Ennead I.6 [1], On Beauty, chapter 1

porphyrian I.6 · chronological 1 · chapter 1 · volkmann page 84-86

Τὸ καλόν ἐστι μὲν ἐν ὄψει πλεῖστον, ἐστι δ’ ἐν ἀκοαῖς κατά τε λόγων συνθέσεις καὶ ἐν μουσικῇ ἁπάσῃ: καὶ γὰρ μέλη καὶ ῥυθμοί εἰσι καλοί: ἔστι δὲ καὶ προιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ ἄνω ἀπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καλὰ καὶ πράξεις καὶ ἕξεις καὶ ἐπιστῆμαί τε καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀρετῶν κάλλος. εἰ δέ τι καὶ πρὸ τούτων, αὐτὸ δείξει. τί οὖν δὴ τὸ πεποιηκὸς καὶ τὰ σώματα καλὰ φαντάζεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν ἐπινεύειν ταῖς φωναῖς, ὡς καλαῖς; καὶ ὅσα ἐφεξῆς ψυχῆς ἔχεται, πῶς ποτε πάντα καλά; καὶ ἆρά γε ἑνὶ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ καλὰ τὰ πάντα, ἢ ἄλλο μὲν ἐν σώματι (τὸ) κάλλος, ἄλλο δὲ ἐν ἄλλῳ; καὶ τίνα ποτὲ ταῦτα ἢ τοῦτο; τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐ παρ’ αὐτῶν τῶν ὑποκειμένων καλά, οἷον τὰ σώματα, ἀλλὰ μεθέξει, τὰ δὲ καλὰ αὐτά, ὥσπερ ἀρετῆς ἡ φύσις. σώματα μὲν γὰρ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁτὲ μὲν καλά, ὁτὲ δὲ οὐ καλὰ φαίνεται, ὡς ἄλλου ὄντος τοῦ σώματα εἶναι, ἄλλου δὲ τοῦ καλά. τί οὖν ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ παρὸν τοῖς σώμασι; πρῶτον γὰρ περὶ τούτου σκεπτέον. τί οὖν ἐστιν, ὃ κινεῖ τὰς ὄψεις τῶν θεωμένων καὶ ἐπιστρέφει πρὸς αὐτὸ καὶ ἕλκει καὶ εὐφραίνεσθαι τῇ θέᾳ ποιεῖ; τοῦτο γὰρ εὑρόντες τάχ̓ ἂν ἐπιβάθρᾳ αὐτῷ χρώμενοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα θεασαίμεθα. λέγεται μὲν δὴ παρὰ πάντων, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς συμμετρία τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον τό τε τῆς εὐχροίας προστεθὲν τὸ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν κάλλος ποιεῖ καὶ ἔστιν αὐτοῖς καὶ ὅλως τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι τὸ καλοῖς εἶναι τὸ συμμέτροις καὶ μεμετρημένοις ὑπάρχειν: οἷς ἁπλοῦν οὐδέν, μόνον δὲ τὸ σύνθετον ἐξ ἀνάγκης καλὸν ὑπάρξει: τό τε ὅλον ἔσται καλὸν αὐτοῖς, τὰ δὲ μέρη ἕκαστα οὐχ ἕξει παρ’ ἑαυτῶν τὸ καλὰ εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ὅλον συντελοῦντα, ἵνα καλὸν ᾖ: καίτοι δεῖ, εἴπερ [τὸ] ὅλον, καὶ τὰ μέρη καλὰ εἶναι: οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐξ αἰσχρῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντα κατειληφέναι τὸ κάλλος. τά τε χρώματα αὐτοῖς τὰ καλά, οἷον καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἁπλᾶ ὄντα καὶ οὐκ ἐκ συμμετρίας ἔχοντα τὸ κάλλος ἔξω ἔσται τοῦ καλὰ εἶναι. χρυσός τε δὴ πῶς καλόν; καὶ νυκτὸς ἡ ἀστραπὴ ἢ [τὰ] ἄστρα ὁρᾶσθαι τῷ καλόν; ἐπί τε τῶν φωνῶν ὡσαύτως τὸ ἁπλοῦν οἰχήσεται, καίτοι ἑκάστου φθόγγου πολλαχῇ τῷ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ καλῷ καλοῦ καὶ αὐτοῦ ὄντος. ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς συμμετρίας μενούσης ὁτὲ μὲν καλὸν τὸ αὐτὸ πρόσωπον, ὁτὲ δὲ μὴ φαίνηται, πῶς οὐκ ἄλλο δεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ συμμέτρῳ λέγειν τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καλὸν εἶναι δι’ ἄλλο; εἰ δὲ δὴ μεταβαίνοντες καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς καλοὺς τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ ἐπ’ αὐτῶν αἰτιῷντο, τίς ἂν λέγοιτο ἐν ἐπιτηδεύμασι συμμετρία καλοῖς ἢ νόμοις ἢ μαθήμασιν ἢ ἐπιστήμαις; θεωρήματα μὲν γὰρ σύμμετρα πρὸς ἄλληλα πῶς ἂν εἴη; εἰ δ’ ὅτι σύμφωνά ἐστι, καὶ κακῶν ἔσται ὁμολογία τε καὶ συμφωνία. τῷ γὰρ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἠλιθιότητα εἶναι τὸ τὴν δικαιοσύνην γενναίαν εἶναι εὐήθειαν σύμφωνον καὶ συνῳδὸν καὶ ὁμολογεῖ πρὸς ἄλληλα. κάλλος μὲν οὖν ψυχῆς ἀρετὴ πᾶσα καὶ κάλλος ἀληθινώτερον ἢ τὰ πρόσθεν: ἀλλὰ πῶς σύμμετρα; οὔτε γὰρ ὡς μεγέθη οὔτε ὡς ἀριθμοὶ σύμμετρα καίτοι πλειόνων μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντων. ἐν ποίῳ γὰρ λόγῳ ἡ σύνθεσις ἢ ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν μερῶν ἢ τῶν θεωρημάτων; τὸ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ κάλλος μονουμένου τί ἂν εἴη;

