Ennead VI.7 [38], How the Multitude of Forms Came to Be, and on the Good, chapter 13

porphyrian VI.7 · chronological 38 · chapter 13 · volkmann page vol. 2, 441-443

ἔστι γὰρ οὔτε νοῦς ἁπλοῦν, οὔτε ἡ ἐξ αὐτοῦ ψυχή, ἀλλὰ ποικίλα πάντα ὅσῳ ἁπλᾶ, τοῦτο δὲ ὅσῳ μὴ σύνθετα καὶ ὅσῳ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ὅσῳ ἐνέργειαι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἡ ἐνέργεια ὡς ἂν λήγουσα ἁπλῆ, τοῦ δὲ πρώτου πᾶσαι: νοῦς τε κινούμενος κινεῖται μὲν ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὅμοια ἀεί, οὐ μέντοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕν τι ἐν μέρει, ἀλλὰ πάντα: ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ἐν μέρει αὖ οὐχ ἕν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο ἄπειρον διαιρούμενον. ἀπὸ τίνος δὲ φαῖμεν ἂν καὶ πάντως ἐπὶ τί, ὡς ἔσχατον. τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ πᾶν ἆρα ὥσπερ γραμμή, ἢ ὥσπερ ἕτερον σῶμα ὁμοιομερές τι καὶ ἀποίκιλον; ἀλλὰ τί τὸ σεμνόν; εἰ γὰρ μηδεμίαν ἔχει ἐξαλλαγὴν μηδέ τις ἐξεγείρει αὐτὸ εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἑτερότης, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐνέργεια εἴη: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις μὴ ἐνεργείας διαφέροι. κἂν κίνησις δὲ ᾖ τοιαύτη, οὐ πανταχῶς, μοναχῶς δ’ ἂν εἴη ζωή: δεῖ δὲ πάντα ζῆν καὶ πανταχόθεν καὶ οὐδὲν μὴ ζῆν. ἐπὶ πάντα οὖν κινεῖσθαι δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ κεκινῆσθαι. ἁπλοῦν δὲ εἰ κινοῖτο, ἐκεῖνο μόνον ἔχει, καὶ ἢ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐ προύβη εἰς οὐδέν, ἢ εἰ προύβη, ἄλλο μένον: ὥστε δύο: καὶ εἰ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ, μένει ἓν καὶ οὐ προελήλυθεν, εἰ δ’ ἕτερον, προῆλθε μετὰ ἑτερότητος καὶ ἐποίησεν ἐκ ταὐτοῦ τινος καὶ ἑτέρου τρίτον ἕν. γενόμενον δὴ ἐκ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου τὸ γενόμενον φύσιν ἔχει ταὐτὸν καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι: ἕτερον δὲ οὐ τί, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἕτερον: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ταὐτὸν αὐτοῦ πᾶν. πᾶν δὲ ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ πᾶν ἕτερον οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἀπολείπει τῶν ἑτέρων. φύσιν ἄρα ἔχει ἐπὶ πᾶν ἑτεροιοῦσθαι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρὸ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἕτερα πάντα, ἤδη πάσχοι ἂν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν: εἰ δὲ μή ἐστιν, οὗτος τὰ πάντα ἐγέννα, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ πάντα ἦν. οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὰ ὄντα εἶναι μὴ νοῦ ἐνεργήσαντος, ἐνεργήσαντος δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλο μετ’ ἄλλο καὶ οἷον πλανηθέντος πᾶσαν πλάνην καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ πλανηθέντος, οἷα νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ ὁ ἀληθινὸς πέφυκε πλανᾶσθαι: πέφυκε δ’ ἐν οὐσίαις πλανᾶσθαι συνθεουσῶν τῶν οὐσιῶν ταῖς αὐτοῦ πλάναις. πανταχοῦ δ’ αὐτός ἐστι: μένουσαν οὖν ἔχει τὴν πλάνην. ἡ δὲ πλάνη αὐτῷ ἐν τῷ τῆς ἀληθείας πεδίῳ, οὗ οὐκ ἐκβαίνει. ἔχει δὲ καταλαβὼν πᾶν καὶ αὐτῷ ποιήσας εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι οἷον τόπον, καὶ ὁ τόπος ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ οὗ τόπος. ποικίλον δέ ἐστι τὸ πεδίον τοῦτο, ἵνα καὶ διεξίοι: εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν καὶ ἀεὶ ποικίλον, καθ’ ὅσον μὴ ποικίλον, ἕστηκεν. εἰ δ’ ἕστηκεν, οὐ νοεῖ: ὥστε καί, εἰ ἔστη, οὐ νενόηκεν: εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδ’ ἔστιν. ἔστιν οὖν νόησις: ἡ δὲ κίνησις πᾶσα πληροῦσα οὐσίαν πᾶσαν, καὶ ἡ πᾶσα οὐσία νόησις πᾶσα ζωὴν περιλαβοῦσα πᾶσαν, καὶ μετ’ ἄλλο ἀεὶ ἄλλο, καὶ ὅτι αὐτοῦ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλο, καὶ διαιροῦντι ἀεὶ τὸ ἄλλο ἀναφαίνεται. πᾶσα δὲ διὰ ζωῆς ἡ πορεία καὶ διὰ ζῴων πᾶσα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῷ διὰ γῆς ἰόντι πάντα, ἃ διέξεισι, γῆ, κἂν διαφορὰς ἔχῃ ἡ γῆ. καὶ ἐκεῖ ἡ μὲν ζωὴ δι’ ἧς ἡ αὐτή, ὅτι δὲ ἀεὶ ἄλλη, οὐχ ἡ αὐτή. ἀεὶ δ’ ἔχων τὴν αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν οὐκ αὐτῶν διέξοδον, ὅτι μὴ ἀμείβει, ἀλλὰ σύνεστι τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ ταὐτά: ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὸ ὡσαύτως καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτά, ἀργεῖ πάντη καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια οὐδαμοῦ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα αὐτός, ὥστε πᾶς αὐτός. καὶ εἴπερ αὐτός, πᾶς, εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ αὐτός. εἰ δὲ πᾶς αὐτός, καὶ πᾶς, ὅτι τὰ πάντα, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ὅ τι μὴ συντελεῖ εἰς τὰ πάντα, οὐδὲν ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, ὅ τι μὴ ἄλλο, ἵνα ἄλλο ὂν καὶ τοῦτο συντελῇ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄλλο, ἀλλὰ ταὐτόν, ἐλαττώσει αὐτοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν ἰδίαν οὐ παρεχόμενον εἰς συντέλειαν αὐτοῦ φύσιν.

