Ennead III.8 [30], On Nature and Contemplation and the One, chapter 4

prop 56 · creuzer page 88

PropositionΠᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως, ἀφ᾽ ὧν καὶ τὰ δεύτερα παρήγετο.

PropositionEverything that is produced by secondary things is also produced, in greater measure, by the prior and more causal things from which the secondary things too were produced.

Εἰ γὰρ τὸ δεύτερον ὅλην ἔχει τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπὸ τοῦ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ τοῦ παράγειν ἐκεῖθεν (καὶ γὰρ αἱ δυνάμεις παρακτικαὶ κατ᾽ οὐσίαν εἰσὶν ἐν τοῖς παράγουσι, καὶ συμπληροῦσιν αὐτῶν τὴν οὐσίαν)· εἰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ παράγειν δύναμιν ἀπὸ τῆς ὑπερκειμένης αἰτίας ἔλαχε, παρ᾽ ἐκείνης ἔχει τὸ εἶναι αἴτιον, ὧν ἐστιν αἴτιον, μετρηθὲν ἐκεῖθεν κατὰ τὴν ὑποστατικὴν δύναμιν. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ προϊόντα αἰτιατά ἐστι διὰ τὸ πρὸ αὐτοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ θάτερον ἀποτελέσαι αἴτιον, καὶ θάτερον αἰτιατὸν ἀποτελεῖ· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ αἰτιατὸν ἐκεῖθεν ἀποτελεῖται τοιοῦτον· ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὅτι καὶ μειζόνως ἐκεῖθεν, δῆλον. Εἰ γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ παράγειν αὐτὸ τῷ δευτέρῳ δέδωκεν, εἶχεν ἄρα πρώτως ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ δεύτερον ἐγέννα, τὴν τοῦ δευτέρου γεννᾶν δύναμιν ἐκεῖθεν λαβόν. Εἰ δὲ τὸ μὲν κατὰ μέθεξιν ἐγένετο παρακτικόν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ μετάδοσιν καὶ πρώτως, μειζόνως αἴτιον ἐκεῖνο, τὸ καὶ ἄλλῳ τῆς γεννητικῆς τῷ ἐφεξῆς δυνάμεως μεταδεδωκός.

For if the secondary has its whole essence from what is prior to it, its power of producing also comes from there (for productive powers are in producers in accordance with their essence, and fill out their essence); and if it obtained the power of producing from the cause set above it, then it has from that cause its being a cause of the things it causes, measured from there by its power of giving hypostasis. And if this is so, the things that proceed from it are caused things because of what is prior to it. For to make the one a cause is also to make the other a caused thing; and if this is so, the caused thing too is made what it is from there. That it is so from there in greater measure is plain. For if it gave the secondary the cause of producing, then it had this cause primarily, and for that reason it generated the secondary as well, the secondary having received from there its power of generating. And if the one became productive by participation, while the other is productive by imparting and primarily, then that one is the cause in greater measure — the one that imparted the generative power to another, to what comes next after it.

Creuzer's note (1) records that codex A numbers this proposition νζ΄ (57) — a one-off numbering divergence in the manuscript, not in Creuzer's text. Note (8) confirms Portus had already conjectured ἄλλῳ, which is why Creuzer's facing Latin is a reworking of Portus rather than an independent version. οὐσία is rendered 'essence' throughout the Greek units, to keep 'being' for τὸ ὄν and 'substance' for Latin substantia as the glossary requires. ὑποστατικὴ δύναμις is rendered 'power of giving hypostasis', holding the glossary's 'hypostasis' for the ὑπόστασις family rather than the smoother 'constitutive power'. In the last movement of the proof, ἐκεῖθεν λαβόν may attach either to the first cause or to the secondary; the English takes it of the secondary, which is how the argument runs.

Numbered νς΄ in Creuzer's edition.

prop 57 · creuzer page 90

PropositionΠᾶν αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ πλειόνων ἐστὶν ὑποστατικόν.

PropositionEvery cause both acts before the thing it causes and, after that thing, gives hypostasis to more things.