Beauty is for the most part in what is seen, but it is in what is heard as well, both in the composition of words and in all music; for melodies and rhythms too are beautiful. And for those who go up from sense-perception toward what is above, there are beautiful pursuits also, and actions and dispositions and branches of knowledge, and the beauty of the virtues. Whether there is anything beautiful before these, the inquiry itself will show. What is it, then, that has made bodies appear beautiful and has made hearing assent to sounds as beautiful? And how is it that everything which belongs to soul, in the order that follows, is beautiful? Are all things beautiful by one and the same thing, or is beauty in a body one thing and something else in something else? And what are these, or what is this one thing? For some things are beautiful not from the underlying things themselves — bodies, for instance — but by participation, while others are beauties themselves, as the nature of virtue is. For the same bodies appear at one time beautiful and at another not beautiful, since to be bodies is one thing and to be beautiful another. What, then, is this that is present to bodies? For this must be considered first. What is it that moves the sight of those who behold, and turns them toward itself, and draws them, and makes them take delight in the seeing? For if we find this, we might perhaps use it as a step and so behold the rest. It is said by nearly everyone that it is the commensurability of the parts toward one another and toward the whole, with good colour added, that makes beauty to the sight; and that for these things, and for all other things generally, to be beautiful is to be commensurate and measured. On this view nothing simple will be beautiful, but of necessity only what is composite; and the whole will be beautiful for them, while the several parts will not have being beautiful from themselves, but will contribute toward the whole so that it may be beautiful. And yet, if the whole is beautiful, the parts must be beautiful too: for surely it is not out of ugly things, but beauty must have taken hold of them all. And for them the beautiful colours, such as the light of the sun, being simple and not having their beauty from commensurability, will fall outside being beautiful. And how is gold beautiful? And the lightning in the night, or the stars, beautiful to see? In the case of sounds likewise the simple will be gone, although each single note, in a beauty that is beautiful as a whole, is itself beautiful in many ways. And when, the same commensurability remaining, the same face appears at one time beautiful and at another not, must we not say that being beautiful is something other than the commensurate, and that the commensurate is beautiful through something else? And if, passing on to beautiful pursuits and beautiful words, they should allege the commensurate in these as well — what commensurability could be spoken of in beautiful pursuits, or laws, or studies, or branches of knowledge? How could theorems be commensurate with one another? And if it is because they agree, then there will be agreement and concord among bad things too: for the saying that self-control is silliness agrees and chimes and is in accord with the saying that justice is a noble simplicity. Beauty of soul, then, is every virtue, and a truer beauty than the things before it; but in what way is it commensurate? For it is not commensurate as magnitudes are, nor as numbers, although the parts of soul are many. For by what ratio is the composition, or the blending, of the parts, or of the theorems? And what would the beauty of intellect be, when it is alone?

Greek collated line by line against the Volkmann plate (vol. 1, pp. 84–86); every departure of the First1KGreek transcription from the printed page is corrected and recorded in the apparatus.