For neither is intellect simple, nor the soul that comes from it; all things are varied in the measure that they are simple — that is, in the measure that they are not composite, and are principles, and are activities. For the activity of the last, as it gives out, is simple, but that of the first is all activities. And intellect, when it moves, moves in the same way and in the same respects and alike always, yet not as the same and one thing in part, but as all things; for what is in part is again not one either, but this too is divided without limit. From what shall we say it sets out, and to what, as last, by all means? And is all that lies between like a line, or like another body, homogeneous and unvaried? But what would be august in that? For if it has no change, and no otherness wakes it to life, it would not even be activity; for such a condition would differ in nothing from non-activity. And even if its motion were of this kind, it would be life not in every way but in one way only; but all things must live, and from every side, and nothing not live. It must be moved, then, toward all things — or rather, have been moved. If a simple thing were moved, it has that alone; and either it is itself and has gone forward into nothing, or, if it went forward, it is another, while it remains: so there are two. And if this is the same as that, it remains one and has not gone forth; but if other, it went forth with otherness, and made from something same and something other a third, which is one. What has come to be from same and other has the nature of being same and other; and other not in some respect, but wholly other, for its sameness too is whole. Being wholly same and wholly other, there is nothing of the others it falls short of. It has, then, a nature to be othered toward everything. If all the others are before it, it would already be affected by them; but if they are not, this begot all things, or rather was all things. It is not possible, then, for the things that are to be, unless intellect had acted — acting always one thing after another, and as it were wandering every wandering and wandering in itself, the wandering the true intellect is by nature fitted to wander in itself; and it is fitted by nature to wander among substances, the substances running along with its wanderings. But it is itself everywhere; so its wandering is one that remains. And its wandering is in the plain of truth, from which it does not step out. It holds the whole plain, having taken it and made it for itself a place, as it were, for its moving; and the place is the same as that whose place it is. And this plain is varied, so that it may also be traversed; if it were not in every respect and always varied, then in so far as it was not varied it would stand still. And if it stands still, it does not think; so that, if it had stood still, it has not thought; and if so, it is not. It is, then, thinking; and its motion is whole, filling the whole of substance, and the whole of substance is the whole of thinking, embracing the whole of life, always another after another; and what is the same of it is also other, and to one who divides, the other always comes to light. And all its journey is through life and through living beings, as for one going through earth everything he passes through is earth, even if the earth has differences. There the life through which it goes is the same, but because it is always other, not the same. It always has the same passage through things not the same, because it does not exchange them, but the same-in-the-same-respects is present with the others; for if the same-in-the-same-respects is not about other things, it is idle altogether, and the actual and activity are nowhere. It is itself the others too, so that it is itself whole; and if it is itself, it is whole, and if not, it is not itself. And if it is itself whole, it is also whole because it is all things, and there is nothing that does not contribute to all things; there is nothing of it that is not other, so that this too, being other, may contribute. For if it were not other but the same, it would diminish its substance, not providing its own nature toward its completion.

The 'plain of truth' is Plato, Phaedrus 248b; same and other are the Sophist's kinds (254d-255e). ἐνέργεια is 'activity' and τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ 'the actual' (glossary). ποικίλος is 'varied', and ἑτεροιοῦσθαι 'to be othered'. The chapter answers the handoff's question of whether intellect's forms are static: they are an activity that wanders through everything and remains.

Greek collated line by line against the Volkmann plate (vol. 2, pp. 441-443); every departure of the First1KGreek transcription from the printed page is corrected and recorded in the apparatus.