Ennead I.6 [1], On Beauty, chapter 2

porphyrian I.6 · chronological 1 · chapter 2 · volkmann page 86-87

πάλιν οὖν ἀναλαβόντες λέγωμεν, τί δῆτά ἐστι τὸ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι καλὸν πρῶτον. ἔστι μὲν γάρ τι καὶ ἐπιβολῇ τῇ πρώτῃ αἰσθητὸν γινόμενον καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ὥσπερ συνεῖσα λέγει καὶ ἐπιγνοῦσα ἀποδέχεται καὶ οἷον συναρμόττεται. πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρὸν προσβαλοῦσα ἀνίλλεται καὶ ἀρνεῖται καὶ ἀνανεύει ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ οὐ συμφωνοῦσα καὶ ἀλλοτριουμένη. φαμὲν δή, ὡς τὴν φύσιν οὖσα ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ πρὸς τῆς κρείττονος ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν οὐσίας, ὅ τι ἂν ἴδῃ συγγενὲς ἢ ἴχνος τοῦ συγγενοῦς, χαίρει τε καὶ διεπτόηται καὶ ἀναφέρει πρὸς ἑαυτὴν καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκεται ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἑαυτῆς. τίς οὖν ὁμοιότης τοῖς τῇδε πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖ καλά; καὶ γάρ, εἰ ὁμοιότης, ὅμοια μὲν ἔσται: πῶς δὲ καλὰ κἀκεῖνα καὶ ταῦτα; μετοχῇ εἴδους φαμὲν ταῦτα. πᾶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἄμορφον πεφυκὸς μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος δέχεσθαι ἄμοιρον ὂν λόγου καὶ εἴδους αἰσχρὸν καὶ ἔξω θείου λόγου: καὶ τὸ πάντη αἰσχρὸν τοῦτο. αἰσχρὸν δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ κρατηθὲν ὑπὸ μορφῆς καὶ λόγου οὐκ ἀνασχομένης τῆς ὕλης τὸ πάντη κατὰ τὸ εἶδος μορφοῦσθαι. προσιὸν οὖν τὸ εἶδος τὸ μὲν ἐκ πολλῶν ἐσόμενον μερῶν ἓν συνθέσει συνέταξέ τε καὶ εἰς μίαν συντέλειαν ἤγαγε καὶ ἓν τῇ ὁμολογίᾳ πεποίηκεν, ἐπείπερ ἓν ἦν αὐτὸ ἕν τε ἔδει τὸ μορφούμενον εἶναι ὡς δυνατὸν αὐτῷ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντι. ἵδρυται οὖν ἐπ’ αὐτοῦ τὸ κάλλος εἰς ἓν συναχθέντος καὶ τοῖς μέρεσι διδὸν ἑαυτὸ καὶ τοῖς ὅλοις. ὅταν δὲ ἕν τι καὶ ὁμοιομερὲς καταλάβῃ, εἰς ὅλον δίδωσιν ἑαυτό: οἷον [εἰ] ὁτὲ μὲν πάσῃ οἰκίᾳ μετὰ τῶν μερῶν, ὁτὲ δὲ ἑνὶ λίθῳ διδοίη τις φύσις τὸ κάλλος, τῇ δὲ ἡ τέχνη. οὕτω μὲν δὴ καλὸν τὸ σῶμα γίγνεται λόγου ἀπὸ θεῶν ἐλθόντος κοινωνίᾳ.

Let us take it up again, then, and say what the primary beauty in bodies really is. There is something that becomes perceptible at the first glance, and the soul speaks of it as though it understood, and recognises it and welcomes it and, as it were, fits itself to it. But when it meets the ugly it shrinks back, and refuses it, and turns away from it, out of concord with it and estranged. We say, then, that the soul, being by nature what it is and belonging to the higher substance among the things that are, whenever it sees something akin to it, or a trace of what is akin, rejoices and is thrilled, and refers it to itself, and is reminded of itself and of what is its own. What likeness, then, have the things here to the beautiful things there? For if there is likeness, let them be alike; but how are both those and these beautiful? By participation in form, we say, these are. For everything shapeless that is naturally fitted to receive shape and form, so long as it is without a share in rational form and form, is ugly and outside divine rational form; and this is the utterly ugly. But that is ugly too which has not been mastered by shape and rational form, because the matter has not allowed itself to be shaped completely according to the form. So the form, approaching, has ordered into one by composition what was to come to be out of many parts, and brought it to a single completion, and made it one by agreement; for since the form was itself one, what was being shaped also had to be one, as far as it could be, being made of many. Beauty, then, is seated upon the thing once it has been brought together into one, giving itself both to the parts and to the wholes. But when it takes hold of something that is one and alike in its parts, it gives itself to the whole: as if beauty were given at one time to a whole house together with its parts, and at another to a single stone — to the stone by a nature, to the house by art. So, then, a body comes to be beautiful by communion with a rational form that has come from gods.

λόγος is 'rational form' throughout this chapter (glossary). Volkmann prints θεῶν, 'from gods', at the chapter's close; the plate was checked for it.

Greek collated line by line against the Volkmann plate (vol. 1, pp. 86–87); every departure of the First1KGreek transcription from the printed page is corrected and recorded in the apparatus.