 'limit'. (c) formae intelligibiles is 'intelligible forms' here, whereas operatio intelligibilis at LdC 3 is 'the intellectual operation'. The Latin word is the same and the English is not: at LdC 3 it names the operation belonging to intelligentia, here it names forms as objects of intellect. Logged as a deliberate split in the Phase 3 report. (d) achili and alachili are left as the text transliterates them, with the Latin's own gloss following. (e) ⚠ 'ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas uice alia' is translated exactly as Bardenhewer prints it, but the argument requires the negative — these standing forms are not destroyed, so they need no repeating. Either the Latin has lost a non or the construction is looser than it looks. Flagged rather than emended. ⭐ RESOLVED 2026-09-09 — the flagged "missing non" is NOT a defect and needs no ruling. Phase 3 flagged `ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas uice alia` as saying the opposite of what the argument requires (forms that are NOT destroyed, and therefore need no renewing). Checked against the plate on both counts: 1. **Our transcription is correct.** Bardenhewer prints exactly this, with no `non`. Confirmed on leaf n192 (p.167, line 26). The OCR layer agrees. Nothing was dropped. 2. **Bardenhewer's own apparatus answers it**, same page, line 26: `ut non (ubi β) sit necessario b β`. Manuscripts **b and β read `ut non sit necessario`** — the explicit negative — against a/α's `ut sit necessarium`, which Bardenhewer printed. The negative IS attested; he chose the harder reading. 3. **The printed text is defensible as it stands**, and the English now reflects it: `non` scopes the whole `ita ut` result clause — 'not destroyed IN SUCH A WAY THAT it would be necessary to repeat them'. b/β make explicit what a/α compress. Both readings mean the same thing, so no emendation is warranted and no `[sic:]` may be fired. The variant is recorded here and belongs in the crux apparatus. ⚑ Note also line 24 of the same apparatus: **b and β begin a NEW CHAPTER at `intelligentiae`** — a section-division variant that bears on the LdC numbering concordance.
Apparatus
- (1) [p.166] 19 rerum creaturarum a b ‖ et ante ipsum non est b β
- (2) [p.166] 20 aliquid für aliud a ‖ esse fehlt b
- (3) [p.166] 22 creatum b β ‖ ab ipso α ‖ id für illud a
- (4) [p.166] 23 causatis a α ‖ das erste et fehlt b β
- (5) [p.166] 24 propinquitatem suam b β ‖ esse uni puro b β: esse primo ponitur [für puro] α ‖ in quo uero a
- (6) [p.166] 25 causatum a α
- (7) [p.167] 1 unum sit b β ‖ id est für scilicet quia b β
- (8) [p.167] 1—2 multiplicationem a
- (9) [p.167] 2 factum fehlt b β
- (10) [p.167] 3 ipsum esse α ‖ causatis a α
- (11) [p.167] 3—4 simplicius eo (fehlt b), ipsum tamen b β ‖ simplicius tamen ipso est a
- (12) [p.167] 4—5 causa quae für omne quod b β
- (13) [p.167] 5 quod fehlt α ‖ achili id est fehlt b α β
- (14) [p.167] 5—6 intelligentia quae completa est in b β
- (15) [p.167] 8 est ex eo b β
- (16) [p.167] 8—9 sub illa est α
- (17) [p.167] 9 illo b β
- (18) [p.167] 10 itaque (utique b) dualitate b β
- (19) [p.167] 11 causatum a α
- (20) [p.167] 12 uerumtamen fehlt b β ‖ est in ipso b β
- (21) [p.167] 13 secundum für per b β
- (22) [p.167] 13—14 fit in eo a: fit uel illic in eo α
- (23) [p.167] 18 seiungentur b β
- (24) [p.167] 19 quantum für quoniam b β ‖ minuuntur b β ‖ sine für absque b β
- (25) [p.167] 21 primo a
- (26) [p.167] 22 super b β