ᾗ γάρ ἐστιν αἴτιον, τελειότερόν ἐστι καὶ δυνατώτερον τοῦ μετ᾽ αὐτό· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο, πλειόνων αἴτιον. Δυνάμεως γὰρ μείζονος πλείω παράγειν· ἴσης δὲ τὰ ἴσα, καὶ τῆς ἐλάσσονος ἐλάσσω. Καὶ ἡ μὲν τὰ μείζονα ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις δυναμένη δύναμις καὶ τὰ ἐλάσσονα δύναται· ἡ δὲ τὰ ἐλάσσονα δυναμένη οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μείζω δυνήσεται. Εἰ οὖν δυνατώτερον τὸ αἴτιον, πλειόνων ἐστὶ παρακτικόν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα δύναται τὸ αἰτιατόν, μειζόνως ἐκεῖνο δύναται. Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως. Συνυφίστησιν ἄρα αὐτῷ πάντα, ὅσα πέφυκε παράγειν· εἰ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ πρότερον παράγει, δῆλον δήπουθεν, ὅτι πρὸ αὐτοῦ ἐνεργεῖ κατὰ τὴν παρακτικὴν αὐτοῦ ἐνέργειαν. ἅπαν ἄρα αἴτιον καὶ πρὸ τοῦ αἰτιατοῦ ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, καὶ μετ᾽ αὐτὸ ἄλλα ὑφίστησιν. ἐκ δὴ τούτων φανερόν, ὅτι ὅσων μὲν αἰτία ψυχή, καὶ νοῦς αἴτιος. Οὐχ ὅσων δὲ νοῦς, καὶ ψυχὴ αἰτία· ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸ ψυχῆς ἐνεργεῖ. Καὶ ἃ δίδωσι ψυχὴ τοῖς δευτέροις, δίδωσι καὶ νοῦς μειζόνως. Καὶ μηκέτι ψυχῆς ἐνεργούσης νοῦς ἐλλάμπει τὰς ἑαυτοῦ δόσεις, οἷς μὴ δέδωκε ψυχὴ ἑαυτήν. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἄψυχον, καθόσον εἴδους μετέσχε, νοῦ μετέχει καὶ τῆς τοῦ νοῦ ποιήσεως.

For in so far as it is a cause, it is more complete and more powerful than what comes after it; and if so, it is the cause of more things. For it belongs to a greater power to produce more, to an equal power to produce equal things, and to a lesser power to produce less. And the power that is capable of the greater things among things of like kind is capable of the lesser as well, while the power capable of the lesser will not necessarily be capable of the greater. If, then, the cause is more powerful, it is productive of more things. And indeed, whatever the thing it causes is capable of, the cause is capable of in greater measure. For everything that is produced by secondary things is produced in greater measure by the prior and more causal things. It therefore gives hypostasis, along with itself, to all that it is of a nature to produce; and if it also produces that thing first, it is surely plain that it acts before it, in accordance with its own productive activity. Every cause, therefore, acts before the thing it causes, and together with it, and after it gives hypostasis to other things. From this it is evident that of whatever soul is the cause, intellect is a cause as well. But soul is not the cause of everything intellect causes; intellect acts before soul as well. And what soul gives to secondary things, intellect gives too, in greater measure. And when soul is no longer acting, intellect still irradiates its own gifts upon the things to which soul has not given itself. For even a soulless thing, in so far as it has participated in form, participates in intellect and in intellect's making.

This proposition restates El. 56 verbatim inside its own proof (Πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν δευτέρων παραγόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν προτέρων καὶ αἰτιωτέρων παράγεται μειζόνως) — which is why Aquinas cites 56 and 57 together as the source of LdC 1. Creuzer's note (1) again records codex A one number ahead (νη΄ = 58); the same +1 divergence stands at El. 56, so it is a running feature of codex A here, not an isolated slip. The sentence Creuzer prints inside this proof is El. 56's own lemma, and the English repeats El. 56's English word for word so that the self-citation is visible on the page. ἐλλάμπειν is rendered 'irradiate' here and at El. 70.

Numbered νζ΄ in Creuzer's edition.