Ennead III.8 [30], On Nature and Contemplation and the One, chapter 1

porphyrian III.8 · chronological 30 · chapter 1 · volkmann page 331-332

Παίζοντες δὴ τὴν πρώτην πρὶν ἐπιχειρεῖν σπουδάζειν εἰ λέγοιμεν πάντα θεωρίας ἐφίεσθαι καὶ εἰς τέλος τοῦτο βλέπειν, οὐ μόνον ἔλλογα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλογα ζῷα καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φύσιν καὶ τὴν ταῦτα γεννῶσαν γῆν, καὶ πάντα τυγχάνειν καθ’ ὅσον οἷόν τε αὐτοῖς, ἄλλα δὲ ἄλλως καὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ τυγχάνειν καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀληθῶς, τὰ δὲ μίμησιν καὶ εἰκόνα τούτου λαμβάνοντα: ἆρ’ ἄν τις ἀνάσχοιτο τὸ παράδοξον τοῦ λόγου; ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦ γινομένου κίνδυνος οὐδεὶς ἐν τῷ παίζειν τὰ αὐτῶν γενήσεται. ἆρ’ οὖν καὶ ἡμεῖς παίζοντες ἐν τῷ παρόντι θεωροῦμεν; ἢ καὶ ἡμεῖς καὶ πάντες ὅσοι παίζουσι τοῦτο ποιοῦσι καὶ τούτου γε παίζουσιν ἐφιέμενοι καὶ κινδυνεύει, εἴτε τις παῖς εἴτε ἀνὴρ παίζει ἢ σπουδάζει, θεωρίας ἕνεκεν ὁ μὲν σπουδάζειν, ὁ δὲ παίζειν, καὶ πρᾶξις πᾶσα εἰς θεωρίαν τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχειν, ἡ μὲν ἀναγκαία καὶ ἐπιπλέον τὴν θεωρίαν ἕλκουσα πρὸς τὸ ἔξω, ἡ δὲ ἑκούσιος λεγομένη ἐπ’ ἔλαττον μέν, ὅμως δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ ἐφέσει θεωρίας γινομένη. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον: νῦν δὲ λέγωμεν περί τε γῆς αὐτῆς καὶ δένδρων καὶ ὅλως φυτῶν τίς αὐτῶν ἡ θεωρία, καὶ πῶς τὰ παρ’ αὐτῆς ποιούμενα καὶ γεννώμενα ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς θεωρίας ἀνάξομεν ἐνέργειαν, καὶ πῶς ἡ φύσις, ἣν ἀφάνταστόν φασι καὶ ἄλογον εἶναι, θεωρίαν τε ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχει καὶ [πῶς] ἃ ποιεῖ διὰ θεωρίαν ποιεῖ, ἣν οὐκ ἔχει.

Suppose that, playing at first before we set about being serious, we were to say that all things aim at contemplation and look to this as their end — not only rational animals but irrational ones too, and the nature in plants, and the earth that begets them — and that all attain it as far as they can, different things in different ways, both contemplating and attaining, some truly, others taking an imitation and an image of it: would anyone put up with the paradox of the argument? Or, since the argument arises among ourselves, there will be no danger in our playing with what is our own. Are we, then, contemplating now, as we play? Or do we and all who play do this, and play at least aiming at this? And it may be that, whether a child or a man plays or is serious, the one is serious and the other plays for the sake of contemplation; and that every action has its seriousness directed to contemplation — necessary action drawing contemplation for the most part toward what is outside, action called voluntary less so, but even this comes about through a desire for contemplation. But this later. Now let us say, about the earth itself and trees and plants generally, what their contemplation is, and how we shall lead back the things made and begotten by it to the activity of contemplation; and how nature, which they say is without imagination and irrational, both has contemplation in itself and makes what it makes through a contemplation which it does not have.

ὁ λόγος in the first paragraph is 'the argument', the ordinary sense (glossary). θεωρία and θεωρεῖν are 'contemplation' and 'contemplate' throughout the treatise (glossary); πρᾶξις is 'action', kept apart from ποίησις 'making'. Volkmann brackets the second πῶς as a deletion; the English follows the text without it, so that the last clause stays under the first 'how'. 'Without imagination' renders ἀφάνταστον (lacking φαντασία).

Greek collated line by line against the Volkmann plate (vol. 1, pp. 331–332); every departure of the First1KGreek transcription from the printed page is corrected and recorded in the apparatus.