- (27) [p.167] 23 incedunt α ‖ bonitates b β ‖ usquequoque α
- (28) [p.167] 24 b und β lassen et aus und beginnen mit dem Worte intelligentiae ein neues Kapitel ‖ superiores . . sequuntur fehlt b ‖ primae fehlt β
- (29) [p.167] 26 ut non (ubi β) sit necessario b β ‖ alia uice b β
- (30) [p.167] 27 declines a α β ‖ et separabiles α
- (31) [p.168] 2 secuntur b: sequuntur β ‖ causatum a α
- (32) [p.168] 3 intelligentiae secundae quae seruant esse quo multiplicantur intelligentiae. quod est a α (Dittographie)
- (33) [p.168] 4 ante für iterum a: iterum fehlt b β ‖ unum habet b β
- (34) [p.168] 4—5 infinitum (finitum a), scilicet (id est α) potens esse et non esse a α (Glosse)
- (35) [p.168] 5 animae igitur b β
- (36) [p.168] 6 perfectae sunt et completae b β
- (37) [p.168] 7 esse fehlt a
- (38) [p.168] 7—8 sunt incompletae declinationis sub b β
- (39) [p.168] 8 et für etiam a: etiam fehlt b β
- (40) [p.168] 9 bonitates suas b β
- (41) [p.168] 9—10 sub animabus inferioribus für super animas inferiores β
- (42) [p.168] 11 quia quod für et quod a α ‖ anima für ea α
- (43) [p.168] 12 fixum et stans α ‖ das zweite motus fehlt b β ‖ et continuus b α β
- (44) [p.168] 13 est uirtus ex ea b β ‖ in fehlt a b α β
- (45) [p.168] 15 permanet inpressio per α
- (46) [p.168] 16—17 intellectibiles a
- (47) [p.168] 17 esse fehlt b β: esse earum α ‖ et fehlt α
- (48) [p.168] 18 animae multae β ‖ et quare (quar b) für quarum b β ‖ aliis uel quibusdam b β
The printed text reads 'ita ut sit necessarium iterare eas uice alia', which the argument seems to contradict; the apparatus records that manuscripts b and β read the explicit negative, 'ut non sit necessario ... alia uice' (p.167, line 26). The English follows the printed text; the variant is in the apparatus.
- Edition
- Bardenhewer, Freiburg, 1882
- Scan
- archive.org
- OCR status
- none
- Translator
- Wroot Press draft
What drew on it
Thomas AquinasSuper Librum de causislectiones IV–V (Parma vol. 21)commentarynode only
Aquinas's Lectio IV covers only the first half of this section ('Prima rerum creatarum est esse ... ipsum recipit multiplicitatem'), and Lectio V picks up the second half (the anima material) — the exact sentence Bardenhewer prints as one continuous paragraph. Node only per ruling 9: neither lectio is plate-verified.
No text is shown here. This witness stands as a node: what it is, where it is, and what it does to the text — nothing quoted that has not been read against the page it is quoted from.
- Edition
- Parma, Parma, 1852-1873 — Opera omnia (Parma/Vives)
- Digital base
- Saffrey 1954 base text (Corpus Thomisticum); Parma/Vives 19th-c. text is the actual PD ingestion source (Corpus Thomisticum, finding aid only, not embedded [ruling 5])
- OCR status
- none
What is not here
- El. 86, which Thomas also quotes here ('Omne entis ens infinitum est'), is not among the pilot's thirteen seeded Proclus units and so is named in this note rather than carried as a margin entry.
- No Albert block has been located for this section's own material specifically. Caput II of Liber II, Tractatus I (extracted, see ldc.1's Albert margin) sketches the fourfold framework spanning §§1-4 in general terms, but it restates none of this section's own argument closely enough to be assigned here rather than to §§1-3, so it is left unassigned per section rather than attached to all four.
This page is draft — the English on it has not yet been through